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INTRODUCTION
The problem of animal awareness lies at the interface of science
and philosophy. As a starting point for the study of phenomena such
as awareness, mind, consciousness, etc., we hardly have any reference
other than our own human experience and in the context of a nondualistic ontology this can be justified. In philosophy and psychology
it appears to be very difficult to give direct operational definitions of
terms such as consciousness, etc. So we might expect this to be even
more difficult in the study of animals. A detailed knowledge of animals
and their behaviour is necessary in order to be able to say something
about their subjective experiences, and to prevent us from excessively
projecting human experience on animals.
Descriptive terms dealing with the nature of animal awareness,
like intelligence, consciousness, etc., are normative as well (Hodos
1982), and therefore the study of animal awareness has wide-ranging
moral implications for our own conduct towards animals (Griffin
1981a; Midgley 1981); some of the reluctance in recognizing the question of animal awareness as legitimate and "scientific" might be explained this way. The question of animal awareness implies the question of the human-animal relationship.

DEFINITIONS
Terms such as awareness, self-awareness, self-consciousness,
etc., indicate that there is a gradual scale of awareness rather than
distinct "states" of awareness. Each species, and each individual
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animal within a species, can display different elements of awareness at
different times. Roughly s~eaking, though, the development from
lower to higher animals will coincide with an increasing degree of
awareness. And, as higher degrees of (self-) awareness are achieved,
the more basic forms remain present and functional; they are recapitulated in the development of young individual mammals.
First of all, there is the level of the "un-conscious" or pre-conscious for bodily, e.g. physiological processes, or the maintenance of
homeostasis in general. This level is present in all living beings. In conscious life, as opposed to unconscious life, the most basic property
seems to be awareness: "a feeling of causal relationship with the external world" (Whitehead, cited by Griffin 1977). This feeling, according
to Whitehead, implies discrimination of the quality of the environment
(harmful or beneficial) and a sense of location. Down to the lowest
forms of life, there are signs of this sort of awareness, be it ever so
vague and unspecified. Directly linked to this is the concept of selfhood: "all animals have attained self-hood, since they exist, have a
will to survive, and have also needs and interests" (Fox 1983a).
Accepting the idea that perception is basically an "emotional"
phenomenon, a "feeling," as Whitehead argues, awareness as defined
above is not necessarily equivalent to mental capacity. Awareness
might be accompanied with the experience of some form of mental images; but by mental capacity is meant the ability to abstract information from external reality in such a way that the dependence of the individual on the environment decreases. "Mind" in this context is more
than just the presence of mental images (Gallup 1982, personal communication); it is the capacity to "use" these images in a flexible, adaptive way (Griffin 1981b).
Hodos (1982), in a recent review of the concept of intelligence,
defines intelligence as a qualitative characterization of an organism's
behavioural responses to pressures from the environment, rather than
as a "specific intellectual faculty." Being intelligent implies the ability
to fulfill purposes, but Hodos' definition stresses the fact that, e.g., a
rabbit's purpose might be very different from human purposes.
Along with a growing ability to abstract information about external reality and manipulate the environment instead of being manipulated, a sense of individuality develops as well. Thorpe (1966) refers to
self-awareness as individual recognition, of self and others, as a
"self." Self-awareness, more than awareness, is the "understanding
that I can be the object of another's attentions" (Clark 1981), the ability to see the "self" as another "other" in the environment. While the
world in a primary state of self-hood is predominantly subjective,
without discrimination between self and other (Fox 1982), the presence
of self-awareness in an animal implies its ability to have a relationship
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with its own body and with its environment, culminating in the experience of an "I" that is not identical with its body nor with its environment. "Self-awareness is the animal's ability to abstract and to form a
conceptual framework of its environment, so that it can perceive itself
and its actions in relation to the environment" (Wood-Gush 1981).
Self-awareness can become more explicit, and result in still a
greater freedom from the environment when self-conscious elements
increase; implying the ability to focus attention (Griffin 1981a) or the
ability to manipulate ideas (Thorpe 1966). Self-consciousness implies
the existence of some sort of introspective ability, the direct experience of the self as self, as a causal agent, not being dominated by sensory brain processes (Thorpe 1966; Sperry 1982). Maybe a clue is that
the word "con-scious" comes from the latin verb scire meaning
"knowing." So "conscious" means "also-knowing": an act performed
by a more or less self-conscious being is accompanied by a knowledge
of the relativity of the act: its reasons, its purpose, etc. This might be
most clearly manifested in the ability to make plans, to act purposefully, or the presence of time-awareness. When consciousness of self increases, then also do the scope of "understanding" and the degree of
freedom increase: self-reflectiveness implies the ability to recognize individuality in others due to the fact that other and self are of the same
kind (Clark 1981). Moreover it becomes possible to manipulate others
(Fox 1982). Capacities like empathy, altruism, intentional deceit, gratitude, etc., are signs of these abilities.
In sum, I propose that any living being has awareness; but an increasing amount of self-awareness entails a splitting of self and other,
an ability to discriminate self from not-self, which may be interpreted
as the ability to "objectify" (Fox 1982).
In the context of this paragraph it is also important to note that
the capacity to suffer could in principle be present well down to the
"lower" levels, since awareness is defined as an emotional perception
of the quality of the environment to suffering of self-aware beings; yet
it indicates that suffering is present not only in self-aware beings.

THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP
The phenomenon of "consciousness," and the existence of an objective "I" has always fascinated man (Lorenz 1963). Is it something
that just human beings have, or is the existence of "personality" a
universal phenomenon, somehow present in the whole of nature? Different theories have been given to explain the nature of the relationship between "mind" and "body"; within philosophy, it has always
been a major topic for study, since it comes so close to the mystery of
existence of life itself.
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The discussion seems to evolve around two basic perspectives: a
dualistic one, in which mind is a separate entity from matter in principle; or a panpsychistic one, which assumes "some sort of psychic element in the ultimate physical particles" (Thorpe 1977).
The dualistic perspective has become very influential since Descartes. In this view, one may regard the mind-body relationship as a
two-way causal interaction between mental and physical events
(Thorpe 1977). Another form of dualism is the so-called psycho-physical-parellelism theory, in which mental events may be seen as a "sideeffect" of physical events (Lorenz 1963).
Since dualism is in essence reductionistic (Thorpe 1977), the question comes up at what point in evolution "mind" came into being and
what its adaptive value is in the mechanism of natural selection.
Thorpe (1966) stated that "consciousness may have been an evolutionary necessity in that it may have been the only way in which
highly complex living organisms could become fully viable." In this
way, it would be of great interest to see "whether we can find grounds
to think that consciousness is present only above a certain level of
neural organization." Thorpe thus seems to follow the widespread intuitive assumption that consciousness is related to complexity of neural organization; and also that it is generated "out of the blue" at a certain point in evolution, through the process of natural selection. Griffin (1981a) also mentions the adaptive value of consciousness for complex animals, in order to cope with changing situations. He goes on,
however, arguing that "a sufficiently fertile imagination can almost
always find a plausible adaptive advantage for any observed trait,"
and therefore the argument for the adaptive value of consciousness is
not very weighty in the consideration of its existence. Humphrey
(1982) expresses his doubt of complexity as a condition for consciousness by saying that our animal ancestors "were no doubt percipient,
intelligent, complexily motivated creatures, whose internal control
mechanisms were in many respects the equals of our own. But it is to
say that they had no way of looking in upon the mechanism. They had
clever brains, but blank minds." He proposes social complexity as a
reason for the sudden appearance of consciousness.
Arguments against dualistic perspectives are that one can
speculate about possible parameters for the generation of consciousness, but these remain scientifically unverifiable, and ultimately
the existence of life itself becomes an unexplainable event in a dualistic
framework.
"Generally, in the building of a scientifically 'sound' theory, we
want the newly apparent property to be explicable in terms of the
old, ... to be the sum of whatever composes it... So the awareness of a
complex organism ought, we feel, to be a similar resultant, and either
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atoms are already conscious, or else consciousness is only a misleading
label for neural impulse" (Nagel, cited by Clarke 1981). "There must be
something positive limiting chance, and something more than mere
matter in matter, or Darwinism fails to explain life" (Hartshorne, cited
by Birch 1974). Others, however, reject the idea of "panpsychism" as
"cheap" and "a radical simplification" (Popper 1974), or because it is
not possible to confirm this idea scientifically, and that there is no visible evidence that lower life forms are conscious, as are humans and
some higher animals (Thorpe 1977).
There is, however, a third perspective possible. It is a concept in
some ways resembling panpsychism, yet it is also fundamentally different. Whitehead has developed a theory in which events are at the
same time both mental and physical. Thorpe (1977) states that Whitehead is a panpsychist, yet this does not seem the case to me. The idea
that all "life-events" are physical and mental by nature, does not imply that these events are conscious of this, as panpsychism implies. Nor
does the idea that perception and physical energy are emotional in
nature, imply that this emotionality is consciously experienced at the
lower levels.
A theory which defined the nature of life processes as both physical and mental, in a meaningful interaction, provides a basis for a
gradually evolving continuum of mental capacity. The fact that we accept the statement "human beings are conscious" more or less as an
axiom (Lorenz 1980), forces us to accept that we most probably share
this quality at least rudimentarily with most life forms (Fox 1976;
Griffin 1981a; Rollin 1981; Lorenz 1980).
To account for the evolution of a rudimentary form of perception
of causal relationships, to a conscious experience of self is not easy,
and still requires the explanation of "leaps," for example between the
occurence of mental images and the use of a real mind, as defined
above.
The results of the research on split brains and the nature of consciousness by Nobel-prize winner Roger Sperry (1982) point in the direction of an explanatory concept known as "the emergent principle."
It implies that interaction between parts creates a "whole" that has intrinsic qualities of its own which none of the parts possess. In
Whitehead's framework, this element of "the whole being more than
the sum of the parts" is equivalent to the subjective, "mental" part of
events. "The key development is a switch ... to a new causal or interactionist interpretation that ascribes to the inner experience an integral
causal control role in brain function and behaviour ... The whole,
besides being 'different from, and greater than the sum of the parts,' ...
also causally determines the fates of the parts, without interfering
with the physical or chemical laws of subentities at their own level.
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The events of inner experience as emergent properties of brain processes, become themselves explanatory causal constructs in their own
right." (Sperry 1982).
These results are derived from research on human beings, and
therefore mainly apply to them. A much wider range of application of
the main principles is clearly indicated, however; Sperry himself states
that the acceptance of the revised causal view has important implications for scientific views of man and nature. Also he says that his results indicate features about the nature of consciousness and its fundamental relation to "brain processing." Unless we suppose that the
general concept of animal consciousness is completely different from
human consciousness, which is extremely unlikely (Fox 1976; Midgley
1978; Griffin 1981a), it is only reasonable to apply general principles
about "the nature of consciousness" to animals as well, and in a
Whiteheadian framework to all evolutionary events in general.
If this is the case, then however simple the nervous mechanism
might be, there will always be generated ''a whole,'' some sort of inner
experience.
Complexity of nervous structure probably correlates to complexity of inner experience (Fox 1976). The more complex the interaction
between parts, which then in turn can serve as a new part, of a new
emergent quality, a new ''whole.'' But it would be a mistake to set up a
simple hierarchy of values, attributed to different sorts of complexity
(Hodos 1982). Rather, all life forms constitute "an integrated, interdependent unified field of being, not a ladder leading to some
ultimate goal of perfection." (Fox personal communication 1982).
What an emergent "whole" seems to express is "the being-ness"
of a certain animal, e.g., "the dogness" that comes out of the specific
neural organization of a dog. This beingness implies consciousness on
its own level, on its dog-, or fish-, or whale-level. Each "beingness"
has its own, unique qualities to contribute to the overall ecosystem
and possesses unique modes of perception and awareness, suitable for
the needs of the animal (Hodos 1982).
In conclusion, we can say that man is not alone on earth in his
awareness of life around him; all life forms are conscious in their own,
unique way, and the capacity to individualize and become self-aware
gradually emerges from the lowest levels of perception.
Philosophically speaking, the possibility for real sensitivity and
awareness in the animal kingdom is given. Now we must see what the
biological study of awareness leads to in the framework of a nondualistic philosophy.
In the biological study of awareness, the main indicator for "beingness" would be behaviour, since it represents that aspect of an
animal in which all partial aspects, like physiological and hormonal
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processes, are integrated; it also includes the subjective, individual
evaluation of all these partial aspects. Behaviour, being itself an
emergent property, is the nearest indicator of the animal's emergent
individual subjectivity and quality of being. In fact, one could say that
behaviour is the overt, outward manifestation of inner experience,
both being on the same level of emergence.
An animal relates to its environment through its behaviour. It expresses its inner drives, abilities, and experiences in the way it deals
with different environmental influences. We, as "human animals," can
evaluate different kinds of behaviour by observation and experiments,
and try to classify the quality of beingness as "aware," "self-aware,"
"intelligent," etc. The behavioural data available for this will now be
discussed.

THE ANIMAL AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
The great "oneness" between animal and environment, the complete adaptation which makes animals fit right into their specific
''niche,'' has caused some scientists to presume that animals are
automata, blindly ruled by environmental circumstances. The other,
opposite, way of looking at it is that animals are so perfectly aware of
their environment and at one with it, that an almost transcendent unity arises. In this view the essence of animal life lies largely in its relation to the surrounding world, and this notion leads "phenomenological" scientists to say that the subjectivity of an animal lies as it were
in its "Umwelt" and a qualitative study of the way ananimal "meets"
its environment is the basis for understanding the animal's experiential world, as well as its ecological function (Kortlandt 1954).
This qualitative beingness of an animal is called its nature, or
"telos" (Midgley 1978; Rollin 1981), implying the unique expression of
life that a species represents, and the specificity of needs and purposes
of each different species.
D.R. Griffin should receive the credit for having opened the door
again to serious scientific investigation into animal awareness with his
book The Question of Animal Awareness (1981a). With respect to
animal learning, one of the most basic properties of animal life, he suggests that the principle of parsimony might be best served by accepting some sort of awareness related to animal learning. Trying to stick
to the behaviourist standpoint that animals are black boxes leads to
''complex circumlocutions and confusing euphemisms,'' which are ''far
less parsimonious than frankly calling a spade a spade and a thought a
thought.''
The ability to learn is one of the most basic properties of animal
life. In his review on animal intelligence, Hodos (1982) states that habi-
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tuation "appears to be a universal phenomenon in animal organisms,
including protozoans." Also "classical-and operant conditioning have
been demonstrated ... in those metazoans that possess a central nervous system with axial symmetry." This includes platyhelminthes
(e.g., planarians), annelids, arthropods and molluscs. Delayed response
as a more complex behaviour has been reported in arthropods and molluscs, and molluscs are also capable of reversal learning, so Hodos reports.
A well-known anecdote that Buytendijk reports is that an octopus
is able to distinguish between "touching" and "being touched," which
might even indicate the presence of self-awareness: "A good example
of a lower animal with highly developed interactions with its environment is the octopus, which has a highly differentiated set of behaviour,
much more so than some vertebrates ... One could attribute a relatively
clear form of consciousness to an octopus ... The fact that an octopus
has so-called pupil-reactions e.g. in adverse situations, an indication
of emotional life in mammals, could imply a high degree of development" (Buytendijk 1963).
Entomologist V.B. Wiggelsworth in a recent article argued that
insects might experience visceral pain, as well as pain caused by heat
and electric shock (Rollin 1981). From the existing literature it can be
argued that the experience of pain as such is not possible without the
presence of some sort of purely subjective, inner experience, since the
adversity of any stimulus is essentially something which is experienced
subjectively.
Given the fact that awareness seems to exist from the "lowest"
level of animal life onward, it develops and becomes more complex
along with the development of neural complexity, as was stated earlier. But do animals come near to any kind of "higher" awareness at
all, any kind of the faculties we consider "intelligent" and self-aware
in humans? More than anything else, introspection and the use of symbols are regarded as specific human characteristics, which set man
apart from all other living beings (Jeuken 1975).

GENERAL INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR
The ability to make use of symbols is related to a number of other
abilities: to use language, to use concepts, to have time-awareness,
and to respond adequately to novelty, amongst others. It implies a
capacity to abstract from present reality, and in that respect is directly linked to introspection, which is the capacity to regard the self in an
abstract, "symbolic" way. Many authors connect introspection with
social communication (Humphrey 1978; Midgley 1978; Griffin 1981a;
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Thorpe 1966), or with intention-behaviour and imitation (Rollin 1981;
Midgley 1978). These are mostly the topics dealt with by authors who
discuss animal awareness. They support their point of view with evidence coming from either the little amount of systematic research being done in this field, or from anecdotes of "natural," "spontaneous"
behaviour. A few relevant examples of this evidence will be given
shortly.
Griffin (1981a) states that "Black, McMullan, Robinson, and
others have distinguished animal communication systems from human language on the ground that the former are rigid responses to external or internal stimuli, which ... be definitely specified, whereas
human language is spontaneous, creative and unpredictable." The animal's ability to communicate may be less rigid, however, since studies
of animal behaviour have shown that animals are also capable of spontaneous, creative and unpredictable behaviour. For example, Markowitz (1982), in his book on behavioural enrichment in zoos, reports the
highly unique, creative, unpredictable way in which zoo animals would
invent solutions and play games. A young elephant, for instance, instead of touching the right panel to set off an electrically regulated
reward, would always save water in his trunk, no matter how long before the experimental session the trough was emptied, and smear the
water between the response panels, thereby electrically shorting them,
·so that every response would pay off. (The same elephant walked over
to the only arrogant, boasting person in a group of students and stepped deliberately on this person's foot). This story, in which the animal
actually manipulates the research project and the researcher, instead
of the other way around, can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a
falsification of the argument presented by the three researchers in
Griffin's book. It gives evidence of the presence of time-awareness ("I
will use this water later"), intentionality, conceptual thinking and
creativity in handling a completely new situation, and its behaviour
therefore is worthy to be labelled consciously self-aware.
All of this also holds for a story that Rollin (1981) reports of a
police dog who was trained to hold suspects by the arm unharmed until the officer arrived. When they ran into a robbery being performed
by two men, the men broke away and took off in different directions,
assuming the dog could not pursue both. The dog chased one of them,
disabled his leg, left him, ran after the other and held this man
unharmed by his arm, in this way having caught both men, although
he never had been trained to attack the leg. Like Fox (1982), Mugford
(1981) concludes that the ability to manipulate matters in order to
fulfill a need, gives evidence of self-awareness. Many dog owners may
be able to give examples of dogs who manipulate their owners. Dolphins, apes (Midgley 1978), wolves (Fox 1974), etc., are able to save
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wounded fellows and humans, use and invent tools, and deceive prey in
order to catch it. Both Markowitz and Mugford stress the fact that in
these situations the animal is in control, rather than the experimenter,
and that by humbling himself in this way, the observer might "investigate ways in which animals derive unique solutions, rather than
simply measuring their activities in a narrow response largely dictated
by the experimenter." (Markowitz 1982). However, there are also experiments that indicate some sort of awareness in different animals.
Dawkins (1980) describes well-known experiments with pigeons and
rats. Beninger and his co-workers trained rats to indicate what
behaviour they were performing at the moment a buzzer was sounding. They tried to find a simpler hypothesis than that the rats were actually aware of what they were doing, but failed to do so. This experiment strongly suggests even a kind of conscious awareness in rats.
Hernstein and Loveland, and Siegel and Honig, proved by showing
numerous slides to pigeons that they are capable of forming what
could be described as abstract concepts of almost anything, like water,
trees, human beings, etc.; Kohler furthermore found by doing ingenious, well-controlled tests that pigeons can count, or as he put it,
"think unnamed numbers," and in doing this, really grasp the concept
of numbers, rather than being "Clever Hanses." (Clever Hans was a
horse who could do many a mathematical calculation, but later it was
discovered that he reacted to subtle indications of his owner, instead of
calculating.)
It seems that this evidence, experimental and anecdotal, shows
that some animals are fully capable of abstraction and that they can
think symbolically in order to express themselves and control their
world. What about the "highest" form of symbolic communication,
namely language?

LANGUAGE
There is no consensus about the real nature of language, let alone
the difference between man and animals in this respect. Chomsky
(cited by Griffin 1981a), argues that "the unboundness of human
speech, as an expression of limitless thought, is an entirely different
matter (from animal communication), because of the freedom from
stimulus control and the appropriateness to new situations." Griffin
comments that animal communication is not that rigid at all, nor is
human language endless in its scope. Midgley (1978) considers speech
as a further development of "creative, expressive, communicative
power," and nothing all by itself. Fox (1976) relates speech to the controlling and predicting function of the rational mind, which does not
diminish the consciousness and deep emotional experiences that the in-
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tuitive mind can have, without speaking a word. Animals can very well
have such an intuitive kind of mentality. In this line, Rollin (1981)
argues, while discussing the "private language argument" developed
by Wittgenstein, that animals might have to rely far more on direct experience for learning than on words, or that they might express their
universal statements (all strangers are dangerous) by their behaviour
instead of words, but that this does not imply that animals are not rational beings; rational being defined as the ability to do the right thing
at a certain moment, choosing between different possibilities (Rollin
1981; Midgley 1978). In any case, the fact that the possession of a communication system is a widespread property rather than a specific
human trait, might be demonstrated by the ability of the chimpanzees
trained by the Gardners (Griffin 1981a) to express themselves in alanguage-like way with gestures, and acquire the "vocabulary" of a
young human child.
Also, dolphins have been shown to be able to communicate certain
instructions to a mate purely by sound, while they could not see each
other (Fichtelius and Sjolander 1972).
Monkeys are known to have different warning calls for predators
in the air or on the ground (Seyfarth 1982). The explicit use of variation
in sound for communication, with which apparently detailed and precise information can be passed on, comes very close to what we call
''language.''

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Rather than attributing self-awareness only to language-using
species, many authors discuss the likelihood, and the need, for selfawareness in all socially organized species. Social animals, dependent
on each other for survival, must understand the other animals and
their mental state in order to act adequately (Humphrey 1978); or
must be able to recognize other individuals in relation to themselves in
order to maintain a hierarchy, as in the case of domestic pigs, cattle
and chickens (Bryant 1972), or to live in families or clans (Thorpe
1966). Fox (1974) describes altruistic behaviour in wolf clans: wolves
that go hunting bring back food for the cubs and the "babysitters"
that remained behind.
In the growing up of young animals, play and imitation are of
great importance. The great ability of young (and older) animals to
play indicates their need for the capacity to be aware of self and others,
the need to be able to react to new situations and make decisions; play
facilitates the development of these capacities. But apart from the
functional meaning of play, it implies that animals are spontaneous,
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creative and sentient beings, individuals who are fully able to enjoy
themselves.
While it is sometimes suggested that it is a proof of an animal's
"dumbness" that it imitates a researcher, instead of "consciously"
performing acts, authors like Thorpe, Midgley and Fox refer to play
and imitation as crucial for healthy development in the more complex
social animals, and as a clear indication of the animal's ability to
engage in creative, highly communicative action. The "teaching" of
the art of survival by parents to their offspring could even be seen as a
beginning of culture (Fox 1976). Bonner (1980) devotes a whole book to
"culture" in animal species.
Roughly speaking, the presence of "animal awareness" in' its
many forms has been discussed by going into the phenomena of learning behaviour, general intelligent behaviour, communicative behaviour and social behaviour.
Now that the question "can animals think?" has been discussed,
an equal amount could be written on the question "can animals feel?"
However, I will not attempt it, since many of the same principles that
apply to awareness, apply to the existence of emotions, and the two are
intimately, perhaps inseparably, linked together in animal behaviour.

ANIMAL FEELINGS
As a fact of life, feelings must be rudimentarily present in all life
forms, as Whitehead philosophically indicated. Basic emotions like
fear, aggression, frustration, and satisfaction are directly related to internal motivational states (Wiepkema 1982) and are essential for the
survival of the animal (Dawkins 1977; Murphy 1978; van Putten 1981).
For instance, fear in the predator-prey relationship is very essential.
Considerable research on fear in the domestic chicken has been done by
researchers like Hughes and Murphy (Murphy 1978).* The fact that
these "instincts" have a biological function, and in that respect might
be predictable, does not in the least imply the absence of an actual
emotional experience (Clark 1981; Dawkins 1977; van Rooyen 1981).
As the selfhood of animals develops into greater degrees of selfawareness it will be accompanied by a greater capacity for individual,
conscious emotion. This is especially evident in social animals, who
often form life-long bonds with mates or clans (Fox 1976). Well-known examples are swans, geese arid ducks who choose a partner for the rest of
their lives. Lorenz (1980) describes the signs of grief shown by a goose·
*See also Fear in Animals and Man, 1979. W. Sluckin (ed). New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold,- Ed.
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when it looses its mate; for instance its eyes become dull, its muscles
weaken and the goose lets its head hang down, just as people do, so
Lorenz comments. He states that higher mammals and birds have
emotional experiences completely similar to ours, representative of the
basic structure of all experiences for man and animal alike (Lorenz
1980; see also Midgley 1978). Self-awareness of the emotional state is
shown by the chimpanzee Lucy, who possessed learned gesture-language;
during a session, when her foster mother went away, she ran to a window and signed to herself: "cry me, me cry" (Midgley 1978). She was
also able to appreciate jokes, and imitate them for her own amusement.
Emotions can also lead to empathetic (altruistic) action, such as
cases where dogs save little children, and dolphins support a sick or injured companion. Emotions must also underly the "psychic" tracking
of dogs who travel hundreds of miles to find their owners who moved
to a place, unknown(!) before the dog's arrival (Fox 1976). Because of
the similarity in emotional make-up, animals have many of the same
psychological illnesses and abnormalities as humans, e.g. anorexia and
depression, which in higher animals can occur as a result of sudden environmental changes, such as captivity and isolation from peers, mate
or parent (Fox 1971). Carter (1982), for example, presents evidence
which indicates strongly that many causes of death for dolphins in
captivity are psycho-physiological, the shock of captivity being the
cause for a loss of resistance to disease. Sometimes psychoneurotic illness can be the result of captivity or loss of a mate. This is also the
basis for the very extensive research that is being done on animals in
laboratories, using them as models for human disorders. Research to
find new drugs to relieve anxiety is often done on mice and rats (Goodman and Gilman 1975; McKegney 1982). The experiments of Suomi and
Harlow on the development of depression as a result of maternal deprivation are also well known. They developed "a monkey model of human anaclictic depression, since ... the resulting behaviours are seemingly identical for monkey and human infants alike" (Midgley 1981).
Because of this correspondence in structure and behaviour Midgley is
right, I think, when she criticizes such experiments from an ethical
point of view.
Midgley (1978) comments that "to be disposed to make the gestures, you must also be capable of the emotions in order for them to be
convincing and truly reciprocal;" "behaviour is only possible for a
creature with an inward dimension, with its own real perception of the
world." (Clark 1981). However, the mind is a private thing, as so many
scientists comment (Griffin 1981a), for humans and animals alike; and
so the gap remains, however much research and interpretation we are
prepared to do. At least humans can speak and explain their thoughts
and feelings. But animals cannot; or can they?
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Lorenz (1963, 1980) states that the similarity of experience, the
direct comparability of one's own experience with that of others is
beyond proof, in that it is so evident that we cannot not believe it. This
extends at least to higher vertebrates. Karl Buhler, according to
Lorenz, refers to this as "du-evidenz," a necessary axiom of life. It is
not up to science to establish the framework of communication and
recognition of behaviour, or have ''heady metaphysical doubt'' about
the similarity of experience of man and man, and man and animal,
since science itself depends on this mutual understanding (Clark 1981).
He goes on to say that "we do not see merely material motions (of an
animal) but rather the embodiment of character and feeling in a material mode.'' To make use of the so-called analogy-postulate to assume
animal awareness (Sambraus 1981) might not be direct enough. The
fact that we really do see the embodiment of character and feelings in
behaviour (Clark 1981; Midgley 1978; Fox 1983b) makes it not only
justified to describe "material entities in mentalistic terms" (Clark
1981) but we have no right to withhold those terms to describe animal
behaviour (Rollin 1982, personal communication). "Stones cannot be
bored, or cross, or joyful, but dogs and pigs and cattle can" (Clark
1981).
In an overall perspective, we might say that animals are alive, and
present in their beingness, for anyone who wants to see and meet them
on their own ground. What their minds, or inner experiences are like, is
largely expressed in their behaviour in intimate interaction with the
environment, including other individuals. Olfactory and auditory
senses might play as great a role in this interaction as the highly
valued visual senses (Fox 1976). Although it seems to bother many
scientists that many of the abilities ascribed to animals are also attributable to machines, the nature of the machine is given to it by man,
and the parts are equally as independent or durable as the whole; when
an animal dies, however, the whole body dies, which again shows the
causality of the whole, and the fundamental selfhood of a whole organism (Rollin 1981).
We, as human beings, share different traits with different species
(Midgley 1978) and are especially close to the more complex social
animals such as dogs, elephants, dolphins, and apes, in that those seem
to have a highly developed self-awareness and even self-reflectiveness. Besides, we are able to communicate with them, to a great extent, as one individual to another.
Human beings belong to the "Umwelt" of an animal, just as animals belong to ours. It is in the meeting of individual and Umwelt, of
man and animal, that mutual understanding and appreciation grows
(Kortlandt 1954). There is no separation between our position as
observer and as partner in the relationship and in this context it can be
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seen how our understanding of animals has a direct moral impact on
our actions.
The fact that it is justifiable to describe animal behaviour in empathetic terms does not imply at all that "scientific" inquiry in the
form of systematic observation would not be necessary and useful. It
is important in order to discover the nature of different animal species,
and systematically investigate different assumptions about their nature, needs, and interests.
The most instructive and direct way to learn about animals is by
observing their spontaneous behaviour under conditions where they
have total freedom to express themselves to their fullest potential
(Midgley 1978; Markowitz 1982). "Despite the difficulties, field work
with gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, and wolves demonstrates that
the most realistic observations and assessments on wild animals are
those made in the natural environment" (Carter 1982). For other
animals, for example dogs and cats, a·man-made environment can provide an adequate situation in which a personal bond between observer
and animal might well be a very valuable way of testing and understanding an animal (Mugford 1981; Fox 1983b).
Working in the experimental environment of a laboratory the danger is great that the knowledge which is produced "is hardly a wholesome source of learning, since it is based on abnormally conditioned
animals" (Carter 1982). The most important thing is to ask the right
question, so that the animal can show us its abilities. A negative
answer to a test, like Gallup's mirror-tests, might be our fault: we did
not ask the correct question for that particular species (Rees, Wolfle
1982, personal communication).
The capacities of an animal to feel and be aware are not static
states by themselves, but abilities that are constantly expressed and
developed in interaction among animal, man and environment.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FIELD OF
ANIMAL WELFARE
A being who is aware of his environment, and can react emotionally to external situations, is also able to suffer. Every level of "beingness'' has its own purpose and needs, and its own qualitative link with
its environment; the thwarting of those needs matters to an animal,
and most animals will struggle to survive if in danger. The whole notion of the nature, or telos, of an animal implies that it will suffer if a
certain level of "fulfillment" of its behavioural possibilities is not
reached. In relation to animals in present intensive production systems, Humphrey (1981) points out the importance of realizing that domestic animals have become "dull" and unresponsive not because they
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are dumb and stupid but because we have made them that way by depriving them of stimuli which would enable them to develop a proper
sense of selfhood.
The suggestion that domestic animals do not miss what they do
not know is rejected because the concept of animal awareness implies
that animals actually experience suffering in some conscious way. The
absence of human-like self-consciousness might even increase the intensity of animal suffering: most animals cannot foresee whether their
situation will improve or not, nor realize other factors which make
their suffering relative. Because of this lack of knowledge, all that may
exist for them is a feeling of suffering.
An animal, whether a "lower" or a "higher" one, is a qualitative,
sentient being. To affect its environment is to affect the quality of its
existence, and its individual well-being.
Current intensive production systems have affected what used to
be the natural environment of farm animals tremendously. The demand for efficiency and production more and more became the guiding
factor in designing and creating living environments for the animals.
As a result, environmental diversity has been reduced to its absolute
minimum. The reaction of animals, dependent on the environment as
they are for their development and health, to this deprivation, will be
detailed later in Section IV of this book (Animal Management, Wemelsfelder).
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AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD AND
KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS: AN UPDATE*t
Stephen R. Kellert
ABSTRACT
The distribution of a typology of basic attitudes toward animals in
the American population is explored through personal interviews with
3,107 randomly selected persons in the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Data is presented on the prevalence of these attitudes in the overall
American population and among major social demographic and animal
activity groups. In addition, results are presented on Americans'
knowledge of animals as well as their species preferences. Finally, information is presented on perceptions of critical wildlife issues including endangered species, predator control, hunting, trapping, marine mammals and wildlife habitat protection.

INTRODUCTION
During the period 1973-1976, a typology of basic attitudes toward
animals was developed and a limited study conducted to examine the
distribution of these viewpoints throughout the American public (Kellert 1978). In 1977, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior granted funds to explore more carefully the
presence and strength of these perceptions among diverse social demographic and animal activity groups in the 48 contiguous states and
Alaska. In addition, five other focus areas were identified for this
study: 1) public attitudes toward critical wildlife and natural habitat
issues (e.g., endangered species, predator control, hunting, trapping

*Supported by grant #1416000977056 from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior.
tReprinted from International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems 1(2)1980.
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and habitat preservation); 2) the size and social characteristics of
various wildlife and domestic animal activity groups (e.g., hunters,
birdwatchers, pet owners, and humane and wildlife protection organization members); 3) public knowledge of animals and species preferences; 4) historical trends in uses and perception of animals during the
twentieth century; and 5) children's knowledge of, and attitudes and
behavior toward animals.
This report will review some of the results of this investigation.
Space limitations, however, restrict the amount of information that
can be covered and, thus, some data will be omitted and others only
cursorily examined. No data will be provided on the historical orchildren's studies as these investigations are still in progress.
The results presented in this paper are largely based on a national
survey of 3,107 randomly selected Americans in the 48 contiguous
states and Alaska. A special oversampling was drawn in the Rocky
Mountain States and Alaska in order to ensure sufficient numbers in
these important regions. In all analyses referring to the entire
American population, however, this oversampling was accounted for,
resulting in a total national sample size of 2,455. Respondents were
chosen according to a probability random selection method roughly ensuring that every individual in the American population had an equal
chance of being selected. In addition, a minimum of one initial contact
and three call-backs were included before the designated respondent
could be dropped. These methods considerably enhanced the representativeness of the sample. Each respondent was personally interviewed
for approximately sixty minutes. Twenty-two percent of those contacted refused an interview, thirteen percent could not be located after
the fourth interview attempt, and approximately four percent terminated the interview before its completion. In spite of these limitations, a comparison with the national census suggested that the sample was a relatively good cross section of the American population
with a slightly higher socioeconomic profile (age, sex and race differences were nonsignificant). In addition to the national sample, special
mail surveys, using the same questionnaire, were conducted with
members of the National Cattlemen's, American Sheep Producer's and
National Trappers' Associations, as well as with subscribers to the
magazine, Vegetarian Times.
Five pretests were conducted to develop reliable and valid attitude
questions. Attitude scales were developed based on a typology of nine
basic attitudes toward animals. Cluster and other multivariate analyses were employed in the scale construction process. No useful scale
was devised to measure the aesthetic attitude. Additionally, a neutralistic attitude scale could not be usefully distinguished from a negativistic scale and, thus, only one scale was developed including elements
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of both the negativistic and neutralistic attitudes, with perhaps more
of the latter. Sixty-five attitude questions were used in the development of these scales, with the smallest scale (ecologistic) consisting of
four questions and the largest (utilitarian) thirteen. Where appropriate, the strength of the response (e.g., strongly versus slightly
agree/disagree) was included. Scale scores ranged from 0 to 11 for the
ecologistic attitude scale, and from 0 to 27 for the utilitarian attitude
scale. The independence of the resulting eight attitude scales was suggested by relatively small scale intercorrelations-14 under .20; the
smallest, .04; the largest negative correlation, -.42 (the naturalistic
and negativistic attitudes); and the largest positive correlation, .40
(the naturalistic and ecologistic).
In addition, more than 500 indices were reviewed and three pretests conducted to develop a "knowledge of animals" scale. The
resulting 33-item true-false and multiple choice knowledge scale
covered all vertebrate classes, and five questions dealt with invertebrates. All questions were omitted which favored specialized knowledge on the part of any particular animal activity group. The distribution of knowledge scale scores was roughly normal, with a mean of 52.8
on a range of 0 to 100.

ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS
As previously indicated, prior research identified a typology of
basic attitudes toward animals. As this typology is described in detail
elsewhere, only crude, one-sentence definitions are provided below
(Kellert 1976; Kellert 1979b).
Naturalistic- Primary interest in and affection for wildlife and
the outdoors.
Ecologistic-Primary concern for the environment as a system, for interrelationships between wildlife species and natural
habitats.
Humanistic-Primary interest in and strong affection for individual animals, principally pets.
Moralistic-Primary concern for the right and wrong treatment of animals, with strong opposition to exploitation of and
cruelty toward animals.
Scientistic-Primary interest in the physical attributes and
biological functioning of animals.
Aesthetic-Primary interest in the artistic and symbolic characteristics of animals.
Utilitarian-Primary concern for the practical and material
value of animals.
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Dominionistic-Primary satisfactions derived from mastery
and control over animals, typically in sporting situations.
Negativistic-Primary orientation an active avoidance of animals due to dislike or fear.
Neutralistic-Primary orientation a passive avoidance of animals due to indifference and lack of interest.
The scales used in the national survey are crude approximations of
the attitude types and only in the broadest sense measure their true
prevalence and distribution in the American population. Nevertheless,
the relative frequency of the attitudes in the national sample was
assessed by standardizing the various scale scores on a 0 to 1 range,
plotting a regression line through the scale score distribution frequencies for each attitude, and using these frequency curves and regression
figures to estimate the comparative "popularity" of the attitudes. As
particular scores on one attitude scale cannot be equated with similar
scores on other scales, this procedure only roughly indicates the relative frequency of the eight attitudes in the American population. The
results of this analysis are presented in Figure 1.
These results suggest that the most common attitudes toward animals in contemporary American society, by a large margin, are the
humanistic, moralistic, utilitarian, and negativistic attitudes. In many
respects, these attitudes can be subsumed under two broad and conflicting dimensional perceptions of animals. The moralistic and
utilitarian attitudes clash around the theme of human exploitation of
animals. The former opposes many exploitative uses of animals involving death and presumed suffering (e.g., hunting, trapping, whaling and
laboratory experimentation), while the latter endorses such utilization,
or other human activities which might adversely affect animals, if significant human material benefits result. In a somewhat analogous
fashion, the negativistic and humanistic attitudes tend to clash,
although in a more latent fashion, around the theme of affection for
animals. The former is characterized by indifference and incredulity
toward the notion of "loving" animals, while the latter involves intense emotional attachments to animals. The relative popularity of
these four attitudes in contemporary American society may suggest a
dynamic basis for the conflict and misunderstanding often existing today over issues involving people and animals.
The scientistic and dominionistic attitudes, according to the
results of Figure 1, are the least common perceptions of animals
among the American public. The shape of the naturalistic frequency
curve suggests that this attitude is strongly present among a minority
of Americans, but relatively weakly evident among the majority. The
ecologistic scale score distribution indicates a substantial number of
respondents expressing modest support for this viewpoint, but very
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Figure 1
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Figure 2

EDUCATION GROUPS BY SELECTED KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE
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Figure 3

REGIONS BY SELECTED KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE SCALES
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Figure 4

AGE GROUPS BY SELECTED KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE SCALES
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Figure 5

RACE GROUPS BY SELECTED KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE SCALES
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few strongly oriented in this fashion. Impressions on the percentage
distribution of the attitudes in the American public, their most common behavioral expressions, and benefits or values generally associated with each attitude type are summarized in Table 1.
The distribution of the attitudes among various demographic
groups (e.g., age, sex, urban-rural residence and income) and animal
activity groups (e.g., hunters, birders and organization members) was
also examined. These attitude distributions are reviewed in terms of
relative frequencies on a single attitude, and by comparisons of one or
more groups across all the attitude types. The first type of analysis is
presented in Tables I through V, while the second type is included in
Figures 2-5. In order to expedite the discussion, only the naturalistic,
humanistic, moralistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and negativistic attitude results are described, although tabular results are provided for
the other attitude types.

THE NATURALISTIC ATTITUDE
A comparison of na·;uralistic attitude scale means among various
animal activity groups (Table I) reveals that nature "hunters" had the
highest scores, along with environmental protection organization
members (e.g., members of the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society) and
birders. The naturalistic scores of nature hunters were far higher than
those of meat or recreation hunters. Anti-hunters, livestock raisers,
and fishermen had comparatively low scores on this attitude scale,
although all animal activity groups had higher mean scores on the na-
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turalistic scale than did the general population.
Among social demographic groups (Table II) Alaskans had the
highest naturalistic scores. Other social groups with high naturalistic
scale scores included the college-educated, the affluent, professionals,
persons under 35, respondents from moderate-sized population areas,
Pacific Coast residents, and those who rarely or never attended religious services. In contrast, the poorly educated, nonwhites, the elderly, low income respondents, and persons of farm background scored
substantially below the general population average on this dimension.
The possibility that variable differences were a function of interrelationships among certain demographic factors prompted the use of
a statistical procedure, analysis of variance. Basically, this test examined the combined effect of a number of demographic groups on the
attitude scales. When the following factors were subjected to analysis
of variance-age, sex, race, marital status, occupation, education, income, region, population of present residence, and attendance at
religious services-marital status, occupation and population of
residence were not found to be significantly related to the naturalistic
scale.
Multiple classification analysis is a statistical technique based on
analysis of variance which allows one to determine which categories of
a variable contribute most to the overall significance of the variable-e.g., which specific regional or educational groups are most related to the naturalistic scale after all other demographic variables
have been taken into account. According to the results of this analysis,
(Tables III and IV), the most naturalistic groups were graduate school
and college education, Alaskan and Pacific Coast residents, respondents under 35 years of age, and persons who rarely or never attended
religious service. In contrast, the least naturalistic were blacks, respondents with less than a high school education, and persons over 56
years of age.

THE HUMANISTIC ATTITUDE
Among animal activity groups, humane and environmental protection organization members, zoo visitors, anti-hunters, and scientific study hobbyists scored very high on the humanistic scale (Table
I). In contrast, livestock producers, nature hunters, and surprisingly,
birdwatchers had much lower scores. Apparently these latter groups,
in light of their high scores on the naturalistic scale (with the exception
of livestock producers), were far more oriented toward wildlife and outdoor recreation values than toward the benefits derived from love of
animals, particularly pets.
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Persons under 25 years of age, those earning between $20-35,000,
females, respondents who rarely or never attended religious services,
and Pacific Coast residents were the most humanistically-oriented
demographic groups (Tables II-IV). In contrast, farmers, persons over
. 76 years of age, residents of the most rural areas, and males had the
lowest scores on this attitude dimension. Analysis of variance results
suggested that size of town, education, marital status and race were
not significantly related.

THE MORALISTIC ATTITUDE
Those demographic groups expressing the greatest moralistic concern were Pacific Coast residents, the highly educated, those engaged
in clerical occupations, females, persons who rarely or never attended
religious services, and respondents under 35 years of age (Tables
11-IV). Groups least troubled by animal welfare and cruelty issues
were rural residents, farmers, respondents from Alaska and the South,
and males.
Animal activity groups scoring high on the moralistic scale (Table
I) included humane and environmental protection organization members and anti-hunters. Scientific study hobbyists also had high scores
on this dimension. Recreation and meat hunters, sportsmen organization members, trappers, fishermen, and livestock producers scored
very low on this attitude scale.

THE UTILITARIAN ATTITUDE
Farmers, the elderly, blacks and Southern respondents had the
highest scores on the utilitarian scale. In contrast, persons under 35
years of age, those with graduate school education, Alaska respondents, single persons and residents of areas of one million or more
population indicated the least utilitarian interest in animals (Tables
II, III and IV). Among animal activity groups, livestock producers,
meat hunters and fishermen displayed an especially strong utilitarian
orientation in contrast to members of humane, wildlife protection and
environmental protection organizations, and, to a somewhat lesser
degree, scientific study hobbyists, backpackers, and birdwatchers
(Table I).

THE DOMINIONISTIC ATTITUDE
The most dominionistically-oriented animal activity groups were
trappers and all three types of hunters. Humane organization mem-
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hers and anti-hunters had the lowest scores on this attitude scale, suggesting that differences in dominionistic perception of animals
represented a basic and important distinction in the perspectives of
hunters and anti-hunters. Zoo visitors and environmental protection
organization members also had comparatively low scores on this scale
(Table I).
Farmers, males, Alaska and Rocky Mountain residents, blacks
and those with high incomes were the most dominionistically-oriented
demographic groups. Females, Pacific Coast respondents, the highly
educated, clerical workers, and persons rarely or never attending
religious services scored lowest on this scale (Tables II, III and V). Differences among the most affluent and educated on the dominionistic
scale were in marked contrast to similarities between these higher
socioeconomic groups on other attitude scales, and suggested that
high income and advanced education do not necessarily result in the
same perceptions of animals.

THE NEGATIVISTIC ATTITUDE
No animal activity group revealed marked disinterest or dislike of
animals, as measured by the negativistic attitude scale (Table I)
although livestock producers did score only slightly above the general
population mean. Interestingly, anti-hunters had comparatively high
scores on this dimension, suggesting that broad principles concerning
the ethical treatment of animals were more salient considerations in
opposition to hunting than general interest in animals. Environmental
and wildlife protection organization members, scientific study hobbyists, and birdwatchers were the least negativistic. Among demographic groups, the elderly, those of limited education and females had
the highest negativistic scale scores. In contrast, persons with
graduate school education, Alaska residents, respondents under 25
years of age, and those residing in areas under 500 population were the
least negativistic in their perception of animals (Tables II, III and V).
Ecologistic and scientistic attitude scale differences are indicated in
Tables I-V.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
Attitude profiles of selected demographic groups are provided as
an illustration of comparative group variations across all of the attitude dimensions. Educational group differences (Figure 2), for example, indicate that respondents of limited education had considerably
lower scores than the highly educated on all the attitude dimensions
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with the exception of the dominionistic, utilitarian and negativistic
scales. These findings suggest a relative disinterest in and lack of affection for animals among the least educated, with the possible exception of situations involving sporting satisfactions and material gain.
Indeed, the dramatically evident differences among the education
groups pointed to a fundamental divergence in the perceptions of animals and the natural world among various socioeconomic groups in
our society.
Regional differences (Figure 3) were also fairly large and somewhat surprising. One of the most striking results was the stronger
wildlife interest, concern and appreciation of Alaska respondents. In
general, the western states revealed greater wildlife appreciaton and
knowledge while the South was characterized by the least interest and
concern for animals and the most utilitarian orientation.
Age and race profiles are presented in Figures 4 and 5. Differences
between the very oldest and youngest respondents were especially
striking on nearly every attitude dimension, particularly on the naturalistic, humanistic and utilitarian scales. Those over 75 and 25 years
of age were only similar in their relative lack of knowledge of animals.
Race results suggested a comparative lack of interest in, and concern
and affection for animals among nonwhites.

KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS
All animal activity groups scored significantly higher on the
knowledge of animals scale than did the general public (Table 2). However, birdwatchers, nature hunters, scientific study hobbyists and all
types of conservation-related organization members had significantly
higher scores than did livestock producers, anti-hunters, zoo enthusiasts, sport and recreation hunters and fishermen. Among demographic groups (Tables 2 and 3), the most knowledgeable were persons
with higher education (especially graduate training), Alaska and
Rocky Mountain residents, males and respondents who rarely or never
attended religious services. In contrast, the least informed about animals-even after accounting for the interrelationships of all demographic variables-were blacks, respondents with less than a high
school education, persons over 75 and, interestingly, under 25 years of
age, and residents of cities of one million or more population.
The American public, as a whole, was characterized by extremely
· limited knowledge of animals. For example, on four questions dealing
with endangered species (Table 4), no more than one-third of therespondents obtained the correct answer-only 26 percent knew the
manatee is not an insect and just 24 percent correctly answered the
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statement, "timber wolves, bald eagles and coyotes are all endangered
species of animals." Regarding other knowledge questions, just 13 percent knew that raptors are not small rodents and one-half of the sample incorrectly answered the statement, "spiders have ten legs." A better but still distressingly low 54 percent knew that veal does not come
from lamb, and just 57 percent indicated the correct answer to the
question, ''most insects have backbones.'' The knowledge questions
were divided into a number of generic categories, and a comparison of
mean scores revealed that the public was most knowledgeable on questions concerning animals implicated in human injury, pets, basic
characteristics of animals (e.g., "all adult birds have feathers") and
domestic animals in general. On the other hand, they were least knowledgeable about invertebrates, "taxonomic" distinctions (e.g., "Koala
bears are not really bears") and predators. The respective mean scores
for these categories were:

Animals That Inflict Human Injury
Pets
Basic Biological Characteristics
Domestic Animals Other Than Pets
Predators
Taxonomic Distinctions
Invertebrates
Overall Mean for 33 Question Knowledge
Scale with 0 to 100 Scoring Range

Mean Knowledge Score
63.4
55.6
55.3
53.4
47.1
39.8
36.6

52.8

The general public was also questioned on its perceived familiarity
with or awareness of eight relatively prominent wildlife issues (Table
5). The three most widely recognized issues were the killing of baby
seals for their fur (43 percent knowledgeable), the effects of pesticides
such as DDT on birds (42 percent knowledgeable), and the use of steel
leghold traps to trap wild animals (38 percent knowledgeable). The
least familiar issues included the use of steel versus lead shot by waterfowl hunters (14 percent knowledgeable) and the Tennessee Valley
Authority/Tellico Dam/Snail Darter controversy (17 percent knowledgeable). The public appeared to be far more aware of relatively emotional issues involving specific, attractive and typically large and
"higher" animals, compared to issues of a more abstract nature, involving indirect impacts on wildlife due to habitat loss, and dealing
with "lower" animals.
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SPECIES PREFERENCE
The national sample was queried on its feelings about 33 species
ranked on a seven point like/dislike scale (the most and least liked are
indicated in Table 6). The most preferred were two common domestic
animals-the dog and the horse-followed by two familiar and highly
aesthetic bird species and one insect order-the robin, swan and butterfly. The trout-a popular and highly attractive game species-was
the best-liked fish, and the most preferred wild predator was the eagle.
The most favored wild mammalian species was the elephant.
On the other hand, three of the four least-liked animals were
biting, stinging invertebrates-the cockroach, mosquito and wasp.
The third, fifth and sixth least preferred animals-the rat, rattlesnake
and bat- have all been implicated in physical injury or disease inflicted on human beings. Relatively negative views of the coyote and
wolf were interesting to note given the prevailing controversy over
predator control programs in the United States and the considerable
amount of favorable publicity received by the wolf in recent years.
High standard deviation scores for the wolf, coyote, lizard, skunk,
vulture, bat, shark, and cat suggested considerable variation in public
opinion regarding the positive and negative qualities of these animals.
A qualitative assessment of the most and least preferred animals,
as well as a categorical mean grouping of the 33 animals according to
particular qualities (e.g., attractive, unattractive, predator, etc.-see
Table 6), suggested a number of particularly important factors in
public preference for different species. These factors included:
1. Size (usually, the larger the animal, the more preferred)
2. Aesthetics
3. Intelligence (not only capacity for reason but also for feeling
and emotion)
4. Dangerous to Humans
5. Likelihood of Inflicting Property Damage
6. Predatory Tendencies
7. Phylogenetic Relatedness to Humans
8. Cultural and Historical Relationship
9. Relationship to Human Society: pet, domestic farm, game,
pest, native wildlife, exotic wildlife
10. Texture (generally, the more unfamiliar to humans, the less
preferred)
·
11. Mode of Locomotion (generally, the more unfamiliar to humans, the less preferred)
12. Economic Value of the Species
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CRITICAL WILDLIFE ISSUES
Public attitudes toward over thirty critical wildlife and natural
habitat issues were explored. Insufficient space precludes a review of
all these findings, and a detailed description can be found elsewhere
(Kellert 1979a). Only a brief summary of results pertaining to the
following issues will be provided here: endangered species, predator
control, hunting, trapping, harvesting of selected marine mammals
and wildlife habitat protection.
Endangered Species
Protection of endangered species was generally explored in the
context of various socioeconomic impacts including energy development, water use, forest utilization, and industrial development. The
results graphically depicted in Table 7 concern the situation of costly
modification of an energy development project in order to protect
varying kinds of endangered species. While the public overwhelmingly
accepted this sacrifice to protect species of eagle, mountain lion, trout,
crocodile and butterfly, less than a majority were willing to tolerate
this socioeconomic impact for the sake of plant, snake or spider species.
The results of Table 8 deal with a Tellico Dam-type question involving the protection of a threatened, unknown fish species at the
cost of forfeiting various needs derived from these water uses- hydroelectric energy, increased drinking supplies and agricultural irrigation-the public strongly disapproved of curtailing the water projects
to protect the unknown fish species. On the other hand, in situations
entailing relatively "nonessential" benefits-water for cooling industrial machinery and to make a lake for recreational purposes-less
than a majority approved of the projects.
The results in Table 9 cover two additional endangered species
questions. The first concerns the preservation of large amounts of
wilderness habitat to protect the grizzly bear at the expense of forest
products and jobs. The results suggest a moderate, but significant
public willingness to accept this economic sacrifice to protect the
species. The second question concerns the filling of wetlands to build
an industrial plant in an area of high unemployment. The endangered
species is an unspecified bird species and, in line with the grizzly bear
result, the public indicated a significant but moderate support for protection despite the socioeconomic impact.
These results and related literature suggest eight factors critically
related to the public's willingness to protect endangered wildlife
(Ehrenfeld 1970; Guggisberg 1970; Ziswiler 1967). The first is
aesthetics, which was probably relevant in results involving the but-
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terfly, snake and spider. The second is phylogenetic relatedness to
humans. Generally speaking, the closer the biological relation of the
endangered animal to human beings, the greater the likelihood of
public support for the species. The third factor is the reason for endangerment, with typically greater public sympathy in cases involving
direct causes of endangerment (e.g., overexploitation or persecution)
than in situations involving indirect impacts (e.g., habitat loss due to
expanding human populations). The fourth factor is the economic
value of the species being exploited. The fifth concerns the numbers
and types of people affected by efforts to protect the endangered
animal. The cultural and historical significance of the endangered
species is the sixth factor, and may have been involved in public sympathy for the bald eagle and trout. The seventh variable is the public's
knowledge and familiarity with the endangered animal. Public support
for the American crocodile may reflect this factor. Finally, the perceived
humaneness of the activity threatening the species may be important.
For example, the relatively slight opposition to water uses endangering an unknown fish species may have stemmed partially from
assumptions regarding the capacities of fish to suffer or experience
pain.
The willingness to protect endangered wildlife varied considerably
among diverse demographic groups. These variations are summarized
in the results of an endangered species protection scale developed on
the basis of the four previously described endangered species questions. As Table 10 indicates, significantly higher scores (i.e., a greater
willingness to protect endangered species) were found among the
highly educated, younger and single respondents, persons residing in
areas of more than one million population, and residents of Alaska. In
contrast, older respondents, persons with less than an eighth grade
education, farmers, residents of highly rural areas and residents of the
South had significantly lower endangered species protection scores.
One of the most controversial issues facing the wildlife field today
is predator control. Table 11 deals with the issue of controlling coyotes
that prey on domestic livestock. Five control options were considered
and the views of an informed and uninformed general public, as well as
members of the American Sheep Producers and National Cattlemen's
Associations were contrasted.* Options considered included the two
most controversial control strategies: indiscriminate population reductions by shooting or trapping as many coyotes as possible, and poison-

*Results of the fifth option-compensating ranchers for livestock losses out of general
tax revenues-is not presented. Both the general public and livestock producers were
opposed to this alternative.
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ing. The public was moderately opposed to indiscriminate population
reductions (with the informed public significantly more opposed) and
overwhelmingly against the use of poisons (even though this alternative was described as the least expensive). In dramatic contrast,
livestock producers were strongly in favor of both control strategies
(indeed, these differences were, statistically, the largest found in the
study).
As indicated in Table 11, nearly 79 percent of the public supported
the notion of hunting only individual coyotes known to have killed
livestock. Additionally, more than two-thirds approved of capturing
and relocating coyotes in areas away from livestock despite this being
described as a very expensive solution. While livestock producers were
strongly opposed to coyote relocation efforts, they were somewhat
divided on the notion of hunting only individual coyotes responsible
for livestock loss.
In general, the predator control results indicated a strong public
concern for the humaneness and specificity of the control method as indicated by strong opposition to the use of poisons and support for controlling only individual offender coyotes.
An equally controversial issue is the public's attitude toward
hunting. Attitudes toward six different kinds of hunting were explored. Table 12 indicates the public overwhelmingly approved of the
two most pragmatically justified types of hunting-subsistence hunting as practiced by traditional native Americans and hunting exclusively for meat regardless of the identity of the hunter. On the other
hand, approximately 60 percent opposed hunting solely for recreational or sporting purposes, whether for waterfowl or big game.
Moreover, over 80 percent objected to the notion of hunting for a
trophy. Perhaps most interestingly, 64 percent approved of hunting
for recreational purposes if this also included using the meat. The implication is that hunting is viewed as too serious an activity to be
engaged in solely for its sporting or recreational value, but is acceptable if the animal's meat is to be consumed.
Over 70 percent of the public objected to the use of the steel
leghold trap. No difference was found between knowledgeable and uninformed people. On the other hand, nearly all trappers saw nothing
wrong with the use of these traps (Table 13).
Somewhat unexpectedly, 77 percent of the general public approved of
killing whales for a useful product so long as the species was not endangered. A very different perception of the dolphin was indicated
with nearly 70 percent willing to pay a higher price for tuna if this
resulted in fishermen killing fewer porpoises in their nets. The disparity between these two marine mammal findings may have been related
to the colorful and romantic history of whaling in America, as opposed
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to the absence of any tradition in this country of harvesting porpoises.
On a variety of wildlife habitat protection questions, the public indicated a moderate but significant willingness to protect wildlife
habitat even at the expense of various human benefits. The results of
four habitat protection questions are indicated in Table 14. In each
situation, a trade-off was proposed, placing the protection of wildlife
habitat in the context of various socioeconomic costs. In order to maintain waterfowl habitat, the filling of wetlands for housing development
is sacrificed; to protect rangeland from overgrazing, higher beef prices
result. The wilderness, housing development, and livestock grazing
findings were remarkably similar-a moderate but significant majority of the public was willing to protect wildlife habitat even at the expense of the stated human benefits. Seventy-six percent favored the
harvesting of timber in ways which helped wildlife even if this resulted
in increased lumber prices.

CONCLUSION
A variety of results have been presented suggesting considerable
public interest in and affection for animals and a willingness to support wildlife conservation in this country. On the other hand, a great
deal of variation and conflict was found in the attitudes, perceptions
and knowledge of animals among diverse groups in American society.
While a bedrock of affection and concern was found, it appears that
much needs to happen before this appreciative orientation is usefully
broadened to encompass a more biologically knowledgeable and ethically sensitive feeling for animals. Those responsible for animal
welfare and natural environments should recognize this public sympathy and interest in animals and devote increasing efforts to addressing the needs for greater awareness and understanding. The challenges
are great for wildlife professionals, humane educators, natural resource managers, and others responsible for the future well-being of
the nonhuman world. Until these human factors are more properly understood, however, it is doubtful that the continued erosion of land resources and destruction of fauna will be arrested.
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Table 1. Attitude Occurrence in American Society
Attitude

Estimated %
Of American
Population Strongly
Oriented Toward
The Attitudet

Naturalistic

10

Common Behavioral Expressions

i§l

Most Related
Values/Benefits

Outdoor wildlife related recreation - Backcountry
use, nature birding and nature hunting

Outdoor recreation

Conservation support, activism and membership,
ecological study

Ecological

Ecologistic

7

Humanistic

35

Pets, wildlife tourism, casual zoo visitation

Companionship, affection

Moralistic

20

Animal welfare support/membership, kindness
to animals

Ethical, existence

Scientistic

1

Scientific study/hobbies, collecting

Scientific

Aesthetic

15

Nature appreciation, art, wildlife tourism

Aesthetic

Uti I itarian

20

Consumption of furs, raising meat, bounties,
meat hunting

Consumptive, utilitarian

Dominionistic

3

Animal spectator sports, trophy hunting

Sporting

Negativistic

2

Cruelty, overt fear behavior

Little or negative

fiJ

Neutralistic

35

Avoidance of animal behavior

Little or negative

"'
...r;:

~

....
tTotals more than 100% as persons can be strongly oriented toward more than one attitude.
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Table 2. Animal Knowledge Scale by Selected Groups: 1978 National Sample Maximum
Score= 100

Animal Activity Groups
Group
Birdwatchers
Wildlf. Protect. Org. Memb.
Nature Hunters
Scientific Study
Env. Protect. Org. Member
Humane Org. Memb.
Sportsmen Org. Memb.
Gen. Conserv. Org.Memb.
Backpackers
Meat Hunters
Fishermen
Sport/Rec. Hunters
Zoo Visitors
Livestock Raisers
Anti-Hunters
General Population

Selected Demographic Groups

Score
68.3
65.6
65.3
65.0
64.4
62.8
62.7
62.5
57.5
57.4
56.4
56.3
54.8
53.9
53.9
52.9

1978 Mail Sample
Natl. Trappers
Cattlement
Sheep Producers

66.0
63.5
61.8

Group
Ph.D.
Non-Ph.D. Graduate
Alaska
Law or Medical Degree
College Complete
Rocky Mountain Region
$50,000-99,999 I neG> me
Professional
Some College
25,000-49,999 Pop.
Childhqod
General Population
<$5,000 Income
Widowed
6th-8th Grade Education
Black
75 + Years Old
<6th Grade Education

Score
67.7
61.6
60.6
60.4
56.8
56.8
56.7
56.6
56.3
55.7
52.9
49.3
49.1
47.8
46.1
46.0
44.4
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Table 3. Animal Knowledge Scale Analysis of Variance and Multiple Classification
Analysis Results Against Selected Demographic Variables

Analysis of Variance
F Value

Age
Population of Present Residence
Region
Education
Occupation
Religiosity
Income
Marital Status
Race
Sex

7.67+
3.09+
5.93+
31.83+
0.23
4.75+
5.31+
3.07t
30.31+
66.82+

Multiple Classification Analysis:
Largest Positive and Negative Deviations After
Adjusting for Independent and Covariant Variables

Graduate Education
Alaska
Rocky Mountain States
College Education
Male
Rarely/Never Attend Religious Services

7.73
4.86
2.75
2.36
2.18
1.96

1 Million+ Population
18-25 Years Old
76 + Years Old
9th-11th Grade Education
Less than 8th Grade Education
Black

-2.07
-2.30
-3.12
-3.36
-5.10
-5.50

tSignificance ~0.05
:f:Significance ~0.01
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Table 4. Knowledge of Endangered Species

%Correct
Answer

%Wrong
Answer

%Don't
Know

The passenger pigeon and the Carolina
parakeet are now extinct.

26.2

23.1

50.6

Pesticides were a major factor in the
decline of brown pelicans.

33.3

9.9

56.8

The manatee is an insect.

25.6

23.1

51.3

Timber wolves, bald eagles, and
coyotes are all endangered species of
animals.

25.6

61.7

13.8

Question or Statement

Table 5. Awareness of Selected Wildlife Issuest

Issue

% Knowledgeable % Not Knowledgeable

Killing baby seals for their fur

43

32

Effects of pesticides such as
DDT on birds

42

32

Using steel leghold traps to
trap wild animals

38

37

Endangered Species Act

34

40

Killing of livestock by coyotes

23

52

Tuna-porpoise controversy

27

55

Tennessee Valley Authority
Tellico Dam/snail darter issue

17

70

Use of steel shot versus lead
shot by waterfowl hunters

14

75

tThe 'knowledgeable' category combines the groups of very and moderately knowledgeable; the 'not knowledgeable'
category combines the groups of very little and no knowledge. The 'slightly knowledgeable' category results are
nrnitta.-1 in thi" r-nrnn!lric;nn
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Table 6. Animal Preference Means

Most Liked Animals
Animal
Dog
Horse
Swan
Robin
Butterfly
Trout
Salmon
Eagle
Elephant
Turtle
Cat
Ladybug
Raccoon

X Valuet
1.70
1.79
1.97
1.99
2.04
2.12
2.26
2.29
2.63
2.69
2.74
2.78
2.80

tLower score indicates greater preference

8
Species Preference Mean/Scores
For Selected Animal Categories

Least Liked Animals
Animal
Cockroach
Mosquito
Rat
Wasp
Rattlesnake
Bat
Vulture
Shark
Skunk
Lizard
Crow
Coyote
Wolf

X Valuet
6.45
6.27
6.26
5.68
5.66
5.35
4.91
4.82
4.42
4.13
4.06
4.02
3.98

Animal

Mean Scoret

Domestic animals
Attractive animals
Game animals
Birds
Mammals
Amphibians, reptiles, fish
Predators
Animals known to cause
human property damage
Invertebrates
Animals known to inflict
human injury
Unattractive animals
Biting and stinging
invertebrates

2.08
2.38
2.59
2.98
3.40
3.55
3.91
4.02
4.64
5.08
5.46
6.13

!7J
~

~
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Table 7. Public Attitudes Regarding Changing of an Energy Project to Protect Endangered Species Types

~

't:l

"'=

Question: A recent law passed to protect endangered species may result in changing some energy development projects

~

at greater cost. As a result, it has been suggested that endangered species protection be limited only to certain
animals and plants. Which of the following endangered species would you favor protecting, even if it resulted in
higher costs for an energy development project?

% Favor

Species
Butterfly (Silverspot)
Mountain Lion
Fish (Agassiz Trout)
Spider (Kauai Wolf)
American Crocodile
Furbish Lousewort
Eastern Indigo Snake
Bald Eagle

%Oppose

# Polled

Strong

Moderate

Slight

Slight

Moderate

Strong

No
Opinion

%Favor
Overall

2452
2453
2450
2452
2452
2451
2452
2452

9.5
16.7
11.9
4.7
13.2
5.7
6.0
43.9

29.2
35.9
36.7
11.9
35.0
20.8
19.2
37.0

25.0
20.6
22.4
17.4
21.5
21.1
18.2
8.1

9.3
6.6
7.2
13.8
7.3
10.8
10.7
2.6

15.1
11.9
10.7
28.9
13.5
17.8
25.3
4.3

3.7
2.8
2.6
14.0
4.2
5.2
12.4
1.2

8.2
5.6
8.2
9.2
5.2
18.4
8.0
2.8

64
73
71
34
70
48
43
89

~
.....

Table 8. Public Attitudes in Regard to Various Water Uses If Such Use Would Endanger a Fish Species

N

~

Statement: Various kinds of fish have been threatened with extinction because of dams, canals and other water projects.
Please indicate if you would approve of the following water uses if they were to endanger a species of fish.

%Approve
Moderate

% Disapprove
Slight
Moderate

# Polled

Strong

A. Cool industrial
machineryt

2316

3.1

21.7
(48)+

23.2

17.1

22.1
(46)

7.1

B. Provide hydroelectric
power

2336

7.7

38.2

25.7

10.2

10.1
(24)

3.3

C. Increase human
drinking supplies

2391

18.6

51.6
(87)

16.5

4.9

4.2
(11)

1.6

D. Dammed for
recreational use

2374

3.6

17.6
(39)

18.1

15.5

28.6
(57)

13.3

E. Diverted for agricultural
irrigation

2384

12.7

47.1
(83)

23.4

6.8

5.2
(14)

1.9

Water Use

(72)

tDifference between approve and disapprove on this is not significant {Z
Differences on B- E are highly s1gnif1cant (P

Slight

0.0001)

+Numbers m parentheses () are totals approvmg or d1sapprovmg

=

0.75. P

=

0.45)

Strong

rn
~

;=..."'
....
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Table 9. General Public Attitudes toward Protection of Forest Land and Wetlands for
Endangered Species

Question

It has been suggested that 5 million acres
of national forest land be set aside so that
the endangered grizzly bear remain undisturbed. The timber industry objects,
saying that jobs and needed lumber will
be lost. Would you agree to protect the
endangered grizzly bear even if it
resulted in the loss of some jobs and
building material?
A large coastal city has an unemployment
problem. A major manufacturer want to
build a new plant on a marsh it owns
which could employ 1,000 people, but
conservationists claim this will destroy
land needed by a rare bird. Do you agree
that this plant should be built, even if it
endangers the bird species?

%

%

z

Agree

Disagree

Value

56

39

9.1
(P<:::::.0001)

38

55

9.1
(PL:.0001)

Table 10. Endangered Species Scale (Mean Scores) by Selected Demographic Groups:
1978 National Samplet

Demographic Groups (High)
Students (Largely College)
Non-Ph.D. Graduate
18- 25 Years Old
Single
1 Million+ Population
Alaska
Demographic Group
General Population
56-65 Years Old
Southern Region
Less than 500 Population
Farming
6th - 8th Grade Education
75 + Years Old
tAll differences between high and low groups and between these

Mean Score (Scale Max. = 56)
28.4
28.4
28.1
27.8
27.4
26.7

24.8
22.8
22.8
22.4
22.1
21.6
20.7

Table 11. General Public and Livestock Producer Attitudes Toward Different Methods of Coyote Control

Question
Question
Question
Question

~

1. Shoot or trap as many coyotes as possible.
2. ~oisoning, because it is the least expensive solution even though other animals may be killed.
3. Whenever possible, hunt only individual coyotes known to have killed livestock.

4. Capture and relocate coyotes away from sheep even though this is a very expensive solution.

Group
General Public
Informed
Uninformed
Sheep Producers
Cattlemen

%Approved+
Question 3
Question 2

II Polled

Question 1

548
1833
134
124

38:t:
44:t:
96
94

8
10
75
70

71
77
43
52

67
69
17
10

778.12
.0001

964.64
.0001

195.95
.0001

650.55
.0001

All Groups, (x)2
(x)2 P Value

Question 4

tIn all cases, % disapproved can be obtained by subtracting from 100.
+The x2 value for informed versus uninformed public was 56.61 and it had a P value of less than 0.0001
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Table 12. Attitudes toward Hunting

"'t:l

Question: Of the following reasons for hunting, which do you approve of or oppose?

Reason

II Polled

%Approve
Moderate
Strong

Slight

~

% Disapprove
Moderate
Slight

Strong

Traditional native hunting
(e.g. by Eskimos and Indians)

2379

16.2

47.5
(82)*

18.4

5.9

6.8
(15)

2.1

Hunting game mammals for
recreation and sport

2417

4.4

18.6
(37)

13.6

10.9

27.3
(62)

23.6

Hunting waterfowl for
recreation and sportt

2425

4.6

19.1
(40)

15.8

11.9

25.9
(59)

21.4

Hunting for meat

2429

22.1

46.5
(85)

16.6

5.5

5.1
(14)

3.1

Hunting for recreation
and meat!:

2417

9.2

31.7
(64)

23.3

11.7

13.9
(34)

8.5

Hunting for a trophy

2412

2.0

7.8
(18)

8.4

9.4

26.7
(80)

44.1

• Number in parentheses ( ) is total of approve or disapprove.

t
:t:

Difference between approve and disapprove, Z ~ 9.81, P
Difference between approve and disapprove, Z ~ 15.07, P

.0001
.0001

N
0

C1

i

Table 13. Attitudes of General Public and Trappers Toward the Use of Steel Traps

Statement: I see nothing wrong with using steel traps to capture wild animals.

# Polled

Strong

Informed Public

929

3.9

Uninformed Public

841

Trappers

171

Groupt

t The x2

value is 676.98 (P

I

I

%Agree
Moderate

% Disagree
Moderate

Slight

Slight

11.6
(20)t

4.9

8.0

23.4
(79)

47.1

1.2

10.4
(19)

7.5

11.6

32.6
(74)

30.2

81.9

12.9

1.2

2.9

0.6
(4)

0.6

(96)

Strong

.001) for the differences between the general public and the trappers.

+Number in parentheses { ) is total of agree or disagree.

rn
1:1':1

"'t::

Sl.....
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Table 14. Public Attitudes Toward Wildlife Habitat Protection
%
Agree

%
Disagree

Natural resources must be developed
even if the loss of wilderness results
in much smaller wildlife populations.

44

51

I approve of building on marshes
that ducks and other nonendangered
wildlife use if the marshes are
needed for housing development.

39

57

8.94
(P::::: 0.0001)

Cutting trees for lumber and paper
should be done in ways that help
wildlife even if this results in higher
timber prices.

76

20

28.22
(P::::0.0001)

Cattle and sheep grazing should be
limited on publicly owned lands if it
destroys plants needed by wildlife,
even though this may result in
higher meat costs.

60

34

13.02
(P:=0.0001)

Question

Z Values

(P

3.28
0.001)

=
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Scale Mean Scores by Selected Animal Activity Groups:
1978 National Sample

Max. Poss. Score t
General Population
Anti-Hunters
Backpackers
Birdwatchers
Env. Protect. Org. Memb.
Fishermen
Gen. Conserv. Org. Memb.
Humane Org. Memb.
Meat Hunters
Livestock Raisers
Nature Hunters
Scientific Study
Sport-Rec. Hunters
Sportsmen Org. Memb.
Wildlf. Protect. Org. Memb.
Zoo Visitors

NAT
16

ECO
11

HUM
11

MOR
20

SCI
13

UTI
27

DOM
18

NEG
17

3.1
3.4
5.4
6.3
6.5
4.0
4.6
5.6
4.1
3.2
8.5
5.7
3.8
5.7
5.8
4.4

3.1
3.2
4.5
5.4
7.7
3.6
4.5
5.1
3.9
3.2
5.7
5.3
3.8
5.4
6.3
3.6

4.0
4.6
4.4
3.7
4.8
4.1
4.1
6.1
4.0
3.2
3.9
4.5
3.8
3.8
4.4
4.8

5.5
7.9
7.0
5.5
9.6
4.4
6.3
9.5
4.2
4.5
4.8
8.0
2.9
4.3
7.7
7.1

0.9
1.0
1.6
2.0
1.9
1.0
1.6
1.8
1.0
1.0
1.5
2.7
1.2
1.4
2.2
1.2

5.3
4.4
3.7
3.7
1.6
5.4
4.0
3.0
5.6
7.3
3.8
3.3
5.4
4.8
2.9
4.0

2.0
1.2
2.3
2.6
1.5
3.0
2.2
0.9
3.3
2.7
3.8
1.8
4.1
4.1
1.7
1.5

4.4
4.1
2.7
2.6
1.5
3.6
3.1
2.7
3.2
4.5
2.9
2.2
3.4
2.7
2.7
3.4

3.9
9.6
3.7

5.2
7.3
4.5

3.2
4.0
3.3

1.3
2.8
2.0

0.9
1.8
1.08

13.1
3.4
12.8

5.1
8.5
4.7

3.8
2.1
3.9

1978 Mail Sample
Cattlemen
Natl. Trappers
Sheep Producers

t The score maxima

for each attitude varies because there was a different number of questions for each attitude with different scoring.

For example, there were eight questions for the Naturalistic attitude with a score of either 2 or 0 for three questions and scores of 2,1 or 0
for the other five. The number of questions for the other attitudes are (in the order listed in the table) 4, 5, 10, 6, 13, 8 and 8, respectively.
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TABLE II

Demographic Groups (selected) and Mean Scores for
Different Attitudes.
NAT

ECO

HUM

MOR

SCI

UTI

DOM

NEG

Max. Pass. Score

16

11

11

20

13

27

18

17

General Population

3.1

3.1

4.0

5.5

0.9

5.3

2.0

4.4

4.6

4.4

3.7

4.5

1.3

4.1

2.4

2.4

3.6

3.6

4.4

7.5

3.6

4.5

6.4

1.5
2.3
2.3

4.7
6.0
6.4

2.6
1.5
2.5

Regions

Alaska
North Central
North East
Pacific
Rocky Mountain
Southern
General Groups

Male
Female
Black
White
Married
Single
Never Religious Service
1/Week Religious Service

3.4

3.4

2.1

2.4

3.6
4.3
3.7

3.7
2.8

4.3
4.3
3.5

6.1
6.7

1.3
1.2

4.1
4.1
5.9

3.6
3.9

5.6

Education

<6th Grade
6th-8th Grade
9th-12th Grade

1.3
2.1
2.4

2.3
2.6
2.5

2.4
3.4

3.6
4.7

0.4
0.6
0.6

6.9
7.1
6.1

2.6
2.4

6.4
5.8
5.1

Student

4.0
4.5

3.6
4.5
5.3

4.4

6.7
6.8
7.3

1.6
1.7
1.9

3.9
4.2
3.7

1.7

3.3
3.0
2.3

1.8

1.2

6.3
6.4
4.6

8.5

2.7

Non-PhD. Graduate
PhD.

4.6

1.5

Employment

Unemployed
Retired
Vocational
Professional
Unskilled
Blue Collar
Service
Farming

2.4
2.5
2.7
3.7
2.7
2.6
2.4

2.7
2.7
3.6
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7

3.7
3.7
6.2
4.6

3.1

3.7

4.8

6.2
6.1

5.3
5.3

1.7
2.5

5.3

Age

18-25 Years Old
26-35 Years Old
56-65 Years Old
66-75 Years Old
75 + Years Old

3.4

2.5
2.2

3.4
2.8
2.6
2.6

3.7
3.4
3.2

4.7

1.2
1.2
0.6
0.6
0.4

4.1
4.2
6.4
7.0
7.1

3.5
1.8
5.3
6.0
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TABLE II (Continued)

Income
<$5,000
$15,000-14,999
$25,000-34,999
$50,000-99,999
Population - Childhood
Community
<500
25,000-49,999
250,000-999,999
1 Million+
Population - Present
Community
<500
25,000-49,999
250,000-999,999
1 Million+

NAT

ECO

HUM

2.6
3.4
3.6

2.7

3.7

3.5
3.4

3.6

MOR

SCI

UTI

DOM

NEG

0.7

6.1
4.6

2.3

5.4

2.6

3.5

6.0
3.5
3.7

4.5

2.8
3.4
3.4

3.4

3.4

4.7

4.3

3.2
4.4
4.3

4.0
6.7
6.0
6.4

3.3
6.1

0.7

6.4
4.6

2.4
1.7

4.6

1.8

6.3
4.7

2.5

1.2

1.2

1.8
6.3

• Mean Scores are the same (i.e. do not differ significantly} as those reported for the General Population.

TABLE Ill -

Analysis of Variance of Selected Demographic Variables
by Attitude Scales*

Variable

Age
Population of Present Residence
Region
Education
Occupation
Religiosity
Income
Marital Status
Race
Sex

F Values
NAT
9.64t
1.08
5.03t
12.03t
0.73
4.97t
3.69t
0.69
15.13t
23.16t

HUM
ECO
2.53t 11.31 t
0.74
0.56
3.42t
4.o6t
18.37t
0.56
1.79
1.72
5.34t
4.41 t
5.56t
1.33
0.63
0.32
11.45t
2.39
26.90t 63.12t

MOR
3.35t
2.47t
12.5ot
4.82t
1.84
6.38t
1.59
1.81
0.94
63.18t

SCI
15.69t
0.91
0.56
20.03t
0.57
1.06
0.34
6.12t
0.60
1.52

UTI
DOM
NEG
24.95t
15.91 t
0.99
2.41t
1.70
1.68
6.41t
10.01 t
6.98t
4.49t
2.71t 13.23t
3.28t
0.61
1.88
5.o9t
3.62t
2.46t
3.92t
5.41 t
0.84
5.55t
0.27
1.73
11.54t
6.1ot 23.04t
20.76t 183.93t 128.91t

• Only main effect F values and significance levels are indicated. Two analysis of variance tests were performed. The first included as

main effects: age, population of present residence, region, education, occupation; and, as covariates: attendance at religious services
(religiosity), income, marital status, race and sex. The second run included as main effects: religiosity, income, marital status, race and
sex; and, as covariates: age, population of present residence and education. Occupation and region could not be included as
covariates in the second analysis due to their nonlinear character.

t
:t:

F value has significance of less than 0.01
F value has significance of less than 0.05
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TABLE IV

Multiple Classification Analysis of Selected Demographic
Variables for the Naturalistic, Ecologistic, Humanistic and
Moralistic scales.
(See Table Ill for note on performance of the analysis.)

Naturalistic (Max Score = 16)

Graduate Education
Alaska
18-25 Years Old
26-35 Years Old
College Education
Pacific Coast
Rarely/Never attend
Religious Services
Clerical Occupation
76 + Years Old
56-75 Years Old
9-11 th Grade Education
Less than 8th Grade
education
Black

Humanistic (Max Score

Ecologistic (Max Score = 11)
Deviationt

Group

1.13
0.85
0.52
0.36
0.36
0.31
0.31
-0.44
-0.49
-0.54
-0.54

Group

Deviationt

Graduate Education
Alaska
Prof./Manag. Occ.
Rarely/Never
Attend Religious Service
Male
500-1.999 Pop.
56-75 Years Old
Unskilled Blue Collar
Less than 8th Grade
Education
9-11th Grade Education
Black

1.28
0.94
0.31
0.27
0.27
0.24
-0.29
-0.32
-0.35
-0.58
-0.62

-0.61
-0.87

= 11)

Group
18-25 Years Old
$20,000-34,999 Income
Female
Rarely/Never
Attend Religious Service
Pacific Coast
Less than 500 Pop. -0.42
Male
Alaska
76+ Years Old
Farmers
Less than 500 Pop.

Moralistic (Max Poss. Score
Deviationt
0.71
0.36
0.33
0.31
0.27
South
-0.45
-0.58
-0.67
-0.90
-1.50

Group
Pacific Coast
Clerical Workers
Graduate Education
Female
Rarely/Never
Attend Religious Service
26-34 Years Old
18-25 Years Old
-0.80
500-1,999 Pop.
Male
Farmers
Alaska

=

20)

Deviationt
1.59
1.37
1.32
0.64
0.61
0.49
0.44
-0.83
-0.86
-0.94
-1.38

tAll deviations listed above are significant. The positive deviations indicate greater than average prevalence of the attitude, and
negative deviations lower than average prevalence of the attitude.
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Multiple Classification Analysis of Selected Demographic
Variables for the Scientistic, Utilitarian, Dominionistic, and
Negativistic Scales.
(See Table Ill for a note on performance of the analysis.)

Scientistic (Max. Poss. Score = 13)
Group

Dominionistic (Max. Poss. Score= 18)

Deviationt

Graduate Education
18-25 Years Old
26-35 Years Old
Single
College Education
Alaska
High School/Vocat.
Education
Less than 8th Grade
Education
9th-11th Grade Education
56-75 Years Old
76 + Years Old

0.83
0.30
0.28
0.22
0.17
0.10
-0.19
-0.21
-0.22
-0.30
-0.38

Farmers
76 + Years Old
56-75 Years Old
Black
South
1 Million+ Pop.
Single
Alaska
Graduate Education
26-36 Years Old
18-25 Years Old

t

Deviation t

Male
Farmers
Alaska
Rocky Mt. States
$35,000+ Income
Rarely/Never attend
Rei igious Services
Clerical Workers
Graduate Education
Female
Pacific Coast

0.68
0.66
0.43
0.37
0.23
-0.21
-0.36
-0.45
-0.51
-0.55

Negativistic (Max. Poss. Score = 17)

Utilitarian (Max. Poss. Score = 27)
Group

Group

Deviationt
2.11
1.43
1.15
1.13
0.88
-0.45
-0.61
-0.70
-0.85
-0.88
-1.14

Group
Black
Less than 8th Grade
Education
76 + Years Old
Female
56·75 Years Old
Less than 500 Pop.
Male
18-25 Years Old
Graduate Education
Alaska

Deviationt
1.08
0.95
0.74
0.51
0.50
-0.59
-0.68
-0.69
-0.99
-1.16

All deviations listed above are Slgnlilcant. The pos1l1ve dev1at1ons md1cate greater than average prevalence of the ilttltude, and

negative dev1at1ons lower than average prevalence of the attitude
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ANIMAL BOREDOM: IS A SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF THE SUBJECTIVE
EXPERIENCES OF ANIMALS POSSIBLE?
Francoise W emeisfelder
Instituut voor Theoretische Biologie
Groenhovenstraat 5, 2311 BT Leiden
Holland

INTRODUCTION
The study of animal well-being has now become an accepted field
of scientific research. Until recently the dominant belief was that subjective experience was inaccessible to the natural sciences, since it
could not be experimentally manipulated. It led so-called behaviourists to the denial of any sort of subjective life to animals. This scientific conception of animals is far removed from daily reality, in which
people regard and treat animals as sentient beings. Second, the way we
as human beings exploit animals for our own sake and profit has caused
protest from several groups of people who consider these practices irresponsible and uncaring. Pigs, calves and chickens are "produced" in
great quantity in small housing systems for meat consumption; rats
and other species are extensively used in experimental laboratories,
and all kinds of wild species are kept and bred in zoos. The will to improve the conditions in which these animals live has led to the development of ,a new field of scientific research: the science of animal welfare.
Marian Dawkins' book Animal Suffering (1980) gives an overview
of current theories and problems, and it becomes apparent how difficult it is to find parameters for well-being which are truly adequate,
insofar that we can be sure that certain parameters are directly repre-
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sentative of the limits within which animal well-being can exist.
Another, closely related field which has recently started to attract
attention is the study of animal awareness or intelligence. D.R. Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness (1981a) is the first book dealing
extensively with the subject. Here too, it becomes clear how hard it is
to relate criteria such as communicative ability, or adaptive behaviour
to the existence of real understanding and awareness within the animal. What is the final discriminative evidence to distinguish "hardwired" behaviour from intelligent behaviour, or an "instinctive" reaction from a really "felt" reaction? The question whether it is possible
to study animal well-being scientifically therefore largely comes down
to the question how we can bridge the "communication gap" between
man and animal, or how we can become sure that what are usually considered to be indirect parameters are in fact direct.
This question has intrigued me for several years. In discussions
with colleagues about the justifiability of vivisection, the argument
whether or not animals can feel and suffer played a large role. The fact
that something which seemed so obviously true to me was not accepted within a scientific framework and might even be inassessable
that way puzzled me. I started to study literature on the phenomenon
of pain in animals, since pain is biologically functional, and often overtly expressed; yet it also implies a purely subjective experience within
the animal. It seemed to me that pain is a form of subjective feeling
which (nevertheless) might be accessible to biological research. I explored this in an ethological research project on pain in piglets after
castration without anaesthesia (Wemelsfelder 1982). It appeared that
behavioural criteria rather than physiological ones are adequate to
study pain, since behaviour represents the self-expression of the animal as an intrinsic whole, including any subjective experience it has.
Physiological criteria seem to be more indirectly linked to subjective
experience.
However, current scientific methodology regards the reduction of
phenomena to lower hierarchical levels as fundamentally desirable,
and further there is the great danger of anthropomorphic interpretation of behaviour. Because of these reasons many scientists prefer
physiological criteria on principle.
In fact, the importance which is attributed to different parameters
or criteria seems to depend on the concept of scientific objectivity
itself. Science is not the experience of reality as such; it constructs a
representation of reality, and therefore the decision which representations of reality are valid and which are not so valid depends on the
choice of a meta-scientific framework.
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between different meta-scientific frameworks and the science of animal welfare.
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During the past few years, I have become more and more convinced
that the great difficulty science has in studying subjective experience
in its objects, might be related to the denial of any role to subjective
experience in the observer as an interpretational guide. Can a quality
in the world around us be observed, when this same quality is deliberately excluded from the process of observing?
As a practical example for the discussion described above, the
phenomenon of animal boredom has been chosen. Boredom implies
some sort of awareness, some form of a direct inner experience of selfhood. Because without a sense of selfhood related to the developmental potential of the animal, it would be impossible to "miss" certain
things, to be bored. With the phenomenon of boredom one can illustrate the qualitative difference between behavioural and physiological
deviations, but is still bored, since it misses the opportunity to perform its specific behaviour. How important behaviour is for an animal
is a crucial question in theories on adaptation and stress, and as we
shall see, on the existence of animal boredom as well.
Besides the fact that boredom is, theoretically speaking, an appropriate topic for a discussion about the possibility of studying
animal welfare scientifically, it is also said to be a major problem for
animals in intensive production systems (or bio-industry) and zoos,
and in many cases in laboratories as well (van Putten 1982b; Markowitz 1982; Fox 1974). However, many people, farmers and scientists
alike, share the view that when animals "are well fed, well watered and
the temperature is very comfortable, I do not know what else you
could do" (Kirkeide, Secretary of the North Dakota Beef Cattle Improvement Association, in the Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 28, 1982). It
seems to be in the interest of the animals, therefore, to discuss whether
boredom is a real problem which should be taken seriously, and how we
might study and alleviate it if it is a problem and not some erroneous
anthropomorphic inference.
Within the framework of the discussion mentioned above the following questions are central in this paper:
1. Can animals be bored, and what are important criteria in the
study of boredom?
2. Is there evidence of boredom in intensive animal husbandry?

"OBJECTIVE" SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF
ANIMAL WELFARE
It has often been said that the study of the subjective is unscientific: inner, personal experiences are private and not accessible to
methodological observation. In the science of psychology, verbal com-
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munication between observer and observed bridges most of the gap. In
studying animals, however, this way of having access to their inner experience is closed. This dualistic view can be traced back to Descartes'
well-known statement that "not only do animals have less reason than
humans, they have none at all" (Gilson 1976). The idea that animals
are mere material automata, not possessing any of the human "nonmaterial" qualities, has since become quite influential. Yet it is not a
logical and necessary conclusion.
To conclude that animals have no inner experience since it is not
observable using the scientific method is only justifiable within the
framework of the method used for observation. But it is not right to
exclude the possibility a priori that the subjective world of animals
could be observed- and studied with other methods. What is presently
accepted as "the scientific method" is not the only absolute guarantee
for "objectivity," meaning complete knowledge of an object. Scientific
ideas must ultimately be compatible with "common sense," or the
common experience of humanity as a whole; with "those presumptions, which, in spite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of
our lives" (Whitehead, cited by Griffin 1977). The natural sciences, excluding inner experience (of animals, and humans as well since behaviorism) from their range of vision, are not compatible with human "common experience." Therefore it might be justifiable to say that current
science represents a choice for a certain kind of relationship with the
world; a relationship characterized by duality and total detachment between observer and observed, subject and object.
As a consequence of this duality, life has been reduced to material
mechanisms; the natural sciences have become reductionistic in principle, with the science of Newtonian (mechanistic) physics at the basis of
other, "derived" fields of study (Verhoog 1983).
It is possible, however, to think of a concept of "science" in which
the methodological criteria for objectivity are maintained, but in
which the ontological starting point is different from the current one.
Tranoy (1977) makes this distinction between the two sorts of objectivity, and argues that ontological objectivity, implying a separation
between object and subject, is "not universally acceptable ... , not even
reasonably uncontroversial." Furthermore, it has the serious limitation of excluding objects that are related to "subject-consciousness,"
like intentions, norms, feelings, etc. On the other hand, he says
methodological objectivity is far more essential for any concept of
knowledge. This implies conditions like intersubjectivity and consensus, sincere interest in an object, the absence of arbitrariness, etc.
And, as has been said above, a concept of science which is consistent in
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this methodological sense, but is based on a non-dualistic ontological
starting point (with emphasis on interconnectedness and interdependence) is very well possible.
The field of animal welfare is pre-eminently one in which different
interests are likely to underly the different opinions on the matter. Between economic interests and the interests of the animal, scientific research is supposed to take a neutral position. The role of different
scientific concepts in present controversies will now be examined.
Within the study of animal welfare, the subjective experience of
the animals of course plays a crucial role. Welfare is in essence a subjective concept, and in order to study welfare, we should study the subjective world of an animal. Almost all natural scientists, however,
agree that it is not possible to do experiments to demonstrate (prove)
the existence of animal awareness and feeling. Analogy with humans
or introspection are considered to be necessary to bridge the gap between outward behaviour and inner feeling, and many researchers are
reluctant to do so through fear of anthropomorphism. One even says
that "this idle speculation is a burdensome appendage to the real
scientific work of observing and accounting for lawfulness in animal
behaviour" (Zuriff 1982).
It may well be possible, however, to get access to this very important part of reality. "It is especially in the relationship human-animal
(in which the duality object-subject is transcended) that animal consciousness can be best understood ... and investigated" (Fox 1983b).
Suffering is in principle such an intensely personal phenomenon (Cassel1982) that it certainly cannot be studied in terms of "lawfulness."
It requires willingness of individual observers to interpret data in an
empathetic way. After a symposium on animal awareness Wood-Gush
(1981) commented: "The general opinion seems to be that it (animal
awareness) is very difficult to prove or disprove. The decision one
takes is very much dependent on one's sympathy or attitude towards
animals."
Those who have an economic interest in animals, accepting their
exploitation for our benefit, have a different perspective on and interpretation of the. situation than public groups, for instance, whose interest it is to assure the total well-being of the animal. The first group
might state: "To exclude animals from fulfilling their role in helping to
sustain the human population .. .is untenable" (American Society of
Agricultural Engineers 1981). This point of view is accompanied by
the notion that the general public should be informed "of the generally
high level of animal care and husbandry exercised on most farms today, whether 'large or small'," since "their perceptions of animals are
often unrealistic (oriented to Disney characters, pastoral scenes, and
pets)" (ASAE 1981). Furthermore, it is believed that one of the nega-
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tive aspects of "the current controversy on animal welfare" is that it is
retarding the movement towards modern "technology which improves
production.''
Starting from the basic belief that animals exist to serve mankind,
the main focus is upon production and efficiency, which at the same
time seems to imply a belief that animal welfare in current systems is
only marginally, not fundamentally, affected, and that people who
think otherwise are sentimental and childish.
People whose primary interest is not to make money for a living by
means of animal exploitation, have a totally different opinion; not because they are childish or sentimental, nor are their opinions "unscientific." They speak from the notion of "potential action." Regardless of
any facts, we can give animals better housing than they have now, and
make them less "unhappy." Ethical responsibility is more fundamental than scientific knowledge, as has been argued before, and therefore
to consider nonscientists as "dumb crowds" is a misinterpretation of
the fact that "man is a doer, not a knower" (Cave 1982; Debrock 1982).
Scientific research in the sense of systematic observation can study
different possibilities for reaching a desired goal, and so be a very important tool in making sure that our human ideas are reasonable, and
correspond to natural reality.
Many animal-welfare scientists, however, think of the relationship between science and ethics in the opposite way: "The decisions
whether or not we exploit animals ... and to what extent, ... are ethical
decisions ... that should be made by society at large, ... but not without
knowing the facts, or scientific evidence, provided by scientific research" (Duncan 1981). This statement can be said to represent the
currently accepted view, in which ethical decisions are based on "objective" data. This statement obscures the fact that it is not always
easy to discover hard scientific ''fact.'' An interesting example is the
phenomenon of adaptation, on which much research is focussed. An
animal has to adapt to adverse situations, otherwise it dies. It does so
by abnormal behaviour, for example. The question is, does an adapted
animal suffer, or does "adapted" imply a calmed-down, relatively content animal? The first answer can be defended from a point of view in
which the animal and its environment are seen as a meaningful whole,
combined with empathetic observation of behaviour; the second can be
defended by saying that behaviour is a stimulus-response mechanism,
in which energy outlet is more important than the adequacy of the
stimulus. So it seems that there is no "fact" here; the conclusion depends on which point of view one takes. This example will be discussed
more elaborately in part I of this paper.
A "vice" that scientists often warn of or complain about is the
danger of "anthropomorphic" thinking and reasoning, especially by
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non-scientifically trained people. But respect, involvement, care, and
responsibility as integral parts of compassionate stewardship do not
necessarily imply sentimental projection. The care is for the animal,
and to fulfill its needs, rather than ours. To say that "a pig does not
bathe in the mud because it likes it, but because it increases its possibilities for cutaneous evaporation" (Dantzler and Mormede 1979), is a
denial of the subjectivity of the animal, and creates the duality between subjectivity and objectivity typical of scientific reductionism.
The fear of anthropomorphism might well be a result of fear of taking
animals completely seriously as fellow living beings; and for the "burden" of responsibility that would exist if it was accepted that our anthropomorphic notions about animals might be correct.
Biological data relevant to the concept of animal boredom will now
be presented and discussed. In doing so, the ontological starting point
of nondualism and empathic connectedness as developed in this introduction will be used as a basis. An attitude of empathy, serving as
interpretational guideline, might give rise to controversial conclusions
in the eyes of those who believe in a dualistic perspective. If it has been
argued correctly that the choice of an attitude is primordial to observation, philosophically speaking, and that this choice directs the search
for "scientific evidence," then the proposed procedure is justified.

PART I
ENVIRONMENTAL DEPRIVATION AND THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANIMAL
The environment provides adequate stimuli to fulfill an animal's
needs, and elicits appropriate, species-specific behaviour in an animal.
In a diverse, rich environment, an animal has to search for these adequate stimuli (van Putten 1981). In a monotonous, "barren" environment, the animal is not only prohibited from searching for adequate
stimuli most of the time, but hardly any adequate stimuli are present.
This change in environment has an effect on the behaviour of the animal. What are these effects, and do they matter to an animal? In other
words, does a change in quality of the environment affect the quality
of the animal's life in a noticeable way for the animal?

DOES BEHAVIOUR MATTTER TO AN ANIMAL?
Behaviour includes all those processes by which an animal senses
the external world and the internal state of its body, and responds to
changes which it perceives (Manning 1972). Van den Assem (1973)
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adds that the term behaviour refers only to outwardly observable,
mainly motor responses. In the course of time, several explanatory
models for behaviour have been presented, which try to reduce behaviour "to a system of hypothetical components" (Manning 1972); components that are linked together in such a way that behaviour can be
consistently predicted from certain conditions. '' ... ultimately we shall
hope to explain behaviour in terms of the functioning of the basic units
of the nervous system" (Manning 1972).
The question is, in this framework, where and how subjective experience fits into these kinds of models, and in what way an animal experiences its own behaviour.
In relation to the welfare of individual animals in a deprived environment, Hughes (1980) proposes a behavioural model which is an integration of the Lorenzian psychohydraulic model and the mixed-motivation model as developed by Deutsch and Hinde. The first states
that behaviour is mainly caused by internal, genetic drives which have
to be expressed, even if no adequate stimuli are present; the second
model implies that behaviour is mainly triggered by external stimuli in
combination with internal, chemical receptors, and, therefore, not performing a certain behaviour does not frustrate the animal. Hughes
combines these two into a continuum: some behaviour patterns are
mostly internally originated, some largely externally, and many arise
through the interaction of rhythmically varying internal motivations
and external releasers. In this framework the appearance of distorted
or abnormal behaviour in a barren environment is clear evidence of a
need for some environmental improvement, so he suggests, since the
internal drive apparently is so strong that the absence of adequate
releasing stimuli does not prevent an animal from performing abnormal behaviour.
This split into internally and externally regulated behaviour implies that not performing externally regulated behaviour in case of
absence of stimuli may not be adverse to an animal. Or, an animal does
not miss what it does not know, in other words.
How does an animal experience internally regulated behaviour
that becomes distorted for lack of adequate stimuli? Any lack of an
adequate environment requires adaptation of the animal to the present
conditions. Adaptation is a fundamental property of each animal
(Freeman 1975), and "basically all behaviours, including disturbed
ones, represent adaptations of an organism to its 'Umwelt"' (Wiepkema 1982).
Proposing a model for adaptive behaviour, Wiepkema (1980) uses
the terms "soll-werte" and "ist-werte," meaning, respectively, the
way an animal expects its environment to be and the way its environment actually is perceived to be. When there is a difference between

Animal Boredom

123

soll-werte and ist-werte, the animal makes, or tries to make therequired behavioural or physiological adjustments in order to solve the
conflict. If the gap is too big, however, "abnormal" behaviour is a sign
of the difficulty the animal experiences in attempting to control its environment adequately. According to Wiepkema, abnormal adjustments are accompanied by emotions such as fear and general suffering.
After a certain time, when the animal has not been able to regain
satisfactory control, the physiological parameters revert to apparent
normality, and conflict behaviour develops into stereotypic behaviours. These stereotypic behaviours are not necessarily adverse anymore; on the contrary, they might prevent the animal from feeling unhappy, by caln:!.ing the animal down and suggesting restored controllability (Wiepkema 1982). Discussing Lorenz's psychohydraulic
model, Duncan (1981) says that "even if a psychohydraulic model is accepted, it could be argued that as long as the energy finds an outlet (into abnormal behaviour-au) that is not damaging to the hen itself or
its flockmates, then welfare will not be adversely affected."
From the models presented above, we could conclude that not performing (potential) behaviour does not matter to an animal; that abnormal behavioural adjustments do matter to animals initially; but
that more permanent abnormal behaviour might not be adverse anymore.
This way of looking at an animal and its behaviour, however, is the
result of a reductionistic approach: the starting point is a dualistic
perspective of animal versus environment, internal versus external.
Wanting to reduce behaviour to neural systems (Manning 1972) may
imply the view that the subjective experience of an animal is only
secondarily, temporarily present.
In a recent article, Baxter (1982/83) gives an analysis of functional
behaviour in relation to animal production and welfare, which could illustrate this way of thinking somewhat further.
He states that only those species-specific behaviour patterns
which promote biological fitness have survived the pressure of natural
selection. By biological fitness is meant reproductive potential, and all
factors that contribute to this, such as number and quality of offspring,
ability to rear offspring, etc. Subjective well-being therefore must also
have some function towards this goal, and "will have been selected on
the basis of its representation of biological fitness." Brain programs
cause "the animal to change its current state by inducing pleasurable
or displeasurable sensations ... The study of animal welfare becomes
therefore the study of the programs of their brains."
From this perspective he proceeds to say that the consequences of
behaviour are crucial for animal productivity, and therefore for their
welfare, rather than the behaviour itself: "allowing an animal to per-
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form behaviour is one way of accommodating requirements, and is not
the requirement itself .... This opens the possibility of accommodating
animal requirements entirely by environmental manipulation and
without the animal performing behaviour." Ethology in this framework becomes an attempt at functional interpretation of behaviour,
rather than a study of behavioural requirements in their own rights.
In short, subjective experience, and behaviour are said to be secondary means towards the goal of (re)production. The motor which
moves the different parts of the mechanism is the central nervous
system. And, as Ingram (1981) comments: "if an animal survives so
that its DNA gets into the next generation, it has been a success."
These perspectives on behaviour do not regard animals as individual, qualitative, sensitive beings, but as mechanisms which find their
reason for existence in quantitative production.
From a nondualistic perspective in which qualitative relationships
are crucial for the animal's well-being it does matter to an animal
when it does not have the chance to perform the behaviour which is
part of a species-specific range of behavioural possibilities. The behavioural potential of an animal represents the quality of the animal-environment relationship. Rather than regarding behaviour as a
means towards reproduction (in other words quality serving quantity),
a nondualistic perspective regards reproduction as a means towards
individual life and behaviour (quantity serving quality). Subjective experience is intrinsically present in all activity and together with behavioural expression represents the meaningfulness, the telos, of animal
life.
In this way, distorted abnormal behaviour is an indication of an affliction upon the quality of the animal's life. What follows is a further
discussion of abnormal behaviour, its forms of appearance and function.
The types of abnormal behaviour which occur mostly in barren, deprived environments are stereotypic behaviour, redirected behaviour,
vacuum behaviour (van Putten 1981) and over-reactiveness to sudden
disturbances (Metz and Oosterlee 1980; Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980).
Stereotypic behaviour mainly consists of the constant, compulsory
repetition of certain motor patterns, resulting from a lack of general
stimulation, or a lack of exercise. Redirected behaviour implies the
fulfillment of behavioural needs on inadequate stimuli, and is often
harmful or damaging to the animals, since parts of the body of mates
often form the substitute for the original inanimate stimulus. Vacuum
activity occurs when no appropriate stimulus is present at all, and the
behaviour is performed "in the air," e.g., the air-chewing of sows in
confinement. Over-reactiveness can be seen in, e.g., the alarm-reac-
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tion after sudden disturbances or the response to novel stimuli in a
bare environment.
"In severely impoverished environments, arousal is generally increased, ... due to an unsatisfied, strong motivation for certain activities" (Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980). By performing abnormal behaviour, the animal often "creates" its own stimulation, thereby reducing
the increased arousal (Fox 1971; Vestergaard, 1981).
Again, as has been mentioned before, one can ask the question
whether "abnormal behaviour actually is an advantage for the animal,
since it reduces arousal" (Moss 1981b) but the answer must be "no" if
we consider it from the perspective of the larger whole of an animal's
nature and potentials.
A deprived animal, when placed in a rich environment, will overreact and indulge in a certain behaviour pattern (Wiepkema 1980).
Even when an animal has been performing a certain behaviour on nonadequate objects e.g. bar-biting of sows, or "in the air" (vacuum-activities) it will immediately and strongly respond to adequate stimuli
when these are given after the performance of displacement behaviour.
This clearly indicates that an animal does discriminate between adequate and nonadequate stimuli, and that real satisfaction is not derived
from adapted behaviour, otherwise the animal would not react so vigorously to adequate stimuli (Sambraus 1982; van Putten 1981; Stolba
and Wood-Gush 1980). Sambraus mentions feeding and sexual behaviour as examples; sleep behaviour is furthermore added by Wiepkema.
Stolba and Wood-Gush (1980) showed that the more bare the environment was, the stronger did piglets show the urge to explore new objects.
The fact that an animal has a telos, or intrinsic nature, implies
that the fulfillment of its potential capacities matters fundamentally
to it; every animal has a strong urge to be active and alert.
This is most clearly shown by some experiments which indicated
that animals prefer to work for food, even if they do not have to. Markowitz (1982) describes how ostriches, who had learned to press key in
order to obtain some peanuts as a reward, preferred to work in this
way for their food instead of having it free. When a keeper accidentally
dumped a whole bag of peanuts in their cage, they went over to the
heap, sampled a few peanuts, and went back to their key to "earn"
their peanuts. Wood-Gush (1973) mentions this phenomenon for chickens.
As others have repeatedly found, animals will typically work for
food even when the same food is available free. This phenomenon "has
been disquieting for some traditional learning theorists. After all, this
illustrates how ... superficial some of our explanations of animal
behaviour are .... We are emphatically confronted with the proposition
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that also animals like to do things, to see things change because of
their efforts, to enjoy the pride of gathering their own food or drink,
and to have some control over their lives. This is what behavioural enrichment is all about" (Markowitz 1982).
When an animal can fulfill its telos, and express its natural behaviour freely, it is generally recognized as being a contented or "happy"
animal. Subjective experience, fulfillment and quality are inseparable
aspects that come together in the behaviour of an animal.
What are the basic behavioural needs of animals, indicated by the
concept of telos? Of course, this is basically different for each species,
but attempts have been made to generalize some basic needs into behavioural categories.

BEHAVIOURAL NEEDS OF ANIMALS
In an attempt to determine behavioural needs of domestic animals, as well as those of laboratory animals, the question whether or
not these animals are fundamentally different from their wild ancestors is a crucial one (Duncan 1981).
On a population level, adaptation is the result of changing gene
frequencies (Beilharz 1982), caused by environmental pressures; a process called "natural selection." In the case of domestic species,
another important factor has been selective breeding by man for certain desirable traits, such as docility and productivity.
It can be stated that those animals that have adapted their genotype continually to the demands created by man are very different
from their wild ancestors (Beilharz 1982; Hughes 1980; Duncan 1981).
An example of this might be the elimination of incubation and broody
behaviour in the domestic chicken (Wood-Gush 1973; Craig 1982),
although Brantas (1980) describes the frustration that occurs in hens
that do not have a nest in which to lay their eggs. In the discussion
after Brantas' presentation, it was remarked that the hens might have
been frustrated because they had experienced laying in nests before.
Whether behaviour is learned or not, it remains a fact that the animals
respond adequately to stimuli which used to be a part of their ancestors' natural habitat.
Wood-Gush and Stolba (1982) report that pigs, kept in a "pigpark" with "a variety of environmental features, and a diversified
social structure," show behaviour "that closely resembles behaviour
described for the European wild boar." Boice (1981) in a review article
of studies on captivity and feralization, states that "captivity and
domestication do not necessarily produce behavioural degeneracies."
As an example he mentions an experiment that showed that for albino
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Norway rats, placed in an outdoor pen, "hundreds of generations of life
in captivity have not altered the burrowing abilities of Norway rats.''
Systematic studies of the effects of feralization have shown that for a
large number of species, animals placed in an outdoor pen resume their
wild ways. Therefore, in order to understand the function of behavioural traits in domestic animals, and their importance for the animal,
scientists need to study the wild ancestors of our domestic species
thoroughly (Hartsock and Strickland, personal communication, 1982).
Besides, domestication does not refer to today' s intensive production
systems. It is very unlikely that animals who always have been kept in
extensive or semi-extensive conditions, have been able to adapt to the
rapid changes of the past 20 years (Wood-Gush, as reported by Buchenauer, 1981).
So, on a population level, it is very likely that much of the potential for the full range of behaviour of wild ancestors is still present
genetically, despite some selective, mostly physical changes. Baxter
(1982/83) remarks that selective pressure on agricultural animals
might even have strengthened original traits aimed at biological
fitness rather than diminishing them. This would include traits like
nesting behaviour. For zoo animals hardly any intentional selection
takes place, and therefore their behavioural needs will resemble the
needs of their wild conspecifics very much.
The following behavioural categories are considered to correspond
with the most basic needs of animals:
Eating and drinking behaviour, especially search behaviour, is
agreed upon by several authors to be crucially important (Fraser 1980;
Sambraus 1981). A long list of abnormal and stereotypical behaviour
related to this exists for many farm animal species (Sambraus 1981),
indicating that the animal's internal drive to perform this behaviour is
strong. He reports that when, for example, chickens are given their
food in straw so that they have to search for it, they show a decreasing
amount of abnormal feather-pecking. In zoos too, devices that are invented to make an animal work for his food rather than being fed at
regular times, have caused drastic changes in formerly apathetic, inactive animals (Markowitz 1982).
Closely related to this are explorative behaviour and locomotion,
considered almost as important as ingestive behaviour (Fraser 1980;
Sambraus 1981). Stereotypic weaving of, e.g., polar bears and horses is
interpreted to be evidence of lack of exercise and space to move, and
disappears when more space is provided (Meijer-Holzapfel1968; Fraser 1968). Daschbach et al. (1982/83) consider the importance of
enough space for the locomotory behaviour of encaged monkeys (the
slow Iori, Nycticebus concang, in case), since too little space, especially
if less than the so-called "flight-distance," can cause increased ag-
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gression, physical damage and resulting stress. (Flight distance refers
to the linear distance between an animal and an animal of another
species which is tolerated without fleeing.)
Exploratory behaviour is a strong drive, generally present in most
animals, which serves to increase familiarity with the environment
(Baxter 1982/83). Even when the possibility for locomotion is present,
many abnormal adjustments appear when there is an absence of objects which are explorable. In pigs, for example, a well-known vice
called tailbiting (which is a redirected activity) is considered to be
directly related to a lack of exploratory possibilities, and causes
significant economic losses (Sambraus 1981; Murphy 1978; Wiepkema
1982). Ekesbo, as reported by Duncan (1981) has shown that the incidence of trampled teats and clinical mastitis is higher when dairy
cows are housed in small stalls without bedding. And these are only a
few of the numerous examples of the damage that is done to animals
physically and mentally by deprivation of adequate stimuli and the
restriction of space.
The possibility of relating to the environment in a normal, healthy
way is strongly represented by play behaviour. Especially for young
animals, playing is of essential importance for their normal development, since it provides the possibility for a dialogue between the
animal and its environment (Buchenauer 1981). Young animals develop their own ability for action through the interplay with the environment (Buchenauer 1981; Wood-Gush 1973); they acquire independence from the mother, learn to interact with peers (Jensen and Bobbit, cited by Fox, 1974) and develop motor control (Fraser 1980). By
playing, the young animal gradually learns to be less dependent on its
mother, and to control its environment on its own. "The entire basis
for intelligence, for the acquisition of information, and for learning
itself hinges upon early playful exploratory behaviour" (Fox 1974).
Fraser (1980) further mentions comfort activities like grooming and
nest-building, both of which are recognized as being of primary importance for the domestic chicken (Wood-Gush 1973; Hughes 1980), and
the pig (Sambraus 1981); as well as sleeping and social behaviour.
As Fraser (1980) concludes, these needs seem formidable. But
rather than being discouraged by the long list of behavioural needs, it
might be important in this framework to summarize the discussion
above by saying that most present animal-confinement systems, be it
zoos, laboratories or intensive-production systems, have a great need
for more "general stimulation," whatever stimuli this might imply.
Too little general stimulation, and a (fundamental) lack of the possibility for self-expression, deprive human beings and animals of a
sense of fulfillment and satisfaction. In other words, a qualitatively
poor environment leads to deprived, bored animals as a result (Murphy
1978).
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BOREDOM AS A RESULT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DEPRIVATION
Considering environmental deprivation, it is meaningful to make a
distinction between social environment and physical environment
(Duncan 1981).
Clearly, for social animals the social environment is of crucial importance. All agricultural domestic animals are social species, which
means that they normally live in groups with an organized social structure (Duncan 1981). Most laboratory animals such as mice, rats, dogs
and monkeys are social animals, too. Duncan mentions and discusses
several possible kinds of social deprivation: prevention of the formation of a parent-offspring bond, early weaning, the keeping of animals
in single-age or single-sex groups, and isolation. Some effects of social
deprivation are a higher mortality, increased aggression, displacement
behaviour (e.g., calves, lambs and piglets who are weaned early suck
each other, or perform vacuum-sucking behaviour); distorted behaviour (such as isolated cockerels chasing their own tails), physiological
effects like a high incidence of arteriosclerosis (Duncan 1981) and
"learned" helplessness (Fox 1983a).
However, since a more common problem in farms is overcrowding,
rather than social deprivation (Murphy 1978), it is mainly the impoverished physical environment that makes people question animalkeeping systems like zoos, laboratories and intensive production units.
The so-called "barren environment" is referred to by many authors in
their discussion of animal welfare (Hughes 1980; van Putten 1982b;
Wood-Gush 1973; Duncan 1981; Buchenauer 1981; Brantas 1975).
"What could be more unhealthy than an unresponsive environment?"
Markowitz (1982) asks in his book about behavioural enrichment in
zoos. He reports on the beneficial effect that environmental enrichment had on the performance of species-specific behaviour of polar
bears: reduced stereotypic activity, greatly improved physical health
(not in the least because they stopped begging for junk-food from zoo
visitors), and reduced aggressive behaviour of males towards
newborns. All too familiar is the stereotypic behaviour of caged zoo
animals, from canaries, foxes, coyotes, bears, etc., to great apes. The
latter are also known to eat their own vomit and faeces (Fox 1971).
For laboratory animals, nervous anorexia, coprophagia (eating of
faeces), polyphagia and polydipsia (eating and drinking too much), as
well as asocial, stereotypic and aggressive behaviour can be results of
social and environmental deprivation (Fox 1974).
A related area of concern is the lack of general stimulation for dogs
and cats in shelters. Isolation and understimulation can cause hyster-
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ical, high-pitched barking, abnormal behaviour such as a dog chasing
his own tail, and a general appearance of nonalertness: dull coats and
eyes. This can be improved by providing toys such as sticks, balls and
blankets. But for animals used to being so close to human beings, the
most important need they have is human contact. All other needs such
as exercise, play etc., are dependent on the presence or absence of
human attention. To have a relationship with human beings has become the most important aspect of the nature of a dog; far more so
than for a cat (Wright, personal communication, 1982). However, even
for piglets the presence of two human caretakers can make a difference
of 5 kilograms growth per pig per 6 weeks! (Hammer 1980).
In Part II, the problem of environmental deprivation in agricultural animals will be discussed more elaborately. Many scientists use the
term "boredom" with or without quotes, in talking about the subjective experience of animals in a deprived environment (Wood-Gush
1973, 1981; Murphy 1978; Duncan 1981; Griffin 1981b; Humphrey
1981; K.iley-Worthington 1981; Vestergaard 1981). This phenomenon
can be explained biologically in terms of "a motivational state which
drives the animal to increase its overall sensory input" (Murphy 1978;
see also Griffin 1981b).
But before it can be accepted that animals can be bored, there are
some questions that have to be considered first, according to several
authors. Can one apply a concept like boredom to "an animal as primitive as a fowl, particularly if its behaviour is largely governed by
releasers?" (Wood-Gush 1973). "Does it matter to an animal whether
the necessary stimulation comes from the environment directly or
whether from themselves by performing a stereotypy in a non-stimulating environment?' (Murphy 1978). Is boredom a term which applies
only to humans, as Duncan (1981) says, and which does not refer to an
equivalent mental experience in animals (Murphy 1978; Humphrey
1981)?
Although several authors raise these questions, most of them go
no further than to offer a few speculatory lines. Griffin (1981b) suggests that "since laboratory rodents will run several kilometers every
night in an exercise wheel, while wild conspecifics never seem to go
more than 100 m. from their nest, the laboratory animal might be
bored." Some people say, however, that despite all the evidence that
animals do prefer to respond to external stimuli when these are present, this still does not answer the question whether animals miss what
they do not know (Ewbank 1981), or whether they actually suffer in
the absence of stimuli (Wood-Gush 1973). Because intuitively, that
seems to be what boredom implies: missing stimuli that should be
there but are not.
The presence of stereotypies in zoos and laboratory animals, and
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all domestic species, however, strongly suggests that an animal does
miss general stimulation, otherwise it would not develop these highly
repetitive, unnatural behaviour patterns to stimulate itself, nor would
it engage in all kinds of harmful and physically injurious displacement
activities. This is where the second question comes in: does it matter to
the animal how it satisfies its need for stimulation; do animals have a
sense of "quality of life" as suggested by Murphy (1978).
From a reductionist point of view, there might be no decisive answer to this question. Subjective experience is considered to be a secondarily derived factor in reductionistic explanatory models. A fundamental way of taking subjective experience seriously, as a central
feature of life, requires a shift of observational perspective (or "gestalt-shift'').
From such a perspective we see behaviour not solely as a means towards a reproductive end. Baxter's (1982/83) statement that behaviour
is "one way of accommodating requirements, and not the requirement
itself'' is direct evidence of an approach which reduces the animal to a
functional mechanism. In this approach boredom could not exist as
long as the desired production were guaranteed. A shift from quantity
to quality does imply that behaviour is seen as the requirement itself.
In this framework an animal can be said to be bored when it has to
adapt to its environment in an abnormal way, indicative of understimulation, in order to maintain its sense of selfhood. The continuity between man and animal, and the evidence for feeling and awareness in
animals (see Section I, The Question of Animal Awareness, in this volume) imply that boredom is a direct subjective experience of an ani,
mal.
It is not always easy to distinguish "boredom" from
"frustration." Boredom can give rise to frustration, e.g. when a sow
tries to break away from its ties to build a nest, or when aggression in
battery cage hens increases as a result of deprivation of nesting boxes
for laying-behaviour. An aggressive bird can hardly be called a bored
one, yet it is important to realize the close link between the two
phenomena. Boredom could be regarded as a qualitative description of
the psychological state that gives rise to general frustration.
An advanced form of boredom is the phenomenon of helplessness,
elaborately described by Seligman (1975) for human beings, and by
Fox (1983a) for animals. After a prolonged time of lack of control and
predictability over the environment, animals "give up" trying to express themselves and become apathetic. Van Putten describes this for
tethered sows: the sow sits, lets its head hang down and has its eyes
nearly closed. This has been referred to as "mourning" behaviour (van
Putten 1982b; see also Fox 1983a). In laboratory animals it is often
present as a result of experiments, and the animal's inability to control
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its life (Fox 1982). Helplessness is characterized by the general refusal
to respond, even to novel stimuli, or damage being done to its own
body; these traits distinguish helplessness clearly from habituation
(Fox 1983a). Further effects are decreased learning ability, immunosuppression, loss of weight and appetite, norepinephrine depletion and
increased cholinergic activity (Fox 1983a).
Helplessness is the pathological mental state arising from the
animal's conviction that, whatever it does, it cannot have any real control over its environment. It believes (or has learned) that responding
is useless, since there will be no reinforcement to the response
(Seligman 1975). If lack of natural stimuli can produce such a pathological state, equivalent to mental illness and depression in humans,
then surely it matters to an animal that it be provided with an environment that gives it the chance to be a mentally and physically healthy
animal, rather than a bored or helpless one.

THE SCIENTIFIC ACCESSIBILITY OF BOREDOM
Although there have been no attempts to conduct systematic research about the phenomenon of boredom, methods to do so might be
indicated.
Discussing possible parameters for the observation of boredom, it
is helpful to realize that boredom is a relative as well as an absolute
phenomenon. It is relative in the sense that animals perform a greater
variety of behaviour patterns in a more stimulating environment, and
therefore any environment can be said to be boring in comparison to a
richer environment. A rich environment can give us an idea of the
behavioural potential of different animal species, and may serve in this
way as a frame of reference for the evaluation of understimulating environments, and for the interpretation of the abnormal behaviour occurring in them. Boredom is an absolute phenomenon so far as lack of
stimulation becomes apparent in abnormal behaviour patterns.
For adequate observations of an environment that is suspected to
be boring, the following conditions seem to be essential:
1. A thorough knowledge of the species-specific behaviour and its
development in a rich, stimulating environment, whether it be
wild or domestic.
2. Observations of animal behaviour over long periods of time,
preferably 24 hours, or 12 hours a day. The occurrence of different behaviour patterns can be evaluated best in this way, since
boredom is a concept related to time.
3. The presence of the observer must be concealed, or it must be
certain that this does not influence the behaviour of the animals
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in any way. In relation to boredom this is especially important
since human presence is itself a stimulation which might temporarily obscure evidence of boredom.
The following criteria for boredom are proposed:
1. Stereotypic movements.
2. Redirected activity which occurs systematically towards inadequate stimuli.
3. Vacuum behaviour.
4. General apathy and immobility over longer periods, accompanied by an inalert expression in the eyes, if possible to
observe. This includes longer periods of sitting and standing.
The first three behaviours are evidence of the fact that an animal is
still trying to cope with a lack of stimulation. The fourth, advanced
state of boredom indicates the impossibility for the animal to express
itself; it has more or less given up trying to adapt to the situation.
The presence of any one of these behaviours is a direct indication
of the fact that the environment is inadequate for the behavioural
needs of an animal. It is generally agreed that understimulation is the
main cause for the behaviour patterns which are proposed as indicators of boredom. Everyone who spends a short time in a particular
intensive production system can observe the presence of stereotypic
behaviour, vacuum activities or redirected activities such as forms of
cannibalism. These are all qualitative indicators that the environment
is a boring one to which the animals have to adapt in an abnormal way.
As was said before, larger periods of observation are desirable for a
more detailed scientific description of the situation. However, it is
questionable whether at present this is really necessary. Much is
known already about the occurrence of abnormal behaviour in farm
animals, enough to indicate the actual need for environmental enrichment in intensive systems.
Accepting that boredom is an adverse state, it can be regarded as
a form of stress for the animal. Stress is a phenomenon that has mainly
been studied in terms of internal processes. That is, what are the effects of external stressors on homeostasis, which is the regulation of
the internal environment to maintain an internal equilibrium. In order
to gain insight into the way boredom acts as a stressor on an animal, a
general theoretical framework of stress will be discussed. Central questions in the development of such a framework appear to be "what is
normal?" and "is the maintenance of homeostasis a good criterion for
the absence of stress?" Secondly, "what are the best parameters for
abnormal, stressful states?" As will become clear, the last question
concentrates on the usefulness of behavioural versus physiological
parameters.
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BOREDOM AS A STRESSOR
Within the difficult and vague field of stress research, the concept
of a General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS), as developed by Hans Selye
was a major breakthrough (Moss 1981a; Friend 1980; Ewbank 1973).
One of the important aspects of his work was his distinction between
"stressors" and "stress response," the first referring to adverse or
noxious stimuli, the latter to the mechanisms by which an animal
resists the effects of adverse stimuli (Ewbank 1973; Moss 1981a). He
defined stress as a specific syndrome in a biological system, consisting
of all nonspecific responses to a stressor.
Although Selye's work is still very influential, Fraser, Ritchie and
Fraser (1975) have pointed out that the concept might be too simple.
First, specific stressors may not only generate nonspecific responses
but very specific ones as well (Siegel1980; Dantzer & Mormede 1981),
depending on the nature of the stressor. Second, while overstimulation
might cause a certain (general) reaction, it has become clear that
animals can be understimulated as well, which might also cause a
physiological reaction. In terms of the response of the animal, one
could speak of "understress," "stress" and "overstress" in this context, thereby indicating that "stress" in itself is not adverse, but that
only extreme effects are deleterious to the animal (Ewbank 1973;
Freeman 1978).
This immediately raises the question whether it is possible to
determine a "normal" baseline of stress in order to see which stressors
are "beneficial" (building up biological fitness) and which are adverse
(Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser 1975; Freeman 1976; Perry 1973). A study
on the variance in corticosteroid levels during egg-laying in hens
(Beuving 1980) showed also, however, that changes in normal behaviour correspond to variations in hormone concentration. This makes it
very hard to interpret any response of the adrenal glands as adverse or
normal. In fact, an animal is never in a static state, but always acting
and reacting to external and internal stimuli, in order to maintain a
state of internal, physiological homeostasis (Ewbank 1973).
This state of homeostasis is widely regarded as the "normal"
state. ''The psychological setpoint at which there is no effect on
welfare, represents the homeostatic setpoint" (Baxter 1982/83).
Behaviour, in this context, is regarded as the means by which an animal maintains homeostasis and adapts to the environment (Wiepkema
1982; Bure 1981a).
If the pressure of certain stimuli rises, however, and it becomes
harder for an animal to maintain a homeostatic equilibrium, the internal stress-response leads to a stage which is referred to as "the
resistance stage," a concept introduced by Selye (Fraser, Ritchie and
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Fraser 1975). If the stressors in the environment are too severe, or are
present too long, the stress-response proceeds into the so-called "exhaustion stage" which will result in death, if nothing is done (Freeman
1978; McBride 1979).
It is now widely believed that adaptation to a stressful situation (a
stressor) eliminates that event from being a stressor (Friend 1980
referring to Mobey), which implies that only when an animal's physiological state is in the stage of exhaustion, can it truly be called stressed
in its adverse meaning (McBride 1979; Perry 1973). A very practical
aspect of accepting this concept of stress is that in domestic situations, most animals are slaughtered before they could reach the exhaustion stage, and therefore it is hard to determine whether some
stimuli should be classified as highly stressful or not (McBride 1979;
Freeman 1975). Furthermore, the psychophysiological costs of adaptation, which may lower the animal's ability to cope with additional
stressors, need to be considered when it is believed that an animal has
actually adapted to a given set of stressors.
In the model of stress outlined above, "normal" as a standard for
-\
an acceptable level of stress-response can be replaced by "adapted"
(Bessei 1980), and is represented by a homeostatic state.
Several authors agree upon the fact that stress primarily must be
determined by means of physiological parameters, since homeostasis
is a physiological phenomenon (Freeman 1976; McBride 1979; Friend
1980). " ... It is quite clear that evidence will come from physiologists
and not ethologists. It is they who must face the problems of measurement and definition" (McBride 1979). If, after the initial acute
physiological response to adverse stimuli, physiological changes remain, it might well mean that the situation has become too severe and
that the animal cannot adapt through its behaviour. This is the worst
kind of stress, leading to death. If the initial physiological response
disappears after a while because of behavioural adaptation, then the
developed homeostatic state is not recognized as stressful according to
the framework presented above. In other words, a decrease of physiological deviation is directly correlated to a decrease of stress. Abnormal behaviour has been reported to cause a decrease in corticosteroid
reaction (Dantzer 1981; Bure 1981b; Dantzer and Mormede 1981), and
therefore might be regarded not as a sign of stress, but as a means towards decreasing stress (Wiepkema 1982; Dantzer and Mormede 1981).
It must be questioned whether it is appropriate to consider homeostasis as a standard of what is "normal" in this respect, since the price
that animals have to pay in order to be able to adapt is completely left
out of account. And the distortion of the intrinsic nature of an animal,
caused by the performance of abnormal behaviour, is a high price indeed.
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As Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser (1975) pointed out, from a veterinarian, animal-centered point of view, the quality of the process of coping
is as important as the final result. Referring to "the perennial disagreement" about the question whether behavioural disruptions could by
themselves be regarded as symptoms of stress, without physiological
confirmation, they state that this is justified, since "a system of
husbandry is clearly in need of improvement if adverse consequences
are prevented only by gross changes in either behaviour or physiology"
(emphasis added).
To understand the role behavioural and physiological factors play
it is important not just to understand the relationship between behaviour and physiology, but to understand first of all the relationship of
each of them with the nature, or beingness of the animal.
First of all, it is possible that there are as yet unknown physiological indicators, other than adrenocortical hormones, which do correlate with emotional behaviour. Heart-rate, cardiac output or skinresistance (Baldwin and Stephens 1971) or other neurohormonal systems (Dantzer and Mormede 1981) have been mentioned as possibilities. In this case behaviour and physiology would both refer to the
same state of being of the animal. The suggestion that there also
might be a fundamental difference regarding their function for the animal is elucidated by Seligman (1975), in his book Helplessness. Since
helplessness is an advanced form of boredom, as was described earlier,
Seligman's remarks apply very well to the study of boredom. After discussing several experiments, he concludes that the neurotransmitter
norepinephrine (NE) level appears to be a very important physiological
parameter for a feeling of control over the environment in humans and
animals. However, he goes on, "NE-depletion alone cannot account
for many of the facts that the cognitive theory predicts, since
NE-depletion seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient to produce
learned helplessness ... The difference between escapability and inescapability is not physical; it is information that can only be processed
cognitively." The way in which this information is processed in a particular situation depends on the behavioural possibilities the animal
has for controlling its environment (e.g. to escape or not). Cognition
and emotion are inseparable (Seligman 1975) and so cognition, emotion
and behavioural possibilities are linked on the same level of integration, namely the highest one possible, and equivalent to the concepts
of "nature," "telos" or "beingness." Considering Seligman's results it
can be concluded that stress in general and boredom in particular are
best assessed by behavioral parameters, rather than by physiological
ones. The idea that physiology is a form of behaviour as well (Wiepkema, personal communication 1982) obscures the presence of a qualitative difference between the two: behaviour has to do with the "whole"
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integrated animal, whereas physiology reflects the interaction of the
various (unconscious) parts. Physiological factors cannot be weighed
on the same scale as behavioural ones, though they can certainly be
useful indicators.*
With the definition of stress given by Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser
(1975), there is room for the considerations discussed above: "an abnormal or extreme adjustments in its behaviour or physiology, in order
to cope with adverse aspects of its environment and management."
So far we have argued that homeostasis is not an adequate
criterion for ''normal,'' since it ignores the price an animal has to pay
for its adaptation. It was also argued that behaviour as a parameter
for stressful states is, qualitatively speaking, the most appropriate
one. This shift in emphasis might make it easier to determine what is
"normal" when we have to speak of "abnormal or extreme adjustments." "Extreme" and "abnormal" in a behavioural context do not
refer to a numerical scale anymore as would be the case with physiological parameters, but to a qualitative change in behavioural adjustment. Redirected activity like tail-biting for example can then be
regarded as an indicator of stress, since it is a form of abnormal behaviour.
Rather then speaking of understress, stress and overstress, abnormal adjustments could be indicated by using the terms "stress" and
"distress;" distress being caused by understimulation, and stress by
overstimulation. In this way "normal" refers to a certain level of
"healthy" stimulation by specific stimuli (van Putten 1981), and not to
a normal level of "stress." It is true that animals need a certain
amount of stimulating "pressure" from the environment to develop
their "fitness," their flexible response to changing conditions. But if
the terms "understress" and "overstress" were used as Ewbank
(1973) proposed, thereby accepting the "normality" of stress, or even
calling it beneficial (Ewbank 1973), the adverse quality of the term
"stress" would be very much diminished and thereby lose most of its
meaning.
Boredom, in the framework developed above, can be characterized
as a form of distress, resulting from chronic understimulation. Important criteria are the different forms of abnormal behaviour, mentioned
in the previous paragraph. In physiology, hardly any relevant research
about the effects of understimulation has been done; a few relevant experiments will be discussed shortly. It seems important to consider

*Psychological-cognitive and emotional factors can be more potent in producing
physiological changes such as increased production of natural opiates than physical
trauma per se (Miczek, K.A. et al. 1982. Science 215:1520-1522)-Ed.
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that the physiological reaction towards understimulation might be
(fundamentally) different from the reaction to overstimulation, which
is aimed at a homeostatic equilibrium.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FIELD OF
ANIMAL WELFARE
In order to make it possible for the natural sciences to study
animal well-being, an operational definition of "well-being" is·
necessary. The definition given by Lorz (1979) has been widely accepted as useful in this context: "welfare implies a state of harmony,
both physical and psychological, of the animal with itself and with its
environment. Health and normal behaviour are usually indicators for
well-being. They presuppose a life-course which is species-specific,
and which does justice to species-specific behaviour."
As can be seen from the previous paragraphs boredom represents
a serious impairment of well-being as defined above since it implies a
fundamental lack of behavioural possibilities for an animal. Yet in a
larger context, so it is argued by many, this kind of suffering is only
relative. In nature, animals experience all kinds of other, harmful and
adverse conditions, such as bad weather, lack of food and the pressure
of predators. These are eliminated in intensive farm systems, where
the basic existence of an animal is guaranteed. How can we ever weigh
these different elements on an overall scale of well-being?
The argument implies that an ideal situation is not possible, and
therefore the present husbandry system might give an animal a different environment from its natural one, but not necessarily a worse
one. However, this line of thought leaves out the fact that we as
humans have consciously taken responsibility for the lives and wellbeing of our farm animals. Natural conditions for wild animals are
beyond human responsibility, but it lies fully within our power to provide farm animals with whatever they need, "and there can be no
justification for continuation of the conditions once severe strain has
been diagnosed" (McBride 1979). Not providing animals with the opportunity to express their behavioural needs is therefore a conscious
choice, dependent upon our own moral and economic standards. Only
from a dualistic perspective can one compare natural and confinement
conditions as if they were two "objective" situations. From an involved
perspective, it is clear that however thoroughly we study needs and
adaptive capacities of animals, in the end it remains a subjective
choice whether we realize certain options for the animal or not;
whether we force an animal to adapt, or give it room to express its
basic behavioural drives. "Potentiality is an unseen reality," and as
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long as we know that we could give an animal more stimulation, we
will have to find good reasons not to give it, however great the
animal's adaptive capacities.
Another option we have in the conflict present in farms, laboratories and zoos between the animal's needs and its actual environment, is
not to adjust the environment to the animal, but the animal to the environment. By altering its genetic make-up fundamentally through
selection and genetic manipulation, we could "create" animals whose
needs can be fulfilled in a man-made, economically oriented environment. By selecting animals "that are less aware of their environment
and so less likely to be distressed by it" (Duncan 1973), general animal
welfare could be "improved" according to several authors (Craig 1982;
Faure 1980; Beilharz 1982). Raymond (1980) rejects this idea, however,
not on ethical grounds but for the practical reason that it takes a very
long time; in the meantime our economic needs or ethical framework
might change, and then it would be hard to reverse the process. Adjusting the environment to the animal is more efficient on a shortterm basis and more flexible. But apart from the practical objections,
one can have serious ethical objections. Changing animals in this way
is again one step further on the road of the manipulation of life and the
acquisition of power over the world. I do not see this as a desirable
direction, and I think we would harm ourselves as much as the animals
by alienating ourselves in this way from natural life.
Boredom is a serious problem in present husbandry systems. In
the next section evidence for this statement will be provided, and the
importance of boredom in relation to other parameters of well-being
will be discussed.

PART II
BOREDOM IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
SYSTEMS
We have noted earlier that very little serious research about
animal boredom has been performed. But work on closely related subjects such as housing systems and stereotypic behaviour is very relevant to our understanding of boredom.
In the field of farm animal welfare, most research on environmental deprivation seems to be concentrated on battery cage chickens and
on sows and their litters kept in close confinement. Cows appear to
have much less need for external stimulation. This may be due to their
rumination process, which provides self-stimulation via chewing of
the cud and grooming, and thus "boredom and aggression are reduced
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in establishing groups of cattle" (Albright 1982). Yet in veal calves
boredom might be considered a serious problem. Because of isolation
and lack of opportunity to fulfill their needs, calves lick and suck
themselves, other calves, walls and inanimate objects. Health problems are often the result (Albright 1982).
A general description of present housing systems of pigs and chickens will now be given, and behavioural and physiological evidence of
boredom in these systems presented. The effect that boredom has on
other welfare criteria such as productivity, reproductivity, disease
susceptibility, etc., will be discussed and a general evaluation of
boredom as an indicator of welfare closes this section.

HOUSING SYSTEMS
The housing systems of chickens and sows have changed dramatically since the 1930's (Sainsbury 1978) and 1950's (van Putten 1982a).
Our improved technological ability to develop a completely artificially
controlled microclimate (Sainsbury 1978), the rapidly growing monopoly of the animal-feed industry (van Putten 1982a), the role of genetic
science in the selection for productive animals, along with the increasing cost of land and labour, have worked together to press farmers to
move the animals from outside yards to increasingly restricted environments, "where technical demands were given a higher priority
than the animal's basic needs" (Ekesbo 1981a). As a result "commercial egglayers" are housed mostly in multibird cages with the birds
kept in groups of 3 to 5 with considerable restriction of movements
(Sainsbury 1978).
Sows are usually kept in individual pens and are tethered, preventing social contact with other sows. The floor is bare; oestrus is usually
induced with hormones (because spontaneous oestrus disappears in
the absence of social C!Jntact), and piglets are weaned at ever earlier
ages (Lean 1978).

BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE FOR BOREDOM IN
PIGS AND CHICKENS
Sows and piglets
''The type of pigs most affected by the extreme changes in housing systems are sows" (Buchenauer 1981). Tethering or restraint
deprives them of their natural tendency to be active and inquisitive,
and the lives of sows have become "extremely dull" (van Putten
1982b); their great need to explore the environment is reflected in their
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continuous use (given the opportunity) of their very sensitive noses
(Hartsock, personal communication, 1982). In an article on sow health
and housing Ekesbo (1981a) reports that tied sows are significantly
less active during daytime than loose sows (respectively 32% versus
59%). During this active time the loose sows carried out 12 different
behaviour patterns with straw while for the tied sows, only two or
three behaviour patterns involving straw were observed. Furthermore,
Ekesbo (1981a) also notes that pig breeders have always given their
animals separate areas for feeding, defecating and lying. Recent investigations have shown that loose sows divide their time in these
three areas accompanied by 1216 social interactions, with 12 different
patterns of behaviour. Tied sows only performed 236 interactions,
while three patterns were completely absent.
Daelemans (1981) also argues that loose sows have a chance to
move between separate areas for drinking and eating, thereby being
able to gratify their apparently highly motivated need for exercise
(Ekesbo 1981a). Baxter (1981) adds nest building to the list of behavioural needs. Restrained sows can be observed trying to break away
before farrowing, because of their high motivation to move around and
arrange a nesting area (van Putten 1982b; Buchenauer 1981; Vestergaard 1981).
Restrained sows demonstrate a high incidence of abnormal behaviour, which can be as much as 17.5% of the whole range of behaviour
patterns (Buchenauer 1981). Stereotypical behaviour such as "weaving;" redirected activity such as "bar-biting," licking bars, trough
floor and chain; "play-drinking," and vacuum behaviour such as
"teethgrinding," "air-chewing," "tongue rolling" and rooting; and a
general restlessness, are strong evidence of frustration due to lack of
adequate stimuli (Ekesbo 1981a; Vestergaard 1981; Sambraus 1981;
van Putten 1982b; Buchenauer 1981). Other indicators are the long
periods, up to six hours, of "sitting," which has been attributed to
significant drowsiness (Buchenauer 1981). Vestergaard (1981), Sambraus (1981) and Fraser (1968) report observations of sows sitting with
their heads hanging down, or pressed against the stall divisions.
Standing, which occurs for long periods, may be regarded as a conflict
between the desire for activity and the impossibility to achieve it (Buchenauer 1981).
The absence of straw also appears to be a significant deprivation.
The effect of its presence or absence is discussed by many authors
(Ekesbo 1981a; Vestergaard 1981; Sambraus 1981). Vestergaard
(1981) reports in fact that oral and other stereotypies (such as weaving,
vacuum-chewing, bar-biting) were reduced. by loose straw. He found
that such abnormal behaviour would increase within a few days after
the removal of straw and decrease as soon as straw was present. This
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suggests that stereotypic behaviour might not be a remnant, left over
from adaptation to some adverse situation in the past (Wiepkema
1982), but an immediate response to the adequacy of the environment.
At the same time, straw could be used as nest building material (van
Putten 1982b).
Piglets are never restrained, but the effect of the absence or
presence of straw on their behaviour has been reported in several
studies. When straw is present, rooting and chewing are more common, and other patterns such as nest building behaviour and play with
the straw are elicited (Troxler 1980; van Putten and Dammers 1976).
When straw is absent, redirected exploratory behaviour such as nibbling on other piglets and inanimate objects occurs (Troxler 1980; van
Putten and Dammers 1976; Buchenauer 1981). Tail-biting is reported
to be positively correlated with the absence of straw, since the provision of straw reduces this behaviour (Sambraus 1981; Buchenauer
1981; Koomans 1981). Therefore tail-biting might be a sign of boredom (Ewbank 1981; Bareham and Vestergaard 1981). In the straw
barn, playing and fighting occur more than in cages (Bure 1981a), so
straw in pig pens provides play material and reduces boredom (Bareham and Vestergaard 1981). "By enriching even a small environment,
... their reactivity towards unfamiliar stimuli drops dramatically, and
approaches the low intensity and short duration seen under semi-natural condition" (Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980).
The long list of stereotypic and conflict behaviour, related to exploratory behaviour, feeding behaviour and locomotion in a richer environment where the sows are not restrained, provides evidence that
boredom is a real problem for pigs in modern confinement systems
without straw or some other substance to stimulate various natural
behaviours.

CHICKENS IN BATTERY CAGES
The chicken is a very different animal and is also considered to be
more primitive than a pig (Duncan 1981). Nevertheless, "deprivation
of external stimuli is a factor to be considered even in an animal as
phylogenetically primitive as a fowl" (Wood-Gush 1973).
Compared to deep litter pens, battery cages restrict behavioural
patterns such as turning, dust-bathing, ground-pecking, wing-flapping, movement flapping and general locomotion (Bareham 1972,
1976; Duncan 1979; Hughes 1978). Furthermore, the absence of litter
and nest boxes makes dust-bathing and nesting behaviour impossible.
As was observed for pigs above, the restriction of several behavioural possibilities is accompanied by a range of abnormal behaviour
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patterns, like stereotypic movements and redirected activities. The
most prevalent abnormalities are feather-pecking, as a form of cannibalism, stereotypic pacing, stereotypic headflicking, displacement
preening and vacuum dust-bathing.
"The most important factor contributing to feather-pecking is the
absence of litter" (Duncan 1978). This is supported by experiments
conducted by Bareham (1976). Hughes (1978) suggests that rather
than being a result of boredom, feather-pecking is a substitute for
ground-pecking. However, redirected activities are regarded as signs
of boredom since they indicate the lack of stimuli. Feather-pecking
can be compared to tail-biting in pigs: one animal, probably genetically disposed, starts the vice, and the others "learn" it from a few initiators (Duncan 1978; Sambraus 1981). Sambraus also states that, if
chickens are fed on the ground instead of a trough, this reduces
feather-pecking.
Stereotypic pacing is usually regarded as a sign of frustration due
to the impossibility of performing nest building behaviour in a battery
cage (Hughes 1978; Duncan 1978; Bareham 1976; Brantas 1980;
Wood-Gush 19'Z3; Folsch 1980). Experimentally frustrated hens, in
fact, do exhibit stereotypic pacing (Duncan 1978).
Head-flicking in laying hens described by Bareham (1972) can be
compared to an equivalent sort of head turn in zoo animals when they
are engaged in stereotypic pacing (Bareham 1972; Fox 1971). Its occurrence can be attributed to a monotonous environment with arestriction of external stimuli. This behaviour can be seen as the
animal's attempt to increase its sensory input (Bareham 1972; Duncan
1981). Compensatory feeding behaviour, where chickens play with
their food for long periods, without a higher intake of food, can be
regarded as a compensation for other behaviour which has become impossible. A similar phenomenon occurs in pigs. Excessive preening can
likewise be interpreted as a sign of "mild frustration" in the form of
compensatory activity (Bareham 1976; Duncan 1979). The occurrence
of vacuum dust-bathing indicates the innate need for a hen to perform
this behaviour (Hughes 1980; Vestergaard 1981). The same is true of
the need for wing-flapping and body/wing shaking, which may accumulate as well during deprivation (Vestergaard 1981).
Aggression might be considered as a sign of frustration due to
deprivation, since it can be reduced by providing hens with a nest box
(Vestergaard 1981). Vestergaard furthermore states that this indicates
that "the birds really do miss those things."
From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that boredom, as defined earlier, is a concept applicable to the chicken as well.
The fact that they miss exploration-eliciting stimuli, and stimuli that
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facilitate other natural behaviour, can be inferred from the presence of
many abnormal behaviour patterns, and from experiments that have
shown that chickens prefer to work for their food rather than have it
available freely (Wood-Gush 1973).

PHYSIOLOGICAL INDICATORS OF BOREDOM
Although it was suggested that stress, and distress due to
understimulation, are detected mainly through behavioural phenomena, this does not mean that there are no physiological indicators.
However, hardly any direct research into physiological responses to
understimulation has yet been done. It is known from several experiments (Dantzer and Mormede 1981; Wiepkema 1982) that deprivation can originally lead to rise of plasma corticosteroid levels. But
stereotypic behaviour such as chain-nibbling in pigs during food
deprivation reduces the hormone levels considerably (Dantzer and
Mormede 1981). As a result of these experiments it was concluded that
circulating ACTH and corticosteroid levels are not sensitive to chronic
stress (which boredom is considered to be). However, Barnett, Hemsworth, and Hand (1982/83) do refer to corticosteroid levels as parameters for chronic stress, based on experiments about the effect of
handling pigs. Corticosteroids might be sensitive to chronic stress,
therefore, but not to chronic distress. This is supported by the fact
that none of the three studies done so far on understimulation in chickens indicates any difference between battery cages and deep litter
pens in adrenal activity (Freeman 1978). One can speculate that there
may be physiological indicators that correlate with understimulation,
e.g. the neurotransmitter norepinephrine (Seligman 1975).

THE EFFECT OF BOREDOM ON PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ANIMAL
Production
A bored pig is a slower growing pig, and "time is money" (Jesse,
Wall Street Journal-11/1982). Jesse reported that a group of pigs,
moved around to other, identical pens twice before slaughter, gained 1
pound more per pig per week than a control group. More stimulation,
and a different view of the other pigs around them, are given as the explanation for this. Similar results were found by Koomans (1981): fattening pigs housed in an open front piggery with straw had a significantly higher average daily gain, and higher average back fat, than
those without straw. The average food conversion was the same, which
indicates that the animals ate more per day. This was also noted by
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Jesse who stated of his pigs that "they felt better and ate better." As
tail-biting may result in condemnation to death at the abbatoir, straw
given to prevent tail-biting can minimize production loss in an indirect way (Bareham and Vestergaard 1981).
In chicken farming both better and worse production have been
observed in pens compared to cages (Bareham 1972). The occurrence of
cannibalism and extreme flightiness does decrease egg production
(Craig 1982), but how this correlates with housing in cages or pens is
not clear. There are many different factors at work, and a definitive experiment has not yet been carried out.
Reproduction
The adverse effects of restraint on sows are indicated by a number
of results. First, sows come into heat earlier in a free-range environment, the main reason being the social stimulation from other sows
(van Putten 1982a), but also because piglets suckle less. The constant
suckling in intensive systems retards oestrus (Stolba 1982). In an indirect way, restraint, and thereby the prevention of nesting behaviour,
affects reproduction: the resulting stress can cause inflammation of
udder and uterus, and lactation becomes impossible. This syndrome is
especially prevalent in gilts. Also, indications have been found that
restraint at farrowing increases the incidence of still births, mummified piglets and piglets with splaylegs (Baxter 1981; Ekesbo 1981a).
Disease- susceptibility
An increase in the frequency of disease in sows correlates with the
increased restraint of sows in confinement systems. It is not unusual
that continuous medication is needed to prevent disease, and this is a
poor way of maintaining the animal's health compared to changing the
environment (Ekesbo 1981a; Buchenauer 1981). Concerning the direct
correlation between exploratory behaviour and disease, different
studies have shown that there is a significantly higher incidence of
Salmonella (diarrhea) infection in herds with no straw (Metz and
Oosterlee 1980; Ekesbo 1981b), although rationally the opposite might
be expected because straw may be seen as a good medium for building
up an infection fast (Truyen 1981). Backstrom's studies of environmental factors showed that general health was better in pens with
straw compared to other beddings, and much better than in pens with
no bedding (Ekesbo 1981a).
In this same line Metz and Oosterlee (1980) found a lower antibody
level and therefore a greater disease susceptibility, of tethered sows in
pens without straw, compared with free sows in pens with straw. Total
morbidity, and also the occurrence of the mastitis syndrome (agalactia
toxemia) was shown to be much higher for tethered sows; the litters of
tethered sows in a small pen had a higher total morbidity than litters
of free sows in large pens (Ekesbo 1981a).
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For sows and piglets it seems there is a direct correlation between
disease susceptibility and restraint and the absence of straw, which
are considered to be the two conditions which are very likely to cause
boredom. Besides diarrhea and mastitis, infectious pneumonia is a frequently occurring and highly damaging illness in pig operations.
For fowl, experimental work has been done on the effect of stress
on disease susceptibility (Freeman 1976; Siegel 1980). How these
results apply to the different aspects of battery cage life is not clear;
only the effects of social stress as a result of reduced space have been
examined (Siegel 1980) and were found to cause decreased antibody
levels and greater susceptibility to viral diseases such as New Castle
disease, Marek's disease, hemorrhagic enteritis, and Salmonella infection. (However, resistance to bacterial infection seemed to be increased.)
Most of these stress factors are coupled with a rise in corticosteroid
levels (Freeman 1976), but Freeman also reports that antibody production can be shown "to be impaired by stressors which do not even
evoke a rise in plasma corticosterone. If more research would be done
in this field, it might be speculated that lack of stimulation, and
resulting boredom and frustration, can be forms of non-corticosteroid
mediated chronic stress that affect antibody production.''

PHYSICAL INJURY
The most obvious examples of physical injury as a result of
boredom are the vices of tail-biting in pigs and feather-pecking in laying hens. These are countered by debeaking hens and cutting the tails
of newly born piglets. From a welfare point this is unacceptable, certainly for the hen, since the beak is a primary sensory tool for receiving
information from the environment (Duncan 1978). Many physical injuries are not directly a result of boredom like the examples above, but
are a result of the same barren environment that causes the boredom.
For instance, wounds on feet and back in pigs are a result of the bare,
hard floors (Troxler 1980; Baxter 1981); just as severely damaged
claws of hens are caused by the wire floors of battery cages (Tauson
1980). These injuries could be prevented by providing some sort of bedding; this would, at the same time, lead to the alleviation of boredom.
The same is true for the tethering of sows; the many traumatic injuries
attributed to tethering (Ekesbo 1981a) could be prevented by housing
the sows in a free-range pen. The close correlation between understimulation and injury, due to the same practice, indicates the general inadequacy and undesirability of that practice.
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GENERAL EVALUATION
Studies described in this chapter about the influence of straw for
pigs and deep litter for laying hens confirm the idea that environmental enrichment will be beneficial and adequate as a remedy against
some forms of abnormal behaviour.
Is it important to consider boredom seriously as a criterion of welfare, and what its impact is compared to other welfare criteria?
An essential characteristic of boredom in evaluating welfare is
that it directly refers to the mental state of the animal and therefore
directly implies suffering. Productivity and reproduction are indirect
parameters; they are not only animal centered, since the farmer's
well-being depends on good productivity as well. Physical injury and
disease are animal centered, and it is generally accepted that these are
adverse to the animals' mental well-being. If not too severe, and not
too prolonged, however, pain and disease might be "bearable." The
same may be the case with many forms of stress as a result of overstimulation, since they are temporary and do not fundamentally impair the integrity of the whole animal. But boredom as it is present in
today's production system causes the animals to suffer on their most
existential level. An animal which cannot express its specific behaviour patterns loses its fundamental selfhood, cannot develop itself in
relation to its environment and cannot bear anything, pain in particular. Deprivation of selfhood is the most fundamental affliction that can
be imposed upon an individua~ be it pig, chicken or human.
In nature, animals are never bored. A certain amount of environmental and social stress might be present, but that does not
deprive the animal of its capacity to deal with it. If not too severe, it
might even enhance its coping abilities. Weather conditions and social
interaction are factors that might be desirable in husbandry systems
as well. In human society, prisons are confinement systems where
material care is sufficient, but the freedom of self-expression is intentionally restricted. This may be a moral choice, but we certainly do not
consider a prison a normal environment, and boredom is known to be a
chronic problem there.
To suggest that boredom might be fundamentally worse than several forms of pain does not imply, of course, that the infliction of pain
should not be avoided where possible. It is not a matter of either one or
the other. Rather, as has been discussed in this paper, it is very likely
that many other welfare characteristics will be improved as well by
alleviating boredom. Production, reproduction, and health can be
directly improved, because there is either a direct causal relationship
between boredom and these characteristics, or there is a positive cor-
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relation, as between boredom and physical injury, both being theresult of the same causal factor.
The fact that boredom does have quite a wide range of effects on
other aspects of the individual animal, shows that it is not just anthropomorphic to state that boredom is fundamentally harmful to the
integrity of an animal. Its complete physical health is affected and the
deprivation of selfhood is one of the most serious attacks on mental
health. This is not an anthropomorphic statement, but a statement
about the quality of life, and therefore applying to all living beings.

CONCLUSIONS
1. An empathetic, caring relationship between observer and animal is fundamental if we are aiming at knowledge of the subjective experience of the animal under certain conditions. This can be a ''personal" relationship between the observer and an individual animal, but it
can also take the form of a general empathetic attitude towards a
group of animals, or towards lower, less individuated animals.
A detached, dualistic relationship can be regarded as resulting
from an interest in knowledge for the sake of manipulation; an attitude
of (nonpossessive) love on the other hand has the intention of knowing
an object in order to be able to facilitate that the object can truly be or
become itself. Therefore, an empathetic attitude may be more "objective" than a detached one (see also Section II, Empathy, Humaneness
and Animal Welfare). Furthermore, the alienation between knower and
known is replaced by involvement, and quality becomes more important than quantity because an attitude of care regards an animal as a
qualitative being instead of a quantifiable mechanism.
2. Each animal exists on its own level of beingness, implying that
awareness and emotional experience are fundamental characteristics
of life, existing down to the lowest levels. However far removed from
human inner experience as the lower levels might be, the concept of beingness implies a respect for the selfhood of each species, and a recognition of the fact that the quality of life matters to each animal.
Many higher vertebrates, such as dogs, dolphins, elephants, primates, etc., show capacities which indicate self-awareness and a welldeveloped individual emotional life. They are intelligent and sensitive
and an adequate environment is crucial for the proper expression of their
selfhood. We should therefore be prepared to meet animals on their
own terms in order to value their innate abilities and potentialities, instead of forcing them to "adapt" to man-made environments and to
those conditions that cause them otherwise avoidable stress and distress.
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3. Behaviour is the qualitative expression of an animal's selfhood,
and is therefore an end in itself, and not a means towards a homeostatic state, or towards successful reproduction. Each animal has
basic, genetically inherited, behavioural needs which clearly matter to
it, because when it is prevented from performing these behaviours it
resorts to abnormal behaviour or becomes apathetic. An animal can be
said to be bored when it has to adapt to its environment in an abnormal
way, indicative of understimulation, in order to maintain its sense of
selfhood. Boredom can be regarded as a form of distress, indicating
that an animal is stressed, not due to overstimulation, but due to understimulation.
Behavioural criteria of boredom have been delineated in this paper
and it was concluded that behaviour represents a higher level of integration than physiology; it concerns the whole, integrated animal,
whereas physiology reflects the interaction of the various (unconscious) parts. Physiological processes are directed at the maintenance of a homeostatic state. This state, however, is not necessarily
equivalent to a state of well-being. Boredom is a form of suffering
which primarily is the result of a cognitive process, directly linked to
the behavioural possibilities an animal has. Physiological observations
are not more objective because they are easier to quantify; in contrast
with behaviour they miss the direct link to the subjective experience of
an animal, and are therefore, secondary though they might be, useful
indicators.
4. Many forms of abnormal behaviour in pigs and chickens are described. Their relatedness to boredom appears from the fact that they
usually disappear when some form of environmental enrichment takes
place, and when the animals are more able to express different behaviours.
For sows and piglets, the fulfillment of basic needs which prevent
the worst forms of boredom seem to be: the ability to moue unrestrictedly in a certain amount of space; the provision of straw and contact
with other conspecifics.
For chickens, these needs are: some space to moue, material to perform basic nest building behaviour and the opportunity to search for
food on the floor.
In a housing system where food and drink are provided, the most
important remedy against boredom is the provision of explorative
possibilities. Doing something, whether it be playing, looking for food,
or ht1ilding a nest, constitutes the basis for selfhood. Deprivation of
selfhood is the most fundamental affliction for any living being, and is
reflected in lower production, lower reproduction, higher disease
susceptibility and an increasing amount of physical injury.
Recent research projects indicate that it is possible indeed to
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create environments for domestic animals which give them much more
freedom to express their behavioural needs, within economic limits
(Wood-Gush and Stolba 1982; Albright 1982). The argument that if an
animal is productive it surely is healthy and adapted, obscures the fact
that the use of medical drugs is essential to keep farm animals alive
and productive (Fox 1983a). Medical care is very expensive, and the
cart is constantly put before the horse in this way. Instead of starting
to care for animals when it is almost too late, it seems better to accept
care as the foundation for our attitude towards them.
In this paper I wanted to indicate and elaborate on the idea that
there is an important and direct link between a meta-scientific starting point of empathetic relationship, and practical guidelines for animal husbandry. The willingness to meet animals in a relationship of
friendship, thereby discovering their inner world, can result in useful,
animal-centered knowledge of their needs and preferences. We might
in this way be able to create an environment for the animal which is
healthy, both physically and mentally, and which will benefit not only
them, but ourselves as well.
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Abstract
This paper reviews the results of a study of 267 children in the
2nd, 5th, 8th, and 11th grades. A battery of tests was used to examine
children's knowledge and attitudes towards animals, and behavioral
contacts with animals. A typology of basic attitudes towards animals
and appropriate scales was employed. Children's knowledge and attitudes towards animals were also compared to those of adults 18
years of age and over. Major differences occurred among children distinguished by age, sex, ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. Additionally, significant knowledge and attitude variations occurred
among diverse animal-related activity groups (e.g., among children
who hunted, birdwatched, learned about animals in school). Perhaps
the most important finding was the identification of three stages in the
development of children's perceptions of animals. The transition from
*This study was funded by grants from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and G.R.
Dodge Foundation. For details of Dr. Kellert's earlier and more extensive study of
American attitudes toward and knowledge of animals, see Appendix.
**Many thanks to Miriam Westervelt who co-authored the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, General Printing Office report #024-010-00641-2 of the children's study.
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6 to 9 years of age primarily involved major changes in affective, emotional relationships to animals. The change from 10 to 13 years of age
was marked by a major increase in cognitive, factual understanding
and knowledge of animals. The shift from 13 to 16 years of age witnessed a dramatic broadening in ethical concern and ecological appreciation of animals and the natural environment.

INTRODUCTION
This report is the fifth in a series of studies on American attitudes,
knowledge and behaviors toward animals and natural habitats. The
first three reports focused on the findings of a national survey of 3, 107
adult Americans residing in the 48 contiguous states and Alaska (Kellert 1979, 1980a; Kellert and Berry 1981). The fourth report considered
historical trends in American animal use and perception during the
twentieth century (Kellert and Westervelt 1982). This fifth report focuses on children's attitudes, knowledge and behaviors toward animals.
Children's perceptions of animals, particularly very young children, are especially difficult to study (Pomerantz 1977). This study
should, therefore, be regarded as exploratory, preliminary and tentative. Because of its exploratory character, this study did not include a
random sample of American children. The sample was instead confined to
the state of Connecticut, although representative numbers of children
from each age, sex, urban/rural, and black/white category were included.
The total sample included 63 second, 68 fifth, 67 eighth, and 69 eleventh grade students: a total of 267 children. Because somewhat similar
methodologies were employed in the study of adult Americans, the
children's sample will at times be compared with results obtained in
the national adult survey.

KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS
Knowledge of animals was assessed primarily in four ways: a
series of 33 true/false and multiple choice questions, a pictorial identification test of 15 animals, 11 questions regarding the primary foods of
selected animals, and a film test focusing on ecological relationships.
The results generally indicated that most children possessed a limited knowledge of animals. For example, less than 30% of the children
were aware that the spring peeper is a frog, and only 29% knew koala
bears are not really bears. A disappointing 21% understood veal does
not come from lamb, and 55% believed whales are a large fish. A better
but disappointing 60% realized all birds do not fly south for the
winter, but only 52% knew the penguin is a bird, just 26% knew a tern
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is not an insect, and only 29% realized tigers do not live in Africa.
Lack of ecological understanding was suggested by responses to
the film testing segment. Most children interpreted predation and
nutrient cycling in anthropomorphic and negative terms, rarely appreciating or identifying the ecological values of these activities. The efforts of dung beetles were generally considered "disgusting," and
many children regarded predation as "wrong."
However, some encouraging knowledge results did emerge. Children as a whole, and 11th graders in particular, were significantly
more knowledgeable than adults on questions concerning invertebrates and the basic biological characteristics of animals (Table 1).
Adults were, however, more knowledgeable than children about domestic animals and situations involving animals inflicting injury on people
and property. Greater knowledge of invertebrates among children was
suggested by 78% of all children and 86% of 11th graders, compared
to 50% of adults, knowing spiders do not have 10 legs. When adults
were compared with 11th graders only, 23% of adults versus 48% of
the students knew inch worms are not in the same family as earth
worms.
Table 1. Mean correct score by types of knowledge questions

Children's and adult samples
All children
( <18 years of age)
Biological characteristics
Invertebrates
Human injury
Domestic animals
Taxonomic characteristics
Endangered species

56.8
47.5
39.5
39.2
37.3
24.6

11th
grade

Adult
( <18 years of age)

63.9
51.3
47.8
44.4
43.9
24.6

55.3
34.7
63.4
53.4
38.5
27.4

Based, on mean scores, children were most knowledgeable about
the basic biological characteristics of animals (e.g., "snakes are covered by a thin layer of slime") and invertebrates. These knowledge
question categories had overall mean scores, respectively, of 56.8 and
47.5, on a scoring range from 0 to 100. Adults had a dramatically lower
invertebrate question mean score of 34.7. The adults, however, obtained a
significantly higher mean score on questions concerning human injury or
property damage-63.4 versus a children's mean of 39.5. Both children
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and adults had similar scores on the "taxonomic characteristics of animals" category (e.g., "koala bears are not really bears")-37.3 and
38.5 respectively. Both groups possessed relatively little knowledge of
endangered species.
Children were relatively able to recognize a variety of animal species. At least 85% correctly identified a bluejay, swan, rattlesnake,
eagle, raccoon, dolphin, wolf and monarch butterfly. Almost threequarters correctly identified a duck, although only 28% recognized it
as a mallard duck. On the other hand, only 8% could identify a great
blue heron, just one-third recognized a duck-billed platypus, and only
15% knew a bobwhite.
Children were also knowledgeable about the primary foods of a
variety of species. Most children knew what foods were mainly eaten
by mice, rabbits, wolves, owls, robins, caterpillers, snakes, and frogs.
Only a minority, however, knew which foods were primarily consumed
by trout, deer, and bobcats.
Highly significant knowledge scale differences occurred among
children distinguished by age, ethnicity, and geographic place of residence. Male/female differences were also significant but at a more
modest .02 confidence level (Table 2). Eleventh grade children had the

Table 2. Analysis of variance and multiple classification results on knowledge scale
among age, sex, ethnic and urban/rural groups

Sig F

Age
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade
Sex
Male
Female
Ethnicity
White
Nonwhite
Urban/rural
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural

X score

Deviation from grand mean
after adjusting for independent
and covariate variables

30.50
39.64
51.18
55.11

-13.99
- 5.64
7.45
11.57

47.03
41.82

2.47
2.39

47.40
31.60

1.17
5.72

38.00
46.90
42.90
52.30

5.96
1.13
1.13
5.23

.00

.02

.02

.00
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highest mean scores; 2nd graders, the lowest. Relatively high knowledge scores occurred among rural children and 8th graders. In contrast, relatively low knowledge means were characteristic of black children and children residing in large cities.
Age distinctions were especially impressive. Knowledge scale differences among 8th and 11th graders, however, were substantially less
divergent than between 5th and 8th graders, suggesting a decline in
the effect of age. An absence of knowledge scale differences among
adults over 18 years of age further suggested decreasing importance of
age on knowledge of animals.
Ethnic differences were very striking, particularly the very low
knowledge scores of nonwhites. Black children had the lowest knowledge scores of any demographic group with the exception of 2nd
graders. These knowledge scale differences remained after considering
the possible confounding effects of other demographic variables, particularly urban/rural residence.
Urban/rural differences were very significant, particularly when
comparing children living in large cities with those residing in the
most rural areas. Rural children had the second highest knowledge
scale scores, in contrast to children residing in large cities, who had the
third lowest scores.
Male/female differences were less pronounced, although still significant at the .02 level. Significantly higher male knowledge scores
typically occurred when the animal was a predator. Species preference
results also revealed a more negative view of predator animals among
female children.

ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS
A typology of basic attitudes toward animals was developed during previous research on adult relationships to animals. Brief definitions of nine attitude types are indicated in Table 3, although more
thorough descriptions are available elsewhere (Kellert 1980b). Survey
scales were developed to measure each of the attitudes, although it
proved impossible to obtain an adequate aesthetic scale. Fifty-four
questions were used for measuring the eight attitude scales. Additionally, a 30-minute film, and an accompanying 87-item questionnaire, were created to provide a less structured and more visually sensitive test of attitudes toward animals. Approximately 70 films were
reviewed to obtain appropriate segments for this film methodology.
The relative independence of the eight attitude scales was suggested
by scale intercorrelations of .30 and less with the exception of the
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Table 3. Attitudes toward animals
Naturalistic:
Ecologistic:
Humanistic:
Moralistic:
Scientistic:
Aesthetic:
Utilitarian:
Dominionistic:
*Negativistic:

Primary interest and affection for wildlife and the outdoors.
Primary concern for the environment as a system, for interrelationships between wildlife species and natural habitats.
Primary interest and strong affection for individual animals,
principally pets.
Primary concern for the right and wrong treatment of animals,
with strong opposition to exploitation or cruelty toward animals.
Primary interest in the physical attributes and biological functioning of animals.
Primary interest in the artistic and symbolic characteristics of
animals.
Primary concern for the practical and material value of animals
or the animal's habitat.
Primary interest in the mastery and control of animals typically
in sporting situations.
Primary orientation an active avoidance of animals due to indifference, dislike or fear.

*Hypothetically, the negativistic attitude can be divided into two attitude types:
neutralistic attitude reflecting a passive avoidance of animals due to indifference; and,
a negativistic attitude characterized by dislike and fear of animals. In this research, only one encompassing attitude has been considered.

negativistic and naturalistic, and negativistic and ecologistic attitudes, which correlated at the +.48 level.
The relative occurrence of the attitudes was assessed by examining attitude scale score frequency distributions, the slope of the regression line of the frequency distributions, and standardized attitude
scale mean scores. According to these indicators, the most common attitude was the humanistic (Figure 1). This attitude scale had the
highest mean score, lowest slope figure (indicative of a more dispersed
frequency distribution), and included more children in the higher scoring ranges. Also indicative of .the relative "popularity" of the humanistic attitude was the finding of "loveable animals" as the most
preferred type of animal, cited by 39% of the children (Table 4). In
general, strong emotional attachment to individual animals, and a
tendency toward anthropomorphism, were the most typical perceptions of animals among the children studied.
The second and third most frequent attitudes were the naturalistic
and negativistic. These attitudes were negatively correlated, suggesting two somewhat conflicting perspectives of animals as common
among children. The relative "popularity" of the naturalistic perspective was also suggested by "animals in the woods" as the second most
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Figure 1: Frequency distributions and mean scores of attitude scales, children
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Table 4. Type of animal liked the most by all children

Beautiful animals
Useful animals
Animals that scientists study
Loveable animals
Animals in sports
Animals in the woods
Animals that are important to the balance of nature

11.7%
8.8%
5.6%
38.8%
9.1%
22.8%
4.2%

preferred type of animal, cited by 23% of the children.
The moralistic attitude ranked fourth in overall frequency of occurrence. Concern for the ethical treatment of animals was indicated
by 70% of the children objecting to harvesting wild animals for their
fur. Additionally, only 26% of the children supported hunting for recreational or sporting purposes, and 91% objected to trophy hunting,
although 60% approved of hunting for food.
The utilitarian attitude was fifth in relative "popularity." By comparison, the greater frequency of the humanistic and naturalistic attitudes suggested children appreciate animals more for recreational
and emotional than for practical reasons. Only 9% of the children cited
"useful" animals as their favorite type of animal.
The dominionistic attitude was relatively uncommon, ranking
sixth in frequency of occurrence. The least requently occurring attitudes were the ecologistic and scientistic. These latter attitudes emphasize an intellectual perspective of animals, suggesting that conceptual understandings of animals are somewhat uncommon among children. The rarity of the scientistic and ecologistic attitudes was also reflected in "scientifically interesting animals" being cited by 6%, and
animals "important to the balance of nature" by 4%, of the children as
their favorite types of animals.
In the national study of adults, the humanistic attitude was also
the most frequent perspective of animals, and the negativistic and
moralistic attitudes were similarly popular (Table 5). The most striking difference in attitudes towards animals between children and
adults was the widely varying occurrence of the naturalistic and
utilitarian perspectives; The naturalistic attitude was much more common among children, while a utilitarian view of animals was far more
typical of adults.
Some impressive attitude differences occurred among children distinguished by age, sex, ethnicity, and urban/rural residence.
Significant age differences were observed on every scale with the
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Table 5. National sample-18 years and older; childrens sample-2nd, 5th, 8th,
11th grades by attitude scale mean scores, slope of scale frequency distribution, and
rank of occurence
Adults
X

Dominionistic
Ecologistic
Humanistic
Moralistic
Naturalistic
Negativistic
Scien tis tic
Utilitarian

.14
.22
.36
.27
.20
.28

.10
.23

Children

Slope based on Rank of
actual response occurence
ranges
-

746.08
603.25
359.86
- 375.90
- 578.32
- 456.61
-1143.45
- 398.21

7
5
1
3
6
2
8
4

x
.27
.27
.43
.33
.35
.35
.23
.30

Slope based on Rank of
actual response occurence
ranges
-52.06
-61.60
-17.09
-37.05
-25.04
-23.68
-76.67
-45.74

5
5
1
4
2
2
8
4

exception of the humanistic (Table 6). Younger children consistently
placed the needs of people over animals, and expressed minimal concern for the rights and protection of animals. This difference was
reflected in highly significant utilitarian, dominionistic, and moralistic
scale results. Younger children also expressed far less interest in
animals, particularly wildlife. This difference was reflected in highly
significant negativistic and naturalistic results. Finally, younger children were substantially less knowledgeable and informed about animals and the natural environment, as suggested by striking knowledge and ecologistic scale findings.
These results were somewhat surprising, perhaps due to our society's idealization of young children's perceptions of animals. The
tendency is to believe young children have some natural affinity for
living creatures, regarding them as little friends or kindred spirits. The
results suggest otherwise, since young children were the most exploitative, unfeeling, and uninformed of all children in their attitudes
toward animals. Some have argued our society creates a "make-believe" world for young children, often ill-preparing them for reality,
and a related tendency may be a distortion of the actual views of
young people toward animals. These results suggest educational efforts among children 6 to 10 years of age might best focus on the affective realm, mainly emphasizing emotional concern and sympathy for
animals.
The most profound shift between 5th and 8th grade was a major
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Table 6. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for grade
by attitude and knowledge scales
SigF
score

Dominionistic
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade
Ecologistic
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade
Humanistic
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade
Moralistic
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade
Naturalistic
2nd grade
5th grade
8th grade
11th grade

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
&cov.
variables

.00

SigF

X
score

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

Negativistic .00
4.65
3.26
1.96
2.12

1.71
0.24
-1.35
-0.56

2.00
2.43
3.03
4.28

-1.06
-0.57
0.26
1.30

4.37
4.26
3.45
4.52

0.16
-0.02
-0.36
-0.03

3.59
3.79
3.45
4.71

0.30
0.12
0.36
0.74

.00

Scientistic

.67

Utilitarian

8.79
6.29
5.12
4.04

2.87
0.12
0.87
1.98

3.11
1.93
1.06
1.38

1.22
0.17
0.87
0.48

4.20
3.10
3.06
2.77

0.86
0.16
0.24
0.43

30.50
39.65
51.18
55.11

-13.99
- 5.64
7.45
11.57

.00

.00

.01

.01

Knowledge
5.89
5.53
5.18
6.84

0.03
-0.20
-0.83
0.97

.00

The ages of children in the 2nd, 5th, 8th and 11th grades are (approximately): 6-7,
10, 13, and 16-18 years, respectively.

increase in factual knowledge of animals. The apparent value of emphasizing factual learning at this age is consistent with results reported by Horvat (1974), Dyar (1975), La Hart (1978), and Giles (1959).
Eleventh graders were far more ecologistic, moralistic, and naturalistic in their attitudes toward animals than were 8th graders. Activity results also suggested 11th grade children were far more interested in direct contact and recreational enjoyment of wildlife and the
out-of-doors. The most basic change at this stage, thus, involved major increases in ethical concern for animals, appreciation of wildlife,
and an ability to deal with abstract concepts such as ecosystems and
biological diversity. This period appears to offer the best opportunity
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for developing ethical concern for animals and an understanding of
ecology.
In summary, three major transitions were suggested by theresults. The period from 2nd to 5th grade was most significantly characterized by a major increase in emotional concern and affection for animals. The years between 5th and 8th grades witnessed a dramatic improvement in factual and cognitive understanding of animals. Finally,
the change from 8th to 11th grade was marked most of all by a major
expansion in ethical and ecological concern for animals and the natural
environment.
Highly significant differences among male and female children occurred on the dominionistic, ecologistic, humanistic, negativistic, and
knowledge scales (Table 7). Moderately significant utilitarian scale results were also found. These results indicated greater factual knowledge, awareness and concern for wildlife among male children. On the
other hand, female children were more inclined to oppose subordination and dominance of animals, and evidenced a greater emotional affection for large, attractive, primarily domestic pet animals.
Male/female differences on the humanistic, dominionistic and negativistic scales were significant at all age levels. Gender differences on
Table 7. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for sex by
attitude and knowledge scales

SigF

x
score

Dominionistic
Male
Female
Ecologistic
Male
Female
Humanistic
Male
Female
Moralistic
Male
Female
Naturalistic
Male
Female

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

.00

Sig F

x
score

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

Negativistic .00
3.61
2.34

0.64
-0.62

3.36
2.60

0.39
-0.38

3.93
4.65

-0.35
0.34

3.73
4.05

-0.16
0.16

5.78
5.95

-0.13
0.13

.01

Scientistic

.01

Utilitarian

5.18
6.80

-0.88
0.85

1.83
1.86

-0.03
0.03

3.50
3.06

0.19
-0.19

47.03
41.82

2.47
-2.39

.89

.09

.27

.66

Knowledge

.02
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the knowledge, ecologistic and moralistic scales, however, were inconsequential among 2nd grade children, although significant at all
other age levels. An increase in moralistic concern among female students from 8th to 11th grades was particularly impressive. Male children, in contrast, became far more knowledgeable and concerned about
wildlife and the natural environment than female children as they grew
older.
Ethnic variations were striking on all the attitude scales with the
exception of the moralistic and scientistic (Table 8). Far greater
knowledge of animals and the natural enviroment among white children was particularly evident. Moreover, knowledge variations were as
great in 2nd as 11th grade. Black children also expressed a greater
willingness to subordinate animals, especially in the context of improving human material well-being. These differences were reflected
in significant dominionistic and utilitarian scale results. Finally, black
children revealed less affection and general interest in animals, particularly wildlife, as suggested by significant humanistic, negativistic,
and naturalistic results.
Surprisingly few significant urban/rural differences were observed,

Table 8. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for
ethnicity by attitude and knowledge scale

SigF

Dominionistic
White
Nonwhite
Ecologistic
White
Nonwhite
Humanistic
White
Nonwhite
Moralistic
White
Nonwhite
Naturalistic
White
Nonwhite

X
score

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

2.74
3.83

-0.25
1.21

3.18
2.12

0.13
-0.66

4.41
3.50

0.19
-0.94

3.91
3.55

0.03
-0.14

6.01
5.05

0.05
-0.22

Sig F

:X
score

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

Negativistic .00

.01

Scientistic

.01

Utilitarian

.02

5.58
7.60

-0.16
0.79

1.80
2.19

-0.08
0.39

3.13
4.02

-0.16
0.78

47.40
31.60

1.17
-5.72

.18

.01

.39

Knowledge

.07

.00
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with the exception of negativistic and knowledge scale results (Table
9). Rural children were more interested and knowledgeable about animals, particularly in contrast to children living in the large cities. Few
major changes occurred among residential groups when controlling for
age. One exception was a marked increase in knowledge of animals
among suburban children.
Table 9. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for
population present residence by attitude and knowledge scales

SigF

:X
score

Dominionistic
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural
Ecologistic
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural
Humanistic
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural
Moralistic
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural
Naturalistic
Urban
Small city
Suburb
Rural

Sig F

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
&cov.
variables

x
score

Devia. from
mean after
adj. for ind.
& cov.
variables

Negativistic .04

.24
3.04
3.34
3.19
2.42

-0.48
1.15
-0.12
-0.15

2.71
2.77
3.11
3.35

-0.10
-0.53
0.42
0.10

4.15
4.49
4.42
4.30

0.18
-0.01
-0.04
-0.15

3.92
4.23
4.02
3.50

-0.08
0.30
0.31
-0.40

5.47
5.72
5.79
6.61

-0.49
-0.09
-0.06
0.67

Scientistic

.38

Utilitarian

.84

6.75
5.85
6.29
4.91

0.61
0.41
-0.32
-0.68

1.78
1.45
2.06
2.03

0.33
-0.13
-0.05
-0.15

3.39
3.15
3.44
3.06

-0.12
0.20
0.03
-0.04

38.00
46.90
42.90
52.30

-5.96
-1.13
2.52
5.23

.23

.69

.43

Knowledge

.16

.00

Attitude differences observed across all the demographic groups
additionally revealed some interesting results, although these will be
only briefly examined. On the negativistic scale, the highest scores
were found among 2nd graders, nonwhites, female and urban children,
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in contrast to the low scores of 8th and 11th grade, rural resident, and
male children (Figure 2). Ecologistic scores were highest among older
children, male, and rural residents, in comparison to the low scores of
2nd graders and nonwhites (Figure 3). On the utilitarian scale, 2nd
Figure 2: Negativistic scale mean scores by children demographic groups
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Figure .3: Ecologistic scale mean scores by children demographic groups
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graders and nonwhites had the highest scores, while the lowest utilitarian scores occurred among 11th graders and female children (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Utilitarian scale mean scores by children demographic groups
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ACTIVITIES
The extent and influence of various activities involving animals
will be briefly reviewed. Three-quarters or more of the children participated in seven animal-related activities during the previous twoyear period including visiting zoos (93%), owning a pet (87%), fishing
(87%), learning about animals in schools (83%), feeding birds (82%),
reading books or magazines about animals (76%), and watching "Wild
Kingdom" on television (74%). On the other hand, the least frequent
activities included family livestock raising (21 %), hunting (18%), trapping (13%), and belonging to an animal-related club (8%).
The attitude and knowledge scores of children who frequently par·
ticipated in some of these activities were examined. Particularly surprising was the relatively low knowledge scores of children who learned
about animals in school or who visited zoos (Table 10). Moreover, these
two groups had the highest negativistic scale scores (Table 11). These
activities, thus, appeared to exert little positive influence on children.
Most zoological parks continue to fail to go beyond superficial entertainment toward instilling greater appreciation of animals among children, while most learning about animals in school appears to be so di-
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Table 10. Knowledge scale mean scores by selected animal activity groups*

Mean score
Ever hunted
Belong to animal club
Family raised livestock
Went outside to look at birds
Have a pet
Learned about animals in school
Went to zoo

51.77
51.23
47.09
45.85
45.63
44.99
44.89

*Most of these groups include only children who frequently participated in these activities. Significance tests were not performed because the groups were not mutually
exclusive.

Table 11. Negativistic scale mean scores by selected animal activity groups

Mean score
Went to zoo
Learned about animals in school
Went outside to look at birds
Ever fished
Family raised livestock
Have a pet
Belong to animal club
Ever hunted

5.94
5.92
5.88
5.75
5.65
5.46
5.18
3.89

vorced from direct experience with animals and the natural environment that little basic knowledge results.
More encouraging activity results were found among children who
birdwatched, belonged to animal-related clubs, or hunted. These
children were generally more appreciative, knowledgeable, and concerned about animals. These results suggest the positive value of
direct, participatory contact between children and animals.

CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most outstanding result of this exploratory study was
the indication of varying stages in the evolution of children's percep-
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tions of animals. Each period appears to offer varying opportunities
for environmental education. The transition from 2nd to 5th grade
would seem the most opportune time for emphasizing affective/emotional concern for animals. The interval between 5th and 8th grades,
on the other hand, offers the most promising possibilities for developing cognitive and factual understanding of animals. Finally, the shift
from 8th to 11th grades would appear to be the most appropriate period for fostering ethical and ecological appreciation of animals and the
natural world.
Ethnic and urban/rural findings suggest the need for devoting
more attention to the animal-related perceptions and interests of urban disadvantaged children. Activity results indicate the value of
educational programs that emphasize direct contact and experimental
involvement with animals.
The results of this exploratory study clearly suggest the importance of more extensive and in-depth investigation of children's
perceptions and relationships to animals. The reported findings intimate the possibility of exercising meaningful influence on the
development of a more positive, informed, and benign perspective on
animals among children. More ambitious and imaginative efforts will
be required, however, as the eventual well-being of animals and the
natural world will depend on the future commitment and concern of today's youth.
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EMPATHY,_ HUMANENESS AND
ANIMAL WELFARE
M. W. Fox
2100 L Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Empathy is defined variously as: the intellectual identification
with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of
another (Random House Dictionary); the power of projecting one's personality into and so fully understanding the object of contemplation
(Oxford Dictionary); and the imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being (Webster's Dictionary).
Sympathy and empathy are distinctly different phenomena. Sympathy is the sharing of another's emotions, especially grief and
anguish, involving pity and compassion. Empathy (from the Greek
term meaning affection, and a more recent German term einfuhlung,
which means "a feeling in"), entails the power of understanding and
imaginatively entering into another's feelings. While the two are not
mutually exclusive, empathy implies some level of objective knowledge and therefore a greater accuracy of perception and affect than are
·seen in sympathy, which, because it is more subjective, may be a less
accurate and more intuitive way of perceiving and responding to another's emotions. In our relations with animals (as with each other),
sympathetic concern may or may not be misplaced, while empathetic
concern, since it includes both objective understanding (of both the
animal's nature and our ethical responsibilities) and emotional involvement, is likely to be more accurate and, therefore, less often confounded by anthropomorphic projections.
Empathy is motivateci by concern, the accuracy of that concern (a
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desert animal doesn't need water even if one is thirsty observing it in
the Sahara) being a condition of understanding: of rational objective
("scientific") knowledge. From right understanding, right action, a
compassion (and responsible stewardship) arises. The sympathetic experiences, feelings, and imaginings (of how one might feel in the
other's place) that come from empathizing (i.e., the introjections of
one's projections) become more accurate with experience and rational
understanding. This is the key to good human relations and the humane treatment of animals.
In relation to a person's emotional rapport with an animal, is empathy possible? Sympathetic concern for animals is often judged,
sometimes correctly, as being a sentimental, anthropomorphic projection. Sheer subjective sympathy toward an animal, without objective
understanding of its behavior and needs, can lead to erroneous assumptions as to its well-being, and to misjudgement of others' treatment of animals as being cruel. Empathy is possible when the "feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another" can be vicariously experienced:
thus when there is objective knowledge about what an animal's overt
behavior signifies, and what emotional states, intentions, and expectations such overt behavior reflects, empathy is possible. Without such
objective knowledge, we have sympathy and varying degrees of anthropomorphization. Understanding and sympathy combined make
empathy possible.
Empathy is a perceptual and cognitive phenomenon, not simply an
anthropomorphic "humanizing" projection: it is analogous to what
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty terms lateral coexistential knowledge as distinct from objective, "vertical" (i.e., Cartesian mind over
body) knowing and perceiving. Dallery (1978) illustrates this mode of
perception as follows:
This is not the place to summarize Merleau-Ponty's magisterial
work, The Phenomenology of Perception (1946). For our purposes,
it is important to note that perception is described as the com-·
plex, always open, temporal "access" between world and perceiver. It is neither a causal process rwr a process distinct from
social relations, speech, or understanding (as it would be if perception were a "thought of seeing'~. So in perceiving a snake, for example, I do not simply receive an impression of a sinuous form
having a certain mottled pattern; I do not see a cold, indifferent
fact, or have a bunch of impressions to which I might or might
not endow some value depending on my feelings; I see the snake,
which is to say that I see its behavior in an environment proper to
it and that I "appropriate" the snake's way of being, the snake's
perception of certain things around it. But I am free to regard the
snake as an object and admire its beauty, or to loathe its slithering.
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There is knowledge and feeling inherent in such empathetic perception. Dallery continues:
To see the animal moving in its environment is already to "care"
about the anima~ since in a way I put myself in its place. I say it
is foraging, or mating, or fleeing; I know what it is doing because
these are analogues of my behavior... But if beasts have no interior being and are automata, as Descartes held, I cannot "think
in their place." In fact, I cannot really perceive them. They become real to me only as I add to certain sensations meanings that
come from my sentiment of intellect. In outline, this is the tendency of modem thought. Perception is relegated either to blind
mechanisms (as in skeptical empiricism and objective psychology) or to operations of the mind (as in Cartesianism and Kantianism). For Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, this amounts to canceling out perception and losing the world (at least losing it in and
by means of philosophy). Merleau-Ponty then is not speaking
metaphorically when he charges both camps in the modem tradition with blindness; he does not mean blindness to things in the
environment (loss of the ability to see) but blindness to the world
as lived, the world as open to environments of other beasts, as
providing the ground of our coexistence of being together.
This I call simply a lack of empathy, which makes us dehumanize ourselves by objectifying the world, the causes of which need careful study.
From the existential phenomenologist's perspective, the difference between detached objectivity and rational empathy can be
viewed as follows. Dallery (1978) equates the former with "vertical"
Cartesian, hierarchical, instrumental, perceptional knowledge and the
latter with "lateral" coexistential knowledge and perception. So where
does sympathy fit into this paradigm? Dallery does not answer this
question. It lies, I believe, in the "lateral" or coexistential dimension
as the potential bridge for rational empathy and coexistential knowledge. And it is easily inhibited by the "vertical" dimension of Cartesian thought and perception. Hence Cartesianism, while not inhibiting
rational intellectual development, can impair the expression of sympathy which is a prerequisite for the development of rational empathy
and moral maturity.
The Cartesian dimension is advantageous to our survival or being
and the coexistential dimension vital for our becoming. In thinking
and perceiving in both these objective and trans-subjective dimensions, we literally think and see both ways, a "double-vision" that
reconciles the dialectical nature of reality and the duality of self and
other, with the paradoxical wisdom of objective love. Then, and only
then, is a mature, rationally responsible and empathetic love and
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understanding of others possible. Both meaning and fulfillment are
then experienced as a kind of resonance between love and understanding: agape and logos.
There are those who believe that since the subjective world of
animals cannot be objectively weighed and measured, it does not exist.
Furthermore, empathizing seems pointless since animals do not really
have emotions or an inner subjective mental world, except one governed by unconscious instincts. This animal-as-machine attitude, termed
Cartesianism after the philosopher Rene Descartes who gave this attitude scientific respectability in the seventeenth century, is not the
only factor that impairs our ability to empathize.
The ability to empathize may be inborn as an adaptive component
of our sociobiology, and as Alice Miller (1981) has shown, lack of
mature parental love and understanding can severely impair a child's
empathetic development.
The experience of parents' empathetic understanding (expressed
as the ability to deal supportively with the child's suffering, anxieties,
and growing independence) has a significant influence upon a child's
ability to love and empathize. Males, in our patriarchal society, may
well show more cruelty toward animals, or justify the same, because
they close off empathy more than females when faced with others'
helplessness and suffering. The more intense, existential anxiety and
reduced ability to empathize, plus a greater need to assume dominion
over others (as power and control) in the male of our species may be
rooted in the male child's greater sense of insecurity and separateness
from the mother in early life. This is less intense in little girls because
they have the security and connectedness of maternal gender identity.
Hence women may be better able to empathize and cope with others'
suffering, this sex difference being exemplified by the greater nurturing ability of females that may be more than a culturally determined
sex-stereotype. The greater the sense of personal security, the less
need for such distancing defense mechanisms to cope with anxiety as
rationalization, denial, sublimation, objectification and reaction formation.
Those adult males who are less "feminine," empathetic and nurturing, are not necessarily less sensitive than women. Their apparent
insensitivity may be attributed to an emotional closing down to varying degrees when faced with others' helplessness and suffering. This
awakens their own unbearable feelings of vulnerability, fear of being
hurt and of losing control or of being controlled. Fear and empathy are
thus linked, when empathizing evokes the awareness and terror of
one's own ultimate non-being. The fears of empathy's burdens and of
losing power and control are the greatest obstacles to man's being and
becoming humane. To judge such people as being deliberately cruel or
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intrinsically insensitive is surely unjust, yet this is a common reaction
in the humane, animal welfare and rights movement.
Such defensive ideologies as patriarchal dominionism and Cartesianism, like machismo, are perhaps reaction formations in the service
of the ego, especially of the insecure male ego, in this culture, which
need to be recognized as pathologically maladaptive reaction formations.
The ability to empathize is also affected by cultural attitudes and
values: emotions are put down by instrumental rationalists as being irrational and subjective. Self-serving religious and political ideologies
also impair the ability to empathize, notably such ideologies as: man's
God-given dominion (over women, animals and nature); of God being
only transcendent and not also ominpresent, inhering in all living
things. Beliefs that animals have an intrinsic right to exist, or are ensouled, or possess a spark of inherent divinity, have been dismissed as
"eastern" philosophy and pagan pantheism. Yet respect and compassion toward all of God's creations is an integral part of Christianity
(especially of Paulist, Gnostic and Essene doctrines).
The moral foundation of our industrial civilization's relationship
with animals and nature is clearly flawed by its lack of reverence for all
life. In order to further the exploitation of animals by the biomedical,
farming and wildlife ''resource'' industries, such beliefs in man's dominion and in animals having no inherent rights, divinity or capacity to
suffer emotionally, become essential defenses to rationalize away and
deny empathetic feelings of compassion, guilt and responsibility.
There are a number of other reasons why empathy toward animals
is impaired, leading to their being treated inhumanely or with indifference. First, we lack objective, scientific knowledge, (rather than applied production-related information) about the behavioral requirements and emotional, subjective world of animals. Farmers, animal scientists and others involved in livestock production also have little or no formal training in ethology. A stockman who knows his animals, who can "think like a pig," for example, usually does a better job
than one that lacks this basic and essential knowledge.
Second, desensitization, a blunting of sensitivity, occurs naturally
as a defense mechanism when one has to perform various painful procedures upon animals and must ultimately kill them or send them to
slaughter. Empathy is thus withdrawn, because the burden of responsible compassion that comes with empathizing with another's suffering and helplessness awakens one's own sense of vulnerability and
death awareness, which can be unbearable. Many people seem to confuse empathy with being anthropomorphic probably because they are
repressing their own true feelings behind a defensive screen of intellectual rationalizations used to justify and protect vested interests in
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animal exploitation and to alleviate feelings of guilt. Closing off empathy, especially in laboratory animal research (with its scientific "objectivity") and factory farming and wildlife exploitation (with their objectification of animals as "stock," "food converters," "resources,"
and "trophies,") ultimately distorts perceptions and objectivity, and
becomes a primary source of needless animal abuse and suffering.
Third, the empathetic burden of responsibility is lightened further
by making economic and other rationalizations to justify certain procedures: i.e., that suffering is necessary, unavoidable, and justifiable if
any societal benefits are accrued.
What may be termed "protective objectification" -the denial of
others' subjectivity-in order to avoid closeness, responsibility, and
the burdens of empathy, is another obstacle, exemplified by women being treated as "sex objects," medical patients as "cases," and animals
as trophies, pets, research tools, livestock, etc. Many persons in a
paradoxical and potentially stressful relationship will often mobilize
the above defenses since emotional involvement can lead euphemistically to "burn-out": farmers who nurture animals that will be killed;
animal shelter personnel who are concerned about animal welfare but
must euthanize them; biomedical researchers and laboratory technicians who care for animals but cause them to suffer and mutilate, kill
and dissect them; physicians and nurses attending the terminally ill,
knowing they will soon die. While such persons must be ''realists'' in
dealing with the paradoxes of life, the difference between a nurturing
and supportive person and one who is empathetically disconnected is
the difference between humaneness and indifference, between compassion and inhumanity. The difference is not between intrinsically kind
and cruel persons, but between those who can bear the burden of empathy and those who fear it. The difference between a humane farm
and a large "factory" farm, and regular human hospital and a hospice
for the dying is surely based upon the individual's capacity to empathize and to not protectively shut out the realities of life's suffering
and the finality of one's own non-being.
Protective objectification is analogous to Judaic philosopher Martin Buber's "l-It" relationship. From Buber's perspective (1970), empathy enables us to break out of the objective, detached "l-It"
mind-set into the trans-subjectively objective realm of "1-Thou."
The objective and subjective realms of each "It" and "Thou" are
mutually inclusive: every· entity is a dualistic monad. The subjective,
intrinsic value or worth of one entity is part of the objective, instrumental realm of other interdependent monads (be they atoms or
living beings), that are bound in relationship (which may be purely
physical, ecological, social or emotional). In Buber's terms, the subjective "I" of one monadic entity is the objective "It" of another. But
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when there is respect for the "1-ness" or subjective realm of another's
being, and empathetic love and compassionate understanding, the objective "It" becomes another subjectively resonant, spiritual "Thou."
A monadic relationship is then made, through respect and love, which
is, for Man, the emotional, spiritual and ethical manifestation and experience of a unified field of being. This state of relatedness does not, I
believe, as Huber suggests, exclude or transcend the "l-It" objective
duality, but rather enfolds it in love, such that the objective instrumental realm is still an intrinsic part of the relationship but does
not govern it.
Huber's concept of "1-Thou" embodies the spiritual and political
principles of reverence for all life, humane stewardship, respect, nurturance, "reciprocal maintenance," co-evolution and agape' (as selfgiving love). Objective instrumental rationalism and love are not mutually exclusive, but rather they reconcile, at the conscious, ethical
level of reality, the dialectical, paradoxical antinomies of life. The exclusion of love from objectivity brings evil and suffering into the
world, which cause increasing anxiety, which in turn leads to more
power and control over others or emotional withdrawal, and to more
evil and suffering.
The "otherness" of an animal Huber (1970) describes eloquently
when he strokes a horse at his grandparents' estate:
I must say that what I experienced in touch with the animal was
the Other, the immense otherness of the Other, which, however,
did not remain strange like the otherness of the ox and the ram,
but rather let me draw near and touch it... and yet it let me approach, confided itself to me, placed itself elementally in the relation of Thou and Thou with me.

Huber emphasizes that an "1-Thou" rather than an "l-It" relationship is therefore possible in the absence of a reciprocal observing
ego, as when one contemplates a rock, or nature, or interacts with an
animal. It is possible in such moments of openness with the nonhuman
world to actualize and encounter the spiritual essence of Being that inheres in all animate and inanimate forms and for Man, therefore, to
discover, if not actually bestow meaning and significance, not as objective knowledge or some projected ideology of animism or panpsychism
but as a panentheistic gnosis of the divinity or spiritual quality within
all: an expanding state of pan-relation with the anima mundi, soul of
the Earth, or God within.
Huber writes that the unity and living wholeness of a tree is
manifest to those who say "Thou" and is present when they are present. It is they who grant the tree the opportunity to manifest its being,
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but most often our habitual attitudes, ways of thinking, perceiving
and relating, deny us such a relationship. In Huber's words:
Spirit become word, spirit become form-whoever has been
touched by the spirit and did not close himself off knows to some
extent of the fundamental fact: neither germinates and grows in
the human world without having been sown; both issue from encounters with the other.
That most animals are capable of experiencing and expressing affection and of enjoying life in their way, as we do in ours, and like us
have interests, means that they are emotionally and cognitively, and
some would say spiritually, little different from us. That we are different in terms of our power of dominion over them does not mean that
we can ignore the ethical relevance of these similarities. We differ in
degree and not in kind: we are not superior, but our objectifying of the
world leads us to believe so as we no longer perceive the unified field of
all Being.
Comparative sciences such as zoology, ethology, physiology, and
psychology, reveal how sapience and sentience-intelligence and conscious sensitivity-evolve. The only differences between humans and
other animals, which create no discontinuity but build upon the phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequence, are our powers of self-contemplation, creative imagination and verbal conceptualization and communication. The two axes of sapience and sentience reach their highest
expression phylogenetically and ontogenetically in humans, as
understanding and compassion, as the will is consciously motivated by
the subjective force of love and directed by the objective power of
knowledge. Knowledge applied without love is as self-serving, selflimiting and destructive as the love of narcissism's ignorance. Empathy, the synthesis of concern and sympathetic understanding of
others, a quality not lacking in other animals, is the very essence of
humane being.

CONCLUSION: HUMANENESS AS LOVE
Neither legislation nor moral codes can make people empathize
with animals. Being humane is an attitude of heart and mind, of empathy and understanding, not simply a legal or moral injuction. At
best, laws and codes guide and constrain human actions, but they do
not inspire the ability to "love thy neighbor (and fellow creatures) as
thyself." The one strong point of animal rights philosophy is that it
draws our attention to the animals' own wants, intrinsic worth and interests. This implies that we and they have something in common: a
will, a life of one's own, perhaps a soul. This is speaking closer to the
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heart. Recognition of these qualities in other beings awakens the heart
of humility and compassion, fundamental tenets of all religious teachings. Being humane thus entails the spiritual recognition and affirmation, through empathy, humility, and compassion, of the divinity and
sanctity of Self within all beings, within one's own self as well as
within others.
The Buddha proclaimed: "One thing only do I teach: suffering and
cease of suffering. Kindness to all living creatures is the true religion.''
Likewise Pantanjali (circa 300 B.C.) gave the first step in yogic
(religious) discipline as "the avoidance of injury to all living
creatures," because all creatures were regarded as being part of God's
creation and therefore sacred and ensouled with a spark of the Divine.
Humaneness is an expression of mature love that resacralizes nature, and all living things, not animistically but panentheistically in
accord with the Christian (Paulist, Gnostic and Essene) doctrines of a
divine omnipresent (as well as transcendent) Creator within all of creation, which is the basis of Schweitzer's theosophy of reverence for all
life.
Empathy is the bridge for unconditional love, a love synonymous
· with experiencing the world without the domination of personal interests and preconceptions. Such a mature love is therefore revelationary, since it is the perception of the miraculous, of the numinously
radiant divinity in all. This is the subjective recognition of Self in
other, and thus of self-realization.
Through empathy, mature love is possible: such love is nondialectical in its arbitrary, unconditional non-duality of the observer (the
lover) and the object of one's contemplation (as 1-Thou). And love is
paradoxical, for instead of losing one's sense of individuality, the sense
and meaning of self is enhanced. Love transcends the paradoxical
dualities of the subject-object manifolds of our every day enculturated
reality, consciousness, and unconscious ego defenses. Love is revolutionary, because through the bridge of empathy, understanding as
coexistential knowledge, is possible. This is the beginning of selfrealization; of personal and interpersonal development and human
evolution.
Gilligan (1983) links empathy with moral maturity. When both intellect and empathy are integrated in our thinking, "it joins the heart
and the eye in an ethic that ties the activity of thought to the activity
of care." Without such an integration, purely intellectual, rational
thinking is objectifying and potentially alienating, since it limits empathetic understanding. A purely sympathetic response is a subjective
projection and potentially inappropriate, and no less damaging, than a
purely objective response. Informed sympathy is empathy, expressed
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as compassionate understanding. Rational empathy is the only basis
for ethically responsible behavior.
Insofar as the humane movement is concerned, and humane education in particular, to evoke sympathy for mistreated animals (for
fund-raising purposes or to stimulate students' and supporters' moral
indignation) is unethical if it is based only upon the sentiment of
abolishing all suffering and not also upon respect for animals' intrinsic
worth and recognition of the importance of humane ethics and reverence for all life to our moral development and social change.
We live in two worlds: the objective and the subjective. When we
make the two worlds one, and put the inside on the outside, as Jesus
once said, we will discover the Kingdom of Heaven, or in modern parlance, reality as a unified field of being. As animals, we live in our subjectivity, and as rational beings we stand apart from the world in our
intellectually rational objectivity. In the one is kinship; in the other,
power: but together we have the possibility of mature, responsible relationship and planetary stewardship. Apart, we have delusion, oppression, and destruction, creating the imbalances that we perceive as evil,
and experience as suffering. By introducing empathy and using power
and control over life in order to avoid the feelings of vulnerability and
helplessness in the face of life's burdens of suffering and death, we
cause even more suffering. The barrier between these two worlds,
which Buber termed "l-It" and "I-Thou", is not our objectivity, or
our subjectivity. Both are essential attributes of our being and becoming. But they must become integrated with the unified field of our own
being that embraces animals and nature, for we are both. To perceive
and think otherwise is to remain unintegrated, which is the ultimate
barrier to our self-realization and moral maturity. We, animals and
Nature are one. In order to change the world, we must first become as
one with the world (in peace and harmony). And since peace comes
from within, we must first see to ourselves before we can change the
world. Then the way of empathy is clear.

POSTSCRIPT
Why Do Animal Shelters Kill So Many Pets?
Psychiatrist M. Scott Peck in A Road Less Travelled draws a very
pertinent, which some would see as impertinent, correlation between
the love people have for their pets and the high rate of divorce among
G.I.'s who lost affection for their VietNam and Korean wives as they
began to learn English, and assert their no longer dependent and
subordinate individuality. Puppies and kittens likewise lose their appeal to many as they mature, assert their independence and individ-
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uality. And so like G.I. brides, they are abandoned because, beneath
the complaints that they are disobedient, too much trouble, or have annoying habits and behavioral problems, they are no longer loved.
The mass destruction of some 13 million unwanted, abandoned,
and neglected cats and dogs each year in the U.S. must assuredly
reflect the limitations of an immature, narcissistic love relationship,
an aspect of the human-companion animal bond which has been grossly neglected by researchers and is not simply a consequence of "unthinking and uneducated" owners. Peck defines mature love as "the
will to extend one's self for the purpose of nurturing one's own and
another's spiritual growth." In our relationships with captive and
domesticated animals, this is surely the essence of humane husbandry.
It is the absence of empathy, compassion and understanding, which
undergirds all inhumane and unethical relations between people and
between us and the animals, as they continue to be exploited for selfish, emotional, financial, and other reasons.
Farmers and biomedical researchers can put their empathy, compassion, and understanding of animals on one side for reasons of profit
and instrumental utility, arguing that the extreme privations of factory farming and mental and physical suffering of laboratory cats,
dogs, primates, and other animals, is for the "benefit of society." A
society that can find anything of greater value than empathy, compassion, and wisdom is perhaps suffering from the pathology of materialism and objectivity. The divorced G.I.'s bride was simply the material
of his narcissistic yearnings; a sexual object. Likewise cats and dogs
can be status or play objects, or things to fondle or control; and farm
animals simply biological machines in the computerized technology of
agribusiness; and laboratory animals mere components of experimental design and ultimate execution.
Fortunately not all husbands (G.I.'s) and husbanders (pet owners,
farmers, and biomedical researchers) relate to other living beings in
this way. But unfortunately, we must surmise that they are a minority, for to date they have been relatively silent on matters concerning
human and animal rights. Or are they the silent majority? It is surely
time to break the silence, after reflecting upon the monetary value of
animals, for as Jesus said: "Do not two sparrows sell for a coin of small
value? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground without your
Father's knowledge; not one of them goes forgotten before God." (Matthew 10:29; Luke 12:6).
It is too simplistic to say that people love their pets because pets
are "nonthreatening others." Perhaps by understanding why so many
people find it easy to love animals, we may discover ways to help people love each other, and not be afraid to love, and those who hate, fear,
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or are indifferent toward animals, love them also, as significant, rather
than as nonthreatening, others.
If love is the union of souls, then the bridge is empathy when such
non-sentimental love is based upon compassion, respect, and understanding. Such love entails an openness of feeling, a degree of
vulnerability, intolerable in the presence of any human or animal that
is perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as being threatening. Fear inhibits the ability to give and receive love. Likewise, others' expectations that we feel we must live up to, set up defenses and roles. But
with animals (and little children) when we have no fear toward them,
and they have no demanding expectations of us, then we are free to
love them.
Mature love is also impaired when the object of one's perception
and even claimed affection, is exploited to one's own selfish advantage.
Such exploitation, be it of a spouse or an animal companion (as a
"pet," or for its pelt, meat, or physiological responses to test drugs),
objectifies the potential "Thou" of the others' being into an "it" (a sex
object, a child-substitute, a financial or intellectual gain, etc.). These
objectifying transformations may seem necessary for our well-being,
and to a degree they are. But when we transgress ethical boundaries in
relating to others exploitatively rather than with empathetic understanding and respect, we limit our own potential fulfillment from such
a relationship. This fulfillment is to become human, or even, as Plato
and Aristotle envisioned, to "become like divinity as much as that is
within our power."
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EVILS OF MODERN STABLES*
James Irvine Lupton
(1884)
INTRODUCTION
Portions of veterinarian James Irvine Lupton's book on horse
management that deal with the problems of confinement husbandry
practices have been selected as a significant historical record of humane concerns that were documented one hundred years ago. While
the author's descriptive prose may lack scientific "objectivity," it
does express a common sense morality and the subjective and intuitive observations and conclusions of an experienced veterinarian
who clearly respects and understands the horse. His words bespeak of
a bygone era where the care or husbandry of animals was both an art
and a science, a discipline based upon empathy, compassion and factual knowledge. How far indeed have we progressed, ethically and
technologically, in improving the husbandry of domesticated animals,
such as the horse, since 1884? While conditions may be more sanitary
and diseases better understood, prevented, and treated, it is a fact that
stabled horses in 1984 are too often kept under comparable conditions
of extreme deprivation and show the same behavioral pathologies that
Lupton so clearly describes.

M.W. Fox
Editor
*From Mayhew's Illustrated Horse Management (1884), revised and improved by
James Irvine Lupton, M.R.C. V.S., author of several works on veterinary science and
art. London: Wm. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place Pall Mall, S. W.
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THE EVILS WHICH ARE OCCASIONED BY
MODERN STABLES
It does not require any vast expenditure of thought to discover
that life is action; "to be," is synonymous with "to do": therefore, it is
a sheer necessity of existence that an animated being must be doing
something. Such is the primary consequence of existence. Thus, to
breathe and to move imply one act; since, if the lungs cease to dilate,
respiration immediately terminates, and, with it, animation comes to
an end. Yet, it remained for mortal perversity to rebuke the first principle of established philo_sophy, when stables were built, in which a
breathing animal was to be treated as it were an inanimate chattel.
Nature, like a kind mother, is to this day endeavouring to teach
her wayward children a plain truth, which they may hourly behold enforced by visible examples. The wilful brood appears to be in no hurry
to learn. Man still treats the horse as though he honoured the quadruped by enslaving it; and ennobled a life, by conferring upon the
animal the title of his servant. He acts as though, by such conduct, sufficient reason were exhibited why he should oblige the creature to resign its instincts and relinquish its desires.
The equine race, when in a wild state, are gregarious, or congregate in herds. Man captures such a quadruped and places it in a
stable, built to enforce the extreme of solitary confinement. The plain
is the natural abode of the herd; on their speed depend both their
pleasure and their safety. Man ties the domesticated horse to a manger, and pays a groom to enforce absolute stagnation upon innate activity. The "panting steed" is the most timid of living beings. Man insists the charger is possessed of extraordinary courage; he declares it
delights in the tumult of battle; and he esteems it a glorious achievement to brutally coerce the timorous sensibility. The mild-eyed horse
is, perhaps, the most simple of all the breathing beauties which adorn a
wondrous world. Man declares all of the gentle breed have dangerous
propensities, and are most inherently vicious.
Before subjugation, the creature fed off the surface of the earth.
Man builds a house specially designed for the captive, in which the
corn is placed on a level with the chest, and the hay is stationed as high
up as the head. The animal is gifted with affections; it longs to gratify
their promptings; it yearns for something upon which its abundant
love may gush forth,-a fellow-prisoner-a goat-a dog-a cat-a
fowl;-no matter what,-so it be some living object, on which may be
lavished that excess of tenderness which, confined to its own breast,
renders being miserable. Man esteems it his primary duty to clear the
stable of all possible companionship; but the creature which would re-
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joice, were it only permitted to worship its enslaver, he rarely approaches without a loud voice, a harsh word, or a harsher blow, announcing his presence to the captive.
The inhabitant of such a prison, a domesticated horse miserably
drags through a shortened life, under human protection. The nearest
approach it can make to freedom is its period of labour. It always rejoices to quit its confinement; but, enfeebled by imprisonment, and
subservient to man's exactions, it ever gladly returns to the place of
its sorrow. In proportion as its limbs are finely made, and its actions
are graceful, is it prized. It is never esteemed for its instincts, or
credited with intelligence. It lives in so limited a space, that, in comparison with the dimensions of its abode, a man in a sentry-box dwells
in a mansion; or a lion in a cage roams over a domain. A reasonable and
an intelligent being commands his horse should be fastened to such a
spot, and supposes that a living organism is to endure the confinement, which does not permit the body to turn round; that animated
functions are to exist where most ordinary exercises are rendered impossible: nevertheless, he anticipates the creature will appear bounding with health, in answer to his requirements.
To be sure the prisoner, although its head be fastened (a restraint
not imposed upon the most savage of carnivorous beasts), is permitted
now to bear upon one leg, and then to change it for the other. It may
perhaps lie down or stand up, without provoking chastisement. N either head nor tail is forbidden a proper degree of motion. But at this
point all indulgence is exhausted. It is tied to a rope two yards in
length; but it may not go even to the extent of its tether; neither may it
move close up to the manger; both acts are equally unpardonable: a
properly behaved animal should stand quietly in the centre of its compartment, and always remain there when not lying down.
It is beaten, if its head be raised just to peep over the paling, to exchange a rub of the nose and to give, as well as accept, a warm stream
of fragrant breath to and from its nearest fellow-misery. It must taste
the full flavour of its captivity: no trivial act may distract attention
from the horror of its position. It must lie down where it stands; and
stand where it laid down. It must not display the grace and ease of motion with which it has been endowed; nor must it indulge the kindly
feelings Providence has gifted it with. If the owner of the horse does
not recognize the exquisite adaptation of sight, so as to infract the
minutest particle, and to view the most distant object, the sensibility
of hearing to which movements are audible, when to the duller perceptions of man no sound vibrates on the air; the keenness of scent, which
can appreciate qualitites in substances which to human sense are
devoid of odour; the fleetness of motion which was permitted as a pro-
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tection, the ease of which the most perfect machinery has failed to
rival;- how can he expect his servant to inquire whether such attributes were given by Nature, only to be fastened by the head or to be
confined within a space in which absolute stagnation must ultimately
induce bodily incapacity.
Such a true "Vis inertiae" can alone be varied by the hours of
labour and the periods of feeding. All pastime is unlawful; the most innocent amusement must be practised silently and in secret. Certain
animals, however, try to get through the long hours of enforced
idleness by quietly nibbling at the topmost rail of the manger. Large
portions of tough wood are often removed after this fashion; and, to
him who can rightly interpret signs, a thick post bitten away, fibre by
fibre, will present melancholy evidence of that longing for employment, which could induce so great a waste of perseverance; for animals
are naturally great economists of labour.
Other prisoners will endeavour to cheat the time by licking their
mangers, apparently in the hope that some stray grain of corn may
have escaped previous attention. The soft tongue of the horse, passed
over the hardened surface of the wood, occasions no noise. Often a few
grains will have lodged in the corners; then the effort to displace these
affords a long game. Others, from want of something to do, or from finding impure air and inactivity do not, in accordance with the general
doctrine, promote equine digestion, learn "to crib;" a few, from the
operation of the like causes, become perfect as "wind suckers." All
"speed the weary hours" as they best can; and many heads are turned
around to discover if it be feeding-time again; not that they are
hungry, but eating is an occupation, and they sadly wish for some
employment.
Certain quadrupeds, under these circumstances, adopt a habit,
which is the more remarkable, because hours of tedium have generated
the like indulgence in human beings. Mortals, when compelled to remain stationary, and forced to preserve silence, often strive to kill time
by rocking to and fro, or by "see-sawing" their bodies. Such a pitiable
excuse for amusement is very common among the little people whose
undeveloped limbs are perched on high forms, and in whose hands are
fixed very uninteresting primers, from which the infant mind wanders
into vacuity during the hours of imprisonment which occur in those
pleasing places termed "Preparatory Schools." The horse, also, when
forbidden the pleasures in which Nature formed it to delight, will move
its head methodically from one side of its stall to the other, and will
continue thus engaged for hours together.
So exciting a pastime, most sane people might deem to be harmless enough; but by the arqitrary notions of rectitude entertained with-
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in the stable such custom is punished as a vice. A horse which "seesaws" is said to weave, and weaving is, by grooms, esteemed highly
culpable, and is usually corrected with the lash.
Can human perversity conceive a life without a pastime, and vexatiously impose this terrible fate upon the creature whose existence is
devoted to man's service? When in the field, the horse is never idle.
The only amusement of the simple animal lies in its perpetual occupation. What a despairing sorrow must therefore afflict such an existence, when dragging through its time under the fostering care of the
enslaver. Yet how proudly do some intellectual beings boast of their
stables and of the ceaseless attention lavished on their studs. What is
it this assiduity realizes to the creature on which it is expended?
Stagnation to the active, and solitude to the gregarious. Movement
draws down punishment, as it were a fault. Any attempt to while away
the tedious hours is esteemed "a vice"; sensation must be checked, and
feeling, man insists shall be suppressed. But who, among the millions
of intellectual masters, sufficiently understands the quadruped, over
which they all usurp authority, to regard the huge bulk of that endurance, as the embodiment of the acutest form of every possible earthly
misery?
Perpetual inaction also occasions waste of food: the horse, wanting
exercise, stares at his provender, but has no appetite; the hay piled up
before it is nothing more than matter out of place.
Desire is needed to give value to such abundance; and a nonreasoning being cannot be expected to prize that which it does not require. It cannot eat; but it lacks amusement. The hay is before it. In
sheer idleness, a few stalks are pulled from the rack. Of these, one may
be leisurely masticated; but the remainder, after having been twisted
about the lips, are allowed to fall upon the litter. The sport is followed
up until the rack is emptied; and the creature is a little happier, under a,
conviction that it has escaped from absolute stagnation.
The sin, if there be any, certainly must remain with the man who
piled up the provender before the animal which was without an appetite.
Simple natures, when entirely disengaged, generally make their
own employment, and that employment, being intended for a passing
amusement, commonly consists of what thrifty people designate "mischief." The knowledge, that displeasure will follow upon discovery,
may spice the proceeding which otherwise might want interest. At all
events, so it is with children; and it may be thus with animals. When a
heaped manger is before a satiated quadruped, the impossibility of
feeding makes the creature meditate upon the uses to which the grain
can possibly be applied. None can be discovered. The head of the captive is tied, and the manger is fixed. At length, in carelessness of spirit,
a mouthful is taken from the heap. The portion cannot be swallowed,
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so the lips are moved, and, as they part, the corn falls over them upon
the ground. This may not be a very exciting recreation; but the prisoner is restless with repletion. It cannot sleep; and the grain passing
over the lips, in which equine feeling concentrates, produces a slight
and a novel sensation.
Can any man seriously pronounce that an animal, standing in enforced solitude and compulsory idleness, is to blame for such conduct?
Boys, during their school days, when wanting appetite, or having unnecessary food before them, will not they, in satiety, play with needless
abundance? Are men to demand that prudence from an animal, which
we should certainly not anticipate in the young of our own species? Yet
the child enjoys a certain amount of confidence; and its misdoing is,
therefore, aggravated by a certain abuse of trust. The horse is confined
between boards, and enjoys not the smallest personal liberty. Theseverity of captivity argues, that no reliance reposes upon the captive's
discretion. All responsibility is lost when all freedom of action is
denied. Yet the poor prisoner is cruelly beaten for playing with food,
although the true fault rested upon him who was too idle to give the exercise which would have generated appetite; and was too lazy to proportion the animal's sustenance to the requirments of its situation.
Another so-named "vice" of the horse is frequently the occasion
of more serious results than any of the before-mentioned accidents. No
person has hitherto explained why the skin should be more irritable by
night than during the daytime. Such, however, is the case with horses,
as it is with men. A quadruped, in the morning, is often found disfigured by the hair being removed from comparatively large surfaces.
Itchiness has provoked the animal to rub itself against any prominence, or to scratch its body with the toe of its iron shoe; this indulgence has caused the blemish.
Itching and scratching are numbered among the worst "vices" of
the stable. Such faults, however, are only discovered in their effects;
the groom never estimates, when flogging an animal for this wickedness,
how far the abhorred sin may have been produced by stimulating diet,
by want of exercise, and by impure atmosphere. No! he clothes up the
body of the animal; shuts every window; stops every cranny; and locks
the stable door for the night. The last meal being consumed, and the
quadrupeds not being inclined for sleep, they one and all begin to itch.
Legs are nibbled; necks are rubbed; and tails are lashed. At length one
is sensible of an irritation behind the ear. The head is turned toward
the side; the body is curved to the full extent; and the hind leg brought
forward. Then, the groom not being present, the toe of the hind shoe
can touch the part, and the horse luxuriates in a hearty titillation.
When the head was turned toward the quarters, however, the collar-rope, being attached to the halter, was also stretched in that direc-
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tion. The hind foot having performed its office, a desire is felt to return
to the natural position. The attempt is made; but this is found to be impracticable. The creature strains against the opposing force, but its
struggles only render its comfortless attitude the more fixed. The
truth is, that while devoted to the act which allays cuticular irritability, the pastern has slipped over the collar-rope. Such a mishap not only fixes the leg, but fastens the head. With the neck bent and one leg
disabled, the animal cannot exert half its power; neither can simplicity
comprehend the source of its unnatural constraint. Long continuance
of the position becomes painful; alarm seizes upon timidity; the struggles grow desperate; and the poor quadruped, at length, is cast with
terrible violence upon the straw which had been shaken down for its
repose.
The strongest testimony, however, against stables, as such buildings are at present erected, is perhaps borne by the animals which inhabit
those places. The horse is a delicate test, which man would do well to
attentively observe when he is desirous of ascertaining the healthfulness of any locality. Naturally it is all animation and gaiety of spirit.
But, however much these qualities may be esteemed, such equine
recommendations will soon fade before the joint influence of impure air
and close confinement, although you may groom and feed at discretion. The natural period of life is diminished one half, while much more
than half of the remaining years is rendered useless by age, prematurely brought on by inappropriate treatment.

HUMAN/ANIMAL COMMUNICATION:
CETACEAN ROLES IN
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INTRODUCTION
A review of the literature on the relationship between animal and
human indicates that whales and dolphins may have a mutually beneficial role to play in human therapeutic situations. Florida researchers
have discovered that interaction with dolphins has favourably altered
the behaviour of neurologically impaired people, and of autistic children who are usually withdrawn and uncommunicative.
Explorations with both wild and captive cetaceans may find suggestive direction from extensive research currently being done with
pets and domestic animals. Growing scientific evidence suggests that
animals can benefit not only the physically and mentally ill, the lonely
and the incarcerated, but also the minds and bodies of healthy people
as well. Research done at, for example, the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Interaction of Animals and Society, the University of Minnesota's Center for Study of Human-Animal Relationships
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and Environments, the University of Cambridge, and by members of
the Society for Companion Animal Studies in Paris, indicates marked
therapeutic benefits from the involvement of animals in a variety of
human situations.

DOMESTIC ANIMALS
In healthy people it has been found that animals act as "social
lubricants," that is, they facilitate social interactions between owners
and other people which often result in friendships (Mugford and M'Comisky 1974; Messent 1982). They provide companionship, affection
and tactile contact for people whether they live alone or not. It seems
to be a reciprocal exchange of affection and contact between human
and animal. People report greater feelings of self-esteem, of having
permission to be overtly affectionate, and to openly touch and fondle
(the latter reported especially by men). They also felt animals allowed
them to forget themselves and their problems and to engage in playfulness.
Interestingly enough there is little evidence to suggest that more
than a small minority of people use animals as a substitute for human
companionship. Rather an animal is seen as an "addition to," albeit an
important one (Adell-Bath et al., 1979). In one study done by Katcher
(1981), about 80% of the participants regarded their animals "as a person" and talked to them regularly. The value of a companion who does
not "talk back" or criticize, seems to be of particular importance in the
early lives of children.
Boris Levinson, a pioneer in the field of animal/children bond research, has demonstrated the value of pet animals in child development (Levinson 1969, 1972, 1978). Pets, he claims, can be major sources
of emotional support, acting as friend and confidante, providing a constant source of love and tactile affection. They also enable the child to
learn how to take responsibility and care for another, they also can provide disciplinary models. During times of bereavement, loss or similar
stress, children with animal companions often fare better-the animal
seems to provide continuity.
Levinson has also written about the use of animals in psychotherapy with children. He identifies a pattern in which the child first talks
only to the dog, ignoring the therapist, then includes the therapist in
the conversations with the dog, thus eventually able to deal directly
with the therapist. For disturbed and psychotic children an animal
may be the only animate object with which they can make contact in
their struggle to establish positive human relationships again (Searles
1960). The unquestioning loyalty, total acceptance and uninhibited af-
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fection of the animal seem to be key factors in successful therapy with
children whose communication with adults has either ceased or become disturbed. Successful work has been done with physically handicapped children in West Germany. It was found, for instance, that pet
horses were very popular. Seated high in the saddle, a wheelchairbound child couid for once in her life look down on everyone and "maintain a sense of dignity."
Animals have also been used successfully with adults in mental
hospitals, especially with those patients for whom all "other available
therapeutic methods failed to bring about significant improvement"
(Corson, Corson, and Alexander 1980). The patients were withdrawn,
uncommunicative, self-centered, almost mute and psychologically
bedridden. The introduction of an animal saw a gradual but significant
shift towards self-esteem, responsibility and independence with increased mobility and a reaching out to others.
Similar success has been achieved by the Corsons, using pets on
geriatric wards. One elderly man who had not spoken for 26 years,
spontaneously said "You brought that dog," upon receiving a dog as a
long-shot part of therapy. He later made friends and became quite an
accomplished painter of animals. The introduction of birds to geriatric
wards and to elderly people living alone has had quite remarkable
positive effects from raising self-esteem, creating group cohesion,
making friends, to maintaining health (Mugford and M'Comisky 1974).
The researchers commented on the "surprisingly intimate and presumably rewarding attachment to these unsolicited pet birds.'' The typical
view of a geriatric ward population as helpless, hopeless, and waiting
to die becomes quite the opposite as normal healthy responses to life
dormant in the company of our own kind, are triggered by other species.
This has also been true at Lima State Hospital in Ohio, a maximum security institution housing about 400 patients, including psychopaths and sex offenders. To date nearly 100 patients are involved
in pet facilitated therapy. The 85% attempted suicide rate in the
hospital in general dropped to zero seven years ago on those wards involved in pet therapy, and has remained there. The hospital has 20
aquaria and 160 animals including parrots, gerbils, rabbits, hamsters,
guinea pigs and deer. While controlled studies need to be done,
positive indications are the giving of humane and loving care to
animals and improved social relationships. Similar results have been
obtained with the use of farm animals and pets in psychotherapy with
delinquent children in residential schools (Levinson 1972). Again the
emotional and tactile contact with loving, non-critical animals may
help diffuse feelings of hostility, alienation and rejection common in
criminal offenders and anti-social behaviour.
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EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS
Evidence indicates that benefits accruing to us from the animal/human bond are not only psychosocial but also physiological. It
has been found that in healthy people blood pressure and pulse rate
drops when, for example, petting or talking to their animals, or when
viewing a tank of tropical fish. In contrast blood pressure and heart
rate increase when talking to other people, reading aloud, but again
can be reduced if an animal is present in the room (Katcher and Friedmann 1980). The same researchers also found that the ownership of a
pet was the factor most highly correlated with one year survival
following a heart attack, apart from the physiological severity of the
disease. Exercise and need for companionship were rejected as the
main explanations since the group of patients included both married
and single people, and also owners of small house-bound pets. Rather
it may be that "dumb as opposed to speaking companions" offer a fuller
explanation since "the speechless kind of companionship shared with
pets may provide a source of relaxation that human companions who
demand talk as the price of companionship may not provide" (Friedmann et al., 1980).
For experimental work done with animals in the laboratory during
which animals are often subjected to abhorrent levels of pain and
deprivation, it has been found that similar benefits accrue to the animal if they are in the presence of a sympathetic human. This is even
more true if they are in physical contact. Such benefits are reduction of
anxiety, lowering of blood pressure and heart rate, and increase in coronary blood flow.
Twenty years ago Gantt conducted research on the "effect of person" or effect of human contact on animals. He found significant variations in heart rate when an electric shock was administered to a dog's
foot when the animal was alone and when it was being petted by a person. While being petted the heart rate increase was reduced by half.
Similarly when the dog received a warning bell signalling the approach
of shock, heart rate increased dramatically. If a person petted the dog
during both bell and shock then the increase in heart rate was either
eliminated or even reduced (Gantt et al., 1966). Clearly, human contact
had made an enormous difference lending some credence to Darwin's
belief that petting and contact in animals was an expression of love.
Such experimental findings suggest that the animal/human bond is as
important to the animal as it is to the human.
Other laboratory findings indicate emotional reactions in animals
which closely parallel human behaviour, making reciprocity in the relationship even more believable. While much behaviour is species specific and it is dangerous to generalize to human behaviour, nevertheless,
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the parallels throw valuable light on the nature of the human/animal
bond. According to some researchers emotional disorders such as anorexia, depression, neurotic behaviour, perversions, and criminal disorders have been observed in farm animals and pets, all intelligible in
terms of recent stress or early history (Saul 1962).
The classic work of Harlow and his colleagues on total deprivation
of tactile companionship in infant monkeys indicates similar emotional
reactions to stress. One of the most interesting findings was the constant selection of the cloth surrogate mother during times of anxiety
and insecurity even though the wire surrogate mother provided milk.
It seemed that contact comfort was of overwhelming importance. Experiments in which infant monkeys could see but not touch their mothers, produced similar but less intense disturbances and distress. A further unexpected finding was that even though the cloth mother was inanimate, the infant felt such emotional security through warmth and
body contact alone, that it was able to explore new objects in its surroundings. It was once thought by Harlow that infant monkeys reared
from birth to six months in total isolation would never exhibit normal
behaviour. However more recently he reports that if the right kind of
body contact is provided, the behaviour is reversible (Suomi, Harlow,
and McKinney 1972).
For instance, artificially inseminated mothers reared in isolation
sometimes succumb to the pestering to cling by their determined offspring, such that they rear their second born normally. Secondly,
heated cloth surrogate mothers given to six month old isolates produces positive social behaviour after a few weeks of intense clinging.
Similar results are achieved when normal but younger pre-aggressive
infants are placed in cages with six month old isolates. While the isolate withdraws, the normal infant's tendency is to cling. Again body
contact is influential with the isolate. Another interesting observation
of animal need for contact was reported by Coelho (1980). He observed
a baboon in a primate colony adopt a feral kitten. As in the case of the
human/pet bond the baboon was seen to hold the kitten close, to pet it
and to use it as a social facilitator in interactions with other baboons.
Findings therefore show that two main elements in the animal/
human bond are trust and touch. In the case of humans as has been
said, there is ample evidence that a warm trusting and trustworthy
non-human creature is often a key to health. In the case of both animal
and human, it seems clear from the data that the addition of touch has
not only positive and emotional effect on both, but is essential for normal development. Montagu (1978) reminds us of the general embryological law which says that the earlier a sensory system becomes
functional, the more fundamental it is likely to be. Since touch is the
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earliest sensory system to develop, he argues that it must have profound psycho-biological significance for normal behavioural and physical development. In addition to the evidence of abnormal development
in animals deprived of touch, there is evidence of similar abnormalities
in humans. Children raised by parents or others who for reasons of insensitivity, emotional instability, cruelty or belief, withhold contact
(touching, stroking, fondling) and affection from them, exhibit abnormal psychological development. This may continue into adult life and
be perpetuated on their own children. It is of interest that battering
and abusing parents, treated similarly themselves as children, rarely
report having a pet.
Montagu also refers to positive results of tactile contact in
animals. For instance he comments that hand-milked cows give more
and richer milk than machine-milked cows, that using touch to gentle
young rats makes them better able to tolerate stressful situations as
adults, and that dolphins like to be gently stroked.

CETACEA
In captivity, social interaction, including tactile contact between
trainer and dolphin is standard practice and seen to be an important
factor in bonding the relationship and developing good rapport. We
know from trainers' and researchers' reports that such bonds can be
unusually strong-more so than with other animals-and that separation can result in very stressful experiences for both trainer and
dolphin (Lilly 1967).
There seems to be ample evidence now, and in any case it seems
reasonable to extrapolate from the data on other highly evolved social
animals (wolves, elephants, primates), that social interaction and tactile contact are of significant importance to many species of cetacea.
We know, for example, that their skin is a highly refined sensory organ
of touch and that in groups of whales and dolphins physical contact
is necessary and frequent. As in the case of other animals, cetacea/human bonding seems to involve a mutual need for touching and
stroking, and also seems to involve (at least, as observed in captivity)
mutually strong emotional ties. It is well known that when captured or
placed in stressful situations, dolphins respond well to human touch.
Robson has commented that when touched and stroked and spoken to
soothingly, stranded whales become calm and less stressed.
Animal/human bond research has in fact included work with captive dolphins. Henry Truby, one of John Lilly's colleagues, observed
play interaction between neurologically impaired people and dolphins
and concluded that they were mutually beneficial. More recently in
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1978, Truby and Smith, a Florida researcher, started to explore whether captive dolphins could have a positive effect on the behaviour of
autistic children. Infantile autism, characterized by delayed and deviant language development, severely impaired capacities to relate to
people and objects, extreme withdrawal and failure to respond to sensory stimuli, is sometimes called a communication disease. Any modicum of success with these children can be regarded as a breakthrough.
In the Florida study with eight autistic children, all eight showed,
amongst several behaviour improvements, unusually long attention
spans. One boy, Michael, an 18 year old, fed fish to dolphins, poured
water over them and made clicking noises to gain their attention. Not
only was such interactive play behavior, that is reaching out beyond
himself, highly unusual, but beyond speaking two words, he had never
before made efforts at verbal communication. Smith reports not only
temporary but sustained changes in his behaviour, namely, excitement
on seeing dolphins, grabbing other people to indicate the dolphins, recognition of and clicking at dolphins on television and in books, and the
use of the word "yep" five times in one week in response to questions
about dolphin visits (Smith 1982).
There is as yet no available data on the dolphins' reaction to these
children, but recognizing the intractable nature of this emotional disorder and the unusually positive results, interesting speculations
might be made about the value of cetacea in this kind of work.
The literature indicates that cetaceans historically have demonstrated a benign interest towards us, and that, in the face of some of
our worst atrocities. It further demonstrates a strong emotional pull
towards cetaceans on the part of humans since the earliest times. Cetaceans have shown interest in us in a variety of ways. There are many
examples of the lone dolphin establishing strong relationships with
people in local waters, sometimes selecting particular individuals,
often children, e.g., Opo and Horace in New Zealand, Donald in Britain, Jean Louis in France, and Sandy in the Bahamas. Wade Doak has
collected hundreds of anecdotes from divers, sailors, long distance
swimmers, surfers, etc., commenting on their dolphin encounters
-playing, being protected from sharks, guided to safe waters, being
accompanied, seeking contact, etc. (Doak 1981). Relatively recently
scientists have become aware of a unique situation on the remote coast
of Western Australia at Monkey Mia, where for the last 16 years a
group of dolphins have been visiting the beach to interact with people.
Fish are fed to the dolphins but there is also a great deal of tactile contact and vocal exchanges. While most scientists are convinced that the
food reward is quite secondary to the importance of social interaction,
no controlled studies have yet been carried out. The amount of reported evidence of even whales seeking contact with humans is in-
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creasing, e.g., humpbacks in Hawaii, greys in Mexico, sperm in New
Zealand, and right whales in Patagonia.
There seems to be little doubt that tactile contact between humans
and animals is not only mutually beneficial but also mutually pleasurable. Messent (1981) commented that in our society the need for tactile contact and the opportunity to satisfy it may have values we do
not yet understand. It may well be that it is of paramount importance
to us because it represents an outward expression of the emotion of
love. Darwin (1955) in his book The Expression of Emotions in Man
and Animals shocked the scientific community in 1872 with his claim
that human expression of emotion, although more differentiated was
similar if not identical to that in animals. Emotions were expressed in
all creatures in a manner designed to effectively communicate to
others what was being felt inside. He stated that the emotion of love
was an exception to all the general rules in that while it was the most
powerful of all emotions, it was the only one with no special means of
expression:
Although the emotion of love, for instance that of a mother for her
infant, is one of the strongest of which the mind is capable, it can
hardly be said to have any proper or peculiar means of expression .... A strong desire to touch the beloved person is commonly
felt ... love is expressed by this means more plainly than by any
other.... With the lower animals we see the same principle of
pleasure derived from contact in association with love.

DISCUSSION
While most of us would agree with Darwin that "the emotion of
love .. .is one of the strongest of which the mind is capable," we also
have to wonder why scientists in the twentieth century accepted Darwin's theories but almost totally neglected the study of the emotion he
deemed most important.
The sensitivity of touch and its relationship to the emotion of love
certainly raises some questions about both the importance of animals
in our lives and the nature of animal emotion and consciousness. It
also raises important questions about cetacea and our relationship
with them. The history of close encounter with cetacea may not be accidental if Alistair Hardy is correct that we were once aquatic apes living in the shallows in close harmony and possibly close tactile contact
with coastal cetacea, rather than in the prey/predator relationship as
with most other animals (Morgan 1982).
Given the intelligence of dolphins, the innumerable instances of
sensitive behaviour towards people and their affinity for children, the
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therapeutic benefit could be quite extraordinary. Particularly so since
at the present time we do not know very much about the minds of
other species and in what ways they communicate non-verbally, least
of all about the big-brained acoustically oriented cetacea.
At least there now seems to be some shift away from our traditional arrogant and anthropocentric way of viewing animal behaviour.
Scientists are considering heretofore heretical ideas about the intelligence, culture, language and consciousness of animals (Norris,
Pribram, Terrace, J.J. Bonner, etc.). Speculation has it that some
species of whales and dolphins might be able to transmit and interpret
visual thought patterns. If there is any truth in this then therapeutic
interaction with severely disturbed people, the blind, the deaf and
others whose communication patterns are hindered, might be of primary importance.
While this author is not in favour of captivity, it nevertheless remains true that permits for capture are still being issued and that a
number of cetaceans are now in captivity and will likely remain so for
several more years. These social animals whose need for love and affection, social interaction and tactile contact may be no less than ours,
and who have demonstrated over the centuries a desire to interact with
humans, may benefit equally from therapeutic interactions. Such involvements may well outstrip any psychological benefits currently accruing from their involvement in cognitive research and entertainment.
While in some ways it seems less practical to involve wild cetaceans, it may become less so as: (a) the whale sighting tourist industry
increases; and (b) reports of locations of friendly whales and dolphins
increases. Again, and this is equally speculative, it may be that those
amongst us, who for reasons of physical handicap or emotional trauma, chose or are forced to use uncommon modes of communication,
could find meaningful affective communication with cetacea, as yet indecipherable to the rest of us in our logical linear world.

CONCLUSION
This evidence of mutual benefit from interaction is hardly surprising if we pause to think about our biological and evolutionary heritage,
of the intricate interdependency between human and animal down the
ages. It appears likely that the human/companion animal bond is of
great antiquity beginning perhaps with man's capacity to reach out to
the young of wild animals, culminating about 12,000 years ago in
domestication of canids. It is clear that animals are still important to
modern man-not just for material resources, when we consider that
there are approximately 35 million dogs and 25 million cats in Ameri-
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can households alone. In terms of our psychological development, the
animal is a universal dream symbol, playing a powerful role, not only
in our dreams, fantasies, folktales, art and religion, but in our neuroses
and psychoses. Our children are said to first dream of animals (Levinson 1972).
However, an explanation of the evolution of our attitudes towards
nature, in general, and animals in particular, reveals a relatively recent
but ever increasing shift from cooperative interdependence to competitive independence, with an almost complete and arrogant disregard for our biopsychological kinship and needs. Much has been written on the demise of species and environments and possibly the planet
itself under the domination of the human animal (e.g., Leiss 1974).
While we have "successfully" domesticated nature, bringing it close to
the brink of total disaster, it could clearly be argued that we have
severely lost rather than gained in personal contentment, psychological stability and social cohesion-witness, for example, the human
agony in our hospitals, mental institutions and prisons, and the perplexities and confusions in ourselves and our everyday lives.
Human-animal bond research with its rather ironic findings that
not only do healthy people benefit from such a bond but that in some
cases animal therapy is the only therapy to give any positive results,
may help to provoke a much needed return to a respect for and a cooperation with other species, both wild and domestic.
Much has been written about species interdependency in terms of
basic survival needs. Relatively little has been written about the
possiblility of species interdependency at an emotional level. Involving cetaceans in therapeutic situations may usefully extend the range
of human/animal bond research in ways which could be important to
the mental and physical well being of many species, including humans.
Considering the impressive results from therapeutic work with pets
and domestic animals, how much more dramatic might the results of
such work be with animals whose brain capacity is much close to our
own?
We may even come to acknowledge a primary human need to live
cooperatively with other species. Finally, in the ironic fact of their
sometimes unique capacity to guide us back to sanity, we may also
acknowledge their qualitatively equal differences and therefore their
equal rights to survival.
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LOGIC AND LIMITS
OF ANIMAL LIBERATION
Edward R. Bennett
Department of Medical Microbiology
School of Veterinary Medicine
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30605

INTRODUCTION
The current interest in treatment towards animals goes beyond
the focus of isolated instances of brutality and encompasses the advocacy of significant changes in our traditional attitudes toward animals. In one year (1980) an estimated 2,054,281,000 hogs, beef, lamb,
and poultry were raised on farms and slaughtered in the U.S.* (Agricultural Statistics 1981), and 1,653,385 laboratory animals were used
by facilities registered with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA 197 4). Adding to this the number of related animal industries such as textiles, farm equipment manufacturing, cosmetics and
drug industries, restaurants, and groceries, it is easy to appreciate the
broad spectrum of changes which would result from significant
changes in our relationship with animals. Since all individuals have an
interaction with animals, at least by the animal products they choose
to purchase (or not to purchase), there has been a proliferation of viewpoints concerning the treatment of animals. This paper will primarily
consider Peter Singer's arguments presented in his book, Animal Lib-

*Number in thousands: hogs-97,174; cows and heifers-14,905; steers-16,059;
bulls-679; sheep and lambs-5,742; total poultry-19,169,722.
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eration (1975), because it is a popular thesis which is objective and logically derived.

DEFINITIONS
Before considering views about our treatment of animals, it will be
helpful to define and document several key terms.

Speciesism
Speciesism is a term used by Singer (1975) to mean" ... a prejudice
or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species.''
Pain
The common dictionary definition of pain is "a distressing sensation as of soreness or mental suffering as applied to humans and other
animals." (Oxford Universal Dictionary 1955). When it is applied to
lower invertebrates Singer (1975) says "most mollusks are such rudimentary beings that it is difficult to imagine them feeling pain, or having other mental states." As a logical philosopher Singer admits that
it is not yet possible to determine a precise line between organisms
that feel pain and those that do not, but as an advocate for animal
liberation, Singer (1975) says that " ... somewhere between a shrimp
and an oyster seems as good a place to draw the line as any ... "

Stress
Stress is often imprecisely used as a catch-all term for unknown
factors which adversely affect an animal. A precise definition which
has a physiologically measurable effect has been given by Hans Selye
(1976). He defines stress as "the state manifested by a specific syndrome which consists of all the non-specifically induced changes
within a biological system." The specific syndrome is called the General Adaptation Syndrome (G.A.S.) and consists of a specified alarm
reaction, a stage of resistance, and a stage of exhaustion. The alarm
reaction can be measured physiologically and consists of adrenocortical enlargement, atrophy of the thymicolymphatic organ and gastro-intestinal ulcers. So stress is the result of nonspecific factors that
cause the G .A.S. This definition permits us to recognize stress and
quantify it by measuring the alarm reaction. It is important to note
that stress can be good or detrimental depending upon how the biological systems adapt to the detrimental effects of stress.

Equal Consideration
The concept of equal consideration is used by Singer to determine
the parameters of acceptable treatment. "The basic principle of equali-
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ty does not require equal or identical treatment, it does require equal
consideration." (Singer 1975). Equal consideration is the result of
recognizing that the fundamental common capacity between humans
and animals is the capacity to suffer or feel pleasure. Singer (1975)
quotes Jeremy Bentham, "The question is not can they (animals) reason? nor can they talk? but, can they suffer?" If equal consideration is
given, then animals should not be subject to anymore suffering than
we find permissible in humans. He goes on to state:
... if we consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on a baby for
no good reason then we must, unless we are speciesists, consider
it equally wrong to inflict the same amount of pain on a horse for
no good reason (Singer 1975, p. 16).

SINGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF ANIMAL LIBERATION
Singer (1975) states that animals and humans share the capacity
to suffer pain or experience pleasure and that this capacity is the defining element that gives an individual interests: ''The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all ... "
We can attempt to compare the amount of suffering or pleasure between species, but Singer (1975) admits that precise comparisons are
difficult.
It is probably true that comparisons of suffering between members of different species cannot be made precisely, but precision is
not essential (p. 17).

Precision is not essential since a great amount of suffering will be
eliminated even if a change in treatments is limited to comparisons of
suffering which can be made with certainty. Our treatment of different
species should not permit them to suffer any more than we allow for
any one species. "No matter what the nature of the being, the principle
of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with like suffering" (Singer 1975). In Singer's theory the capacity to feel pain is the
only factor which should be used to give equal consideration to individuals regardless of species. However, on the subject of killing, he allows
other factors to influence the principle of equal consideration. He says
that it is just as wrong to kill animals when under the same conditions,
we would not kill humans. He makes the claim that:
Just as most humans are speciesists in their readiness to cause
pain to animals when they would not cause a similar pain to humans for the same reason, so most humans are speciesists in their
readiness to kill animals when they would not kill humans (Singer
1975, p. 18).
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But he does allow that factors such as "self-awareness, intelligence,
the capacity for meaningful relations with others and so on ... may be
relevant to the question of taking life" (Singer 1975).

ARGUMENTS
Since there are many proponents of animal liberation, there are a
number of arguments which lack logical theory, are based on misconceptions, and allude to anthropomorphism. Several examples can
be cited in Jonny Frank's (1979) article on factory farming. Frank
(1979) says that a baby pig " ... suffers abuse just like its mother:
within a day or two of birth, the young piglet has its ears knotched, its
teeth clipped, its tail docked, and if male, is castrated as well." He
never tries to compare the pain (if any) to pain in humans. Is ear
knotching in the pig more painful thim ear piercing in humans? When
Frank (1979) states that pigs' teeth are clipped, he does not explain
that only the sharp tips of these needle teeth are removed (Esminger
1970). He also fails to say that the reason the sharp teeth are clipped is
to prevent injury to the other piglets and to the sow's udder (Esminger
1970). The fact that the piglets show no apparent signs of pain since
they continue to nurse and fight with littermates (a normal pecking
order behavior) makes it necessary for Frank (1979) to justify why he
calls this practice abusive. A similar argument can be made for tail
docking and castration.
Frank (1979) gives a romaticized view of a good non-abusive farm
in his statement that "Only a few small dairy farms conform to the traditional pastoral scene, permitting the cows to graze in outdoor pastures during good weather." He makes no attempt to objectively evaluate the suffering an animal may have in confinement versus pasture.
The fact that he envisions cattle grazing only in "good weather"
reveals his affinity for emotion rather than detached reasoning.
Unbounded by logic Frank goes on to boldly delve into the inner
psyche of a bovine and claims " ... the separation of the calf from its
mother causes psychological harm.'' This statement is ''justified'' in a
footnote: "Mason visited calf barns and calves would attempt to 'suckle a finger, hand, or part of our clothing.' A farmer explained that
they always do this because 'they want their mothers I guess."' The
farmer's statement hardly qualifies as expert analysis and does not
justify the leap from the observation of suckling behavior to the assumption of psychological harm.
As an advocate of animal liberation, Singer (1975) also occasionally disregards his philosophical objectivity:
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Flesh taints our meals. Disguise it as we may, the fact remains
that the centerpiece of our dinner has come to us from the slaughterhouses, dripping blood. Untreated and unrefrigerated, it soon
begins to putrefy and stink. When we eat it, it sits heavily in our
stomachs, blocking our digestive process unti~ days later, we
struggle to excrete it (p. 183).

Singer (1975) does not justify how his perception of sauces or creative
gourmet techniques constitutes a disguise for meat, not to mention the
many times meat is served plain with decoratively styled vegetables.
His reference to dripping blood may be symbolic. If not, he makes the
common mistake of confusing blood with the inter- and extra-cellular
fluid (not blood) that contains the pigment myoglobin, which reacts
with oxygen and turns red. Any blood that still remained on the carcass would be coagulated by the time it leaves the slaughter house,
and it would not be dripping. Since the decay to which Singer objects
also occurs in fruits and vegetables, his comment is not a valid argument. Finally, to justify the statement that meat blocks our digestive
system, Singer refers to research which compares the mean transit
time of food moving through the digestive tract of nonvegetarians
with that of vegetarians. Although there is speculation about the correlation between the increased transit time and increased incidence of
colon cancer, the implication of this speculation, if it is correct, would
not necessarily be that meat is bad but that the diet should contain
more roughage.
There are a number of common objections that are made against
Singer's theory of animal liberation, but the nature of the theory is
such that most objections can be shown to deny equal consideration on
the basis of irrational speciesism. The practical application of animal
liberation would cause significant changes in the ways animals are
raised on farms (if they are raised at all) and the use of animals in
research. The objective of farm management like other businesses is to
produce the maximum product (milk, eggs, meat, fiber) at the minimum cost. The criticism raised by animalliberationists is that equal
consideration to the interests of animals is not a factor in farm
management. The common objectives often raised by agricultural interests are: (Singer 1975)
1. Domestic animals are selectively bred by man for the purpose

of farming so without agriculture the animals would not exist.
2. The farm animals were born and raised on a farm and have
never known other conditions so they do not know what it
means to live independently.
3. Conditions on the farm '' ... are no worse than conditions in the
wild where animals are exposed to cold, hunger and predators."
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Singer's reply to the first criticism is that "once a being exists, we
have an obligation to avoid making that being suffer unnecessarily,
but we have no obligation to nonexistent beings."
His response to the second criticism is that "animals feel a need to
exercise, stretch their limbs or wings, groom themselves, and turn
around, whether or not they have ever lived in conditions that permit
this." (Singer 1975)
Singer (1975) answers the third criticism by saying that the choice
"is not between life on a factory farm and life in the wild, but whether
animals destined to live on factory farms and then be killed for food
should be born at all."
Ewbank (1973) has attempted to classify groups of behavior
changes that may be caused by intensive confinement management.
Type !. .. abnormal behavior patterns are associated with pathological changes and obvious economic loss.
Type II ... abnormal behavioral patterns occurring with little or
no evidence of economic loss.
Type III. .. changes are qualitative alterations in otherwise normal behavioral patterns and are detectable only by systematic
observation.
He says that it is difficult to assess the behavioral changes in Types II
and III but says that Type I problems are "self-evident." Singer
(1975) would believe that there could be significant changes in our
treatment of animals even if we only considered the Type I behavior.
He states:
Even if we were to prevent this infliction of suffering on animals
only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not
be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected,
we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of
animals ... (p. 17).

ANIMAL RIGHTS
The debate about animal rights complicates the issue of animal
liberation. We can classify two types of rights-legal and moral. We
may define legal rights as those that society assigns while moral rights
can be considered as those that society recognizes as inherent. According to Stone as reported by Dichter (1979) " ... there is no generally accepted standard for legal rights ... " But Stone (Dichter 1979) defines
four conditions for having legal rights:
1. need an authoritative body to review and enforce rights,
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2. must institute legal action at the animals' behest,
3. court must take injury into account,
4. relief must run to the benefit of the animal.
The definition of moral rights may cause more debate. One argument is that "animals are capable of suffering and of frustration and
therefore have interests in the same manner that senile persons, infants, and brain damaged people have rights, even though they are intellectually deficient and cannot claim them." (The Futurist 1979)
Singer (1975) also shares this view when he says "to avoid speciesism,
we must allow that beings which are similar in all relevant respects
have a similar right to life-and mere membership in our own biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right."
Michael A. Fox (1978) argues that since there are no" ... attributes
that all humans without exception share in common ... even the capacity of humans to experience pain and pleasure falls short of universality ... ," we should " ... shift our attention instead to capacities that are
nearly or virtually universal among humans." By doing this we can
find attributes that humans have and animals do not so Fox (1978)
concludes " ... that the concept of a moral right to equal treatment
makes no sense except as applied to humans."
This argument misses the point of Singer's (1975) argument that
the criterion is not a universal capacity for pain or pleasure within a
species but that individuals, regardless of their species, that have the
same capacity for pain or pleasure, should have equal consideration in
treatment with respect to this capacity. Singer (1978) says:
I do not deny that normal human beings may possess capacities
lacked by both retarded humans and animals. My point is that
anyone wishing to defend our existing attitudes has to find some
basis for attributing rights which does apply to all human beings
but not to other animals. I claim that no such basis exists.

To avoid this criticism, Fox (1978) adds an essential statement
that " ... autonomy, which thus entails certain cognitive capacities, is
necessary (and, together with the capacity to enjoy or suffer, sufficient) for the possession of moral rights." Unfortunately, he does not
give any justification for this point. "How can the above entailments
be defended? I cannot give full treatment to this important argument
here ... " Without providing this justification Fox's theory is incomplete and fails to challenge Singer's argument.
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OTHER ARGUMENTS
We may raise the question about our role in the naturally occurring predator-prey relationship which clearly violates the principle of
equal consideration. Singer (1975) says we should not interfere because
" ... judging by our past record, any attempt to change ecological
systems on a large scale is going to do far more harm than good.'' So
apparently if there was a way to eliminate the actions of carnivorous
species without causing major changes in the ecological balance, it
would be justified.
A strong argument is to ask what animalliberationists plan to do
about wild animals which feed on the plant crops. Singer's (1975)
response is to suggest the hope that ''we may eventually develop
methods of limiting the numbers of those species whose interests are
genuinely incompatible with our own." But the main point is that
Singer's philosophy is utilitarian and permits killing animals, after
giving equal consideration if there are conflicting interests. N ozick
(1974) outlines these characteristics of utilitarian theory:
1. maximize happiness for all living beings,
2. stringent side constraints on what a human may do to another
human and
3. animals may be used or sacrificed for the benefit of other people or animals only if those benefits are greater than the loss
inflicted.
Singer assumes that those side constraints for human treatment are
based on the capacity to suffer and should be applied among all individuals according to their capacity to suffer regardless of the species.
But we may argue that those side constraints are based on other factors in addition to suffering.
As mentioned above Singer (1975) says that the factors such as
"self-awareness, intelligence, the capacity for meaningful relations
with others, and so on, are not relevant to the question of inflicting
pain-since pain is pain, ... these capacities may be relevant to the
question of taking life.'' The reason that other capacities are permitted
in the question of killing is because:
... people hold widely differing views about when it is legitimate
to kill humans as the continuing debates over abortion and euthanasia attest. Nor have moral philosophers been able to agree
on exactly what it is that makes it wrong to kill humans, and under what circumstances killing a human being may be justifiable
(Singer 1975, p. 18).
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So the argument "pain is pain" cannot be countered by saying killing
is killing since there are different factors which influence when killing
may be morally justified in humans. The argument that the capacity
to suffer is the only criterion to be used in equal consideration because
"pain is pain," is justified by the assumption that people must hold a
common view about when it is legitimate to cause pain in humans and
that moral philosophers must be able to agree when pain is justified.
Singer does not state this, but it is the logical parallel of his argument
on killing applied to pain. This is the implied explanation for the statement "pain is pain." This is the fundamental point where we can raise
strong objections to Singer's theory of animal liberation.
While Singer's theory is utilitarian with respect to killing animals,
he assumes that there is a moral concensus on human suffering which
is based only on the capacity to suffer and is free of other utilitarian
factors. Singer would allow factors in addition to suffering in the
debates about abortion or the death penalty since these topics involve
the question of killing. But in subjects such as slavery or civil rights,
Singer would hold that the only necessary factor is the amount of suffering. In this respect, Singer's theory is not utilitarian since it
violates Nozick's (1974) third characteristic of a utilitarian position
that" ... animals may be used or sacrificed for the benefit of other people or animals only if those benefits are greater than the loss inflicted.''
It may be that Singer assumes that these other factors are used in
determining treatment in humans, but he cannot simply give equal
consideration to other species based only on the capacity to suffer
because the amount of suffering was not the only factor considered in
determining the moral standard of treatment in the first place.
Our treatment of other people is based on many factors, one of
which is emotional attachment. We see this in animals with maternal
attachment or rejection, and we observe it in humans by the intuitive
observation that we are more sensitive to the pain or pleasure of people
to whom we have closer psychological bonds. Just as we make emotional bonds to certain human individuals, we also make bonds to
animals and this bond affects our treatment of them. "Although regarded as acceptable fare on the continent, eating horse meat is akin to
cannibalism in Britain" (The Economist 1978). One reason that a
laboratory animal which may have "a higher degree of self-awareness
and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a
severely retarded infant" (Singer 1975), may still be used in research
rather than the infant, is because there is a greater emotional attachment made to the infant. This theory is not speciesist since it also
holds that it may be wrong to take someone's pet and use it in an experiment since there is an emotional bond made to the pet animal. Ad-
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mittedly this factor elevates the human species since it always applies
to humans and it is not always applicable to animals. However, it does
not make the theory speciesist since it does not imply that only the
presence or lack of emotional bond should determine treatment. It only suggests that other factors, in addition to the capacity to suffer,
should influence our treatment of animals just as it influences treatment of other humans.

CONCLUSION
In the debate about animal liberation, it is necessary to define
terms and focus on philosophically clear arguments which minimize
casual inaccuracies and are free from emotional embellishment. We
have considered Singer's theory of animal liberation and can conclude
that to be acceptable, Singer must allow other factors in addition to
suffering to directly influence equal consideration. It was argued that
this can be done without resulting in speciesism. The practical application of the theory will still result in significant non-speciesist
re-evaluation of treatment of animals.
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ABSTRACT
Observations of sows and gilts in tethers, stalls, and groups showed
two distinct types of behaviour: pre-feed behaviour when pigs were
anticipating food, and after-feed behaviour. Sows and gilts tethered
for the first time do not show pre-feed excitement, but this develops in
42 days which suggests that pre-feed behaviour is not stereotype, as
suggested by the literature, but is a conditioned reflex.
The question of the importance of after-feeding behaviours which
are often called stereotypies is examined. The total time occupied by
these behaviours over 24 hours by tethered sows is 14.5 to 29.0%, by
tethered gilts 1.4 to 5.6%, by stalled sows 10 to 14%, and 4.2 to 6.3%
in stalled gilts.
Grouped animals do not show the same behaviours as the stalled
and tethered ones.
Several examples of true stereotypies are described, but not all
tethered or stalled pigs exhibit chronic bar biting. Changes in the en-
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vironment of two of these sows did not alter the fixed stereotype
behaviour. Each individual seems to have an optimum level of environmental stimulation which may account for the great differences
in individual behaviours.

INTRODUCTION
Those movements which are combined into rhythmic or complex
sequences of obscure purpose are described as stereotypies. Hediger
(1955) described stereotypies in caged zoo animals which included
weaving to and fro, pacing up and down, and circling.
Removal of the animal from the cage may cause the stereotypy to
cease, but this is not always so (Meyer-Holzapfel1968). Novel objects
may initially reduce the performance of stereotypies in horses but this
lasts only as long as the object remains novel. In cases where animals
have been performing the stereotypies for some time the introduction
of a novel object may actually increase the frequency of the stereotypy
(Riley-Worthington 1983).
Some stereotypies may function as an adaptive mechanism and be
regarded as the attempt of a normal individual to cope with an abnormal environment (Ridley and Baker 1982). This abnormal environment
may result from conflict or frustration situations, low sensory input
(boredom state) or very high sensory jnput (e.g. novel objects).
All these types of situations may contribute at some time to
stereotypies reported in farm animals, such as bar-biting in tether
stalled pigs (Fraser 1975) and weaving, wind-sucking, and crib-biting
in horses (Riley-Worthington 1983).
Some stereotypies in pigs and horses are performed when food is
anticipated (Fraser 1975; Riley-Worthington 1983). It has been suggested also that rapidly consumed food and the lack of even, lowquality, high fibre food to eat at leisure is a major cause of stereotypies
in herbivores (Kiley-Worthington 1983).
Dantzer and Mormede (1981) suggested that pituitary-adrenal activity is a good indicator of emotional arousal. They looked at a
chain-pulling stereotypy performed by food deprived pigs who were
then submitted to an intermittent food delivery schedule (Dantzer et
al. 1980; Dantzer and Mormede 1983). This chain-pulling activity was
accompanied by decreased pituitary-adrenal activity which indicates
a decrease in tension or anxiety. Their data suggests that stereotypies
enable the animals to decrease excessive arousal, rather than provide
an extra source of stimulation.
Horse stereotypies show many characteristics of learned behaviour (Kiley-Worthington 1983) which may be evoked by some mild
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stimulus (head tossing as a result of nasal irritation initially) or learning by imitation, as in some cases of crib-biting.
There is no published evidence for this in pigs but this study suggests there is an element of learning involved in the development of
stereotypies. It also examines the behaviour performed by tethered,
stalled, and groups of pigs before feeding and after feeding, and comments on the effect of changing the environment on several complex
sequences of stereotypic behaviour in sows. Comment is also made on
the notable absence of chronic bar-biting in this herd.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study was carried out in a 55-sow, specific pathogen-free
herd at the Veterinary Science Farm Piggery, University of Queensland (Australia), during 1982-83. The behaviour of the animals (Large
White x Landrace) in three husbandry systems for sows and gilts was
examined.
(i) Stall system providing 1.04 m 2/pig;
(ii) Neck tether system providing 1.04 m 2/pig; but the 65 em chain
allows each pig to use 3.0 m 2 of space effectively;
(iii) Group system of six pigs in a pen (6.24 m 2 ).
Flooring was concrete in the stalls, each pig being provided
with a concrete trough, concrete floor and slats with a metal trough in
the tethers, and concrete floor and slats in the group pens with floor
feeding.
Food was provided twice/day at 0800 to 0830 and 1300 to
1350 in the form of pellets.

OBSERVATIONS-EXPERIMENT 1
Two types of observations were made in each husbandry system:
(i) Detailed observations each week on 36 tethered sows, 8 tethered gilts, 9 sows in stalls, 10 gilts in stalls, two groups of 6 gilts, and
five groups of 6 sows each, penned.
These observations were made from the time of confirmation of
pregnancy when the pigs were put in the husbandry system until farrowing. Detailed observations were made on day 1 and covered the two
feeding periods. Subsequent observations were done each week and
covered only one feeding period. Behaviour was recorded from the time
the pigs anticipated their food (5 to 15 minutes), during the feeding
period and until the pigs lay down.
(ii) Surveys of all the pigs in stalls, tethers, and pens with time
sampling during both the day and night.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Another section of the experiment was to determine how
stereotypies develop. The two groups of penned gilts (6 in each group)
from the previous experiment were used after farrowing as parity 1
sows and placed in tethers when pregnancy was confirmed. They were
observed each week before, during and after a feed period to determine
when or if, stereotypies developed.

RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
There were two distinct types of behaviour in stalled, tethered,
and penned pigs:
(i) Before-feed behaviour, and
(ii) After-feed behaviour.

PENNED SOWS AND GILTS
The grouped sows (five groups of 6 sows) were only kept together
for one day over two feeding periods, as the agonistic behaviour (cqnflict behaviour involving threats, bites, fights) prevented any other be-.
haviour patterns from emerging.
The grouped gilts (two groups of 6 gilts) showed some pre-feed excitement which consisted of crowding and pushing to the fence as the
food trolley came past. There was no pawing or head waving nor was
there opportunity for any bar-biting. Agonistic activity which occurred over the first 16-minute feed period averaged 4 agonistic incidents/minute. This decreased over the next three months to average
1.8/minute.
Pigs showed no true stereotypies after feeding-the first gilt lay
down within 17-34 minutes after the beginning of feeding and all gilts
were consistently lying by 76 minutes after feeding. There were examples of gilts who sat and chewed for up to 20 minutes in the afterfeed period, but this ceased when they lay down.

STALLS AND TETHERS
Pre-feed behaviour
Pre-feed excitement was shown in stalled sows and gilts, and in
tethered sows and gilts when food was anticipated. These behaviours
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are similar to those described by Fraser (1975), and are listed in Table
1a. Day 1 is the day that the pig is put in the husbandry system and
the frequency of the behaviour is noted over the first feeding period.
The tethered and stalled sows showed more pre-feed behaviour sequences than the tethered and stalled gilts. Agonistic displays were
not evident in tethered gilts, nor in stalled sows or gilts. The agonistic
activities in the tethered sows dropped from 4 7% of all sows over the
first two weeks to one example over the three-month period.
Table 1a. Pre-feed behaviours (5 to 12 minutes before feeding) and the frequency they
occurred on the first day that sows and gilts are stalled or tethered.

Tether
Sows (36)

Stalls
Sows (9)

Gilts (8)

Gilts (10)

Day 1
Agonistic
displays
Yell
Paw
Nosing bars

17*
26

Lie until
feed comes

Yell

7

Paw

3

4

Nosing bars

2

1

Froth and
chew bar

5

23
10

Froth and
chew bar

12

Stand and
chew

1

Stand

6

Wave head

Stand for
feed

Pull at
tether

Stand for
feed

6

Paw

1

Stand and
chew

1

Chew bar

1

Poke nose in
and out front
bar

1

4

Stand and
chew

1

Wave head

7

Poke nose in
and out front
bar

6

18

*frequency of behaviour
A pig may show more than one behaviour.

It can be seen (Table 1b) that some of the tethered gilts learned to
chew the bar, wave their heads, paw and yell during the succeeding
three-month observation period. However, there were 5 gilts who did
not show these behaviours and stood up when food was anticipated.
Bar-biting was observed in 17 tethered sows consistently but was
interspersed with pawing, yelling and head waving. Some stalled sows
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Table lb. Pre-feed behaviours observed in tethered and stalled sows and gilts over a
three-month period.
Tether
Sows (36)

Stalls
Gilts (8)

Sows (9)

Gilts (10)

Agonistic Displays
Yell

Stand for feed

Yell

Stand for feed

Paw

Yell

Paw

Paw

Nose bars

Paw

Nose bars

Stand and chew

Froth and chew
bar

Froth and chew
bar

Chew bar

Nose bar

Stand and chew

Chew bar

Wave head

Wave head

Poke nose
in and out of
front bar

Poke nose in
and out of
front bar

and gilts also bit the bar, but again it was interspersed with other activities.
These behaviours occupied a very small time period over 24 hours.
It was 1.7 to 2.0% of the time in stalled and tethered sows, 0 to 0.4% in
tethered gilts and 0 to 0.2% in stalled gilts.
Fraser (1975) refers to head waving as a stereotype but it is evident that none of these behaviours are stereotypies when the definition
is considered. They are sequences which occur, and indeed might be expected, in animals who are waiting for their hunger to be satisfied.

AFTER-FEED BEHAVIOUR
This is one of the periods when stereotypies are reported to occur
in pigs. The behaviours for stalled sows and gilts and tethered sows
and gilts until they rest are shown in Table 2. These behaviours occupy
between 14.5 to 29.0% of a 24-hour period in tethered sows, 10.0 to
14.0% in stalled sows, 1.4 to 5.6% in tethered gilts and 4.2 to 6.3% in
stalled gilts.
There were no examples of chronic bar-biting or the pre-feed
behaviours of yell, paw, wave head, but there were several examples of
true stereotypies which were performed continuously by individual
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Table 2. After-feed behaviours observed in tethered and stalled sows and gilts before
rest.
Tether
Sows (36)

Stalls
Gilts (8)

Sows (9)

Gilts (10)

Lie

Lie

Lie

Lie

Lie and chew

Lie and chew

Lie and chew

Lie and chew

Lick trough

Lick trough

Stand and chew

Stand and chew

Stand and chew

Stand and chew

Lick trough

Sit and chew

Chew trough

Rub nose on floor

Rub nose on
trough

Sit

Rub nose on
floor

Lick trough

Play with chain
Rub nose on floor
Rub nose on trough

pigs until they lay down. These were observed for three months:
(i) A tethered sow who continually pressed the water nozzle and
squirted water over the floor in random bursts (45 seconds to 140
seconds with 3- to 5- second stops in between).
(ii) A tethered sow who sat poking her tongue in and out.
(iii) A tethered sow who pushed the water nozzle and licked the
water in sequences of 27-30 seconds of continuous pressing, then a
rest period of 2 seconds. This was repeated for an average of 165
minutes until the pig lay down.
(iv) A stalled sow who rubbed her nose in an upward direction on
the two front bars of her stall in a random pattern which also had a
random time component.
Kiley-Worthington (1983) points out that in horses there appears
to be an optimum level of environmental stimulation for each individual. This seems to be similar to pigs and may account for the
great differences in individual behaviours.
An interesting observation was that when the tethered pig who
continually squirted water had farrowed and was placed in stalls she
continued this stereotypy. Also the bar rubbing stereotypy described
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in the stalled sow continued when she was tethered. This indicated
that a fixed stereotypy is difficult to stop even by a change of environment.
The frequencies of the other after-feed behaviours are given in the
survey results for tethered pigs (Table 3) and stalled pigs (Table 4)
which were done in the daytime. A survey of tethered and stalled pigs
over 15 hours (1500- 0645) is shown in Tables 5a and 5b.
One hour after feeding, stand and chew, followed by stand and lick
trough, were the most common behaviours. Stand and chew was the
most common behaviour for two to three hours following feeding, after
which most pigs were resting.

Table 3. Behaviour of 30 tethered pigs on three different days (number indicates the
number of pigs performing the behaviour).

Day 2

Day 1
Behaviour

Lie only

Day 3

1hr
1hr
5-15 min 3 hr 40 min
before feed before feed after feed after feed
(1240)
(1500)
(0800)
(0845)
8

0

8

4

3hr
after feed
(1700)
7

Lie and chew

2

0

6

3

4

Stand only

3

6

3

0

0

Stand and chew

8

5

3

9

7

Stand and lick trough

3

2

3

9

4

Sit only

2

1

2

2

0

Sit and chew

0

0

3

2

6

Stand and poke
tongue in and out

1

1

1

1

1

Stand with nose
pressed on bar

1

0

0

0

Chew bar

1

0

0

0

Stand and head wave

1

2

0

0

0

Stand, wave and paw

0

6

0

0

0

Stand, wave,
chew bar

0

3

0

0

0

Stand and paw
Play with chain

0
0

4
0

0
0

0
0

0
1
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Table 4. The behaviour of 18 stalled pigs on day 1, and 15 stalled pigs on day 2 (number
indicates the number of pigs performing the behaviour).

Day 1 (18 pigs)
Behaviour

Day 2 (15 pigs)

5-15 min
4hr
3hr
1hr
2hr
3hr
before feed after feed after feed after feed after feed after feed
(0845)
(1200)
(1300)
(1500)
(1600)
(1700)

Lie only

0

13

9

1

1

14

Lie and chew

0

0

0

0

0

0

Stand only

5

0

0

2

0

1

Stand and chew

0

5

6

9

11

0

Stand and lick trough

0

0

0

3

2

0

Sit only

0

0

2

0

0

0

Sit and chew

0

0

0

0

0

0

Stand and
poke tongue

0

0

0

0

0

0

Nose pressed
on bar

0

0

1

0

0

0

Chew bar

4

0

0

0

1

0

Stand head wave

9

0

0

0

0

0

Stand and paw

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table 5a. Behaviours observed in 35 tethered pigs from 1500-0645 hours (15 hr 45
min); fed at 1430 and all pigs lie from 1830 to 0640.

Behaviour
Lie

1500

1530

1600

1630

1700

1730

1800

1830

0645*

3

11

4

16

24

23

33

35

25

2

2

4

0

0

0

Lie and chew

0

0

2

Stand

1

10

19

3

3

4

2

0

7

Stand and chew

1

6

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

Stand and lick trough

29

6

0

10

0

0

Sit

1

1

2

2

5

1

0

0

0

Sit and chew

0

1

3

2

1

3

0

0

0

*The husbandman arrived to feed the pigs.
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Table 5b. Behaviours observed in 11 stalled pigs from 1500-0645 hours; fed at 1430,
and all pigs rest from 1830 to 0640.

1500

1530

1600

1630

1700

1730

1800

1830

0645*

Lie

5

8

5

8

9

9

5

11

6

Lie and chew

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Stand

3

0

0

3

1

0

4

0

3

Stand and chew

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Stand and lick trough

2

1

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

Sit

0

1

2

0

0

1

1

0

0

Sit and chew

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

Behaviour

*The husbandman arrived to feed the pigs.

EXPERIMENT 2
During the first observations after the parity 1 sows settled into
their tethers there was not the pre-feed excitement exhibited by the
older sows. None of them pawed, waved their heads back and forth, or
yelled. These sows had been penned together until parturition and this
was their first experience in tethers.
The sows, by 42 days in tethers, were exhibiting some pre-feed excitement by salivating, waving heads, and pushing their snouts
through the front bars of the tether-stall.
After-feed behaviour included rubbing snout along the floor under
the trough, licking inside the trough and chewing. All sows were lying
down by 100 minutes after feeding although there were great individual differences. One sow consistently showed no after-feed
behaviour and lay down immediately.
As yet, true stereotype behaviours have not developed in these
animals, which suggests that an element of learning is involved in
their development.

CONCLUSIONS
Only four examples of true stereotype behaviour appeared which
might indicate that these individuals have a different tolerance level to
the other animals. Changes in environment did not alter the complex
fixed stereotype behaviour in two sows. It is suggested that some
stereotype behaviour is conditioned.
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The pre-feed excitement is not stereotype behaviour according to
the definition, but is a conditioned reflex. Only a few tethered or stalled sows and gilts exhibited chronic bar-biting before or after feeding.
There remains the question of whether the after feeding behaviours observed in most animals are true stereotype behaviours, as described in the literature. It seems unlikely that most of them are harmful to the welfare of the animals in this piggery.
The piggery in this study has several factors which may account
for the lack of serious stereotypies:
(i) many students go into the piggery and handle the animals during clinical procedures,
(ii) several ongoing research projects are carried out continuously,
(iii) the husbandman is interested in the pigs' welfare.
If stereotypies are due to boredom and lack of stimulation as has
been suggested, the presence of people may prevent this.

EDITORS' ADDENDUM
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE NON-THERAPEUTIC
USE OF DRUGS
The use of prostaglandins to induce farrowing in pigs (regardless
of the stage of farrowing at which different sows might be) is an animal
welfare and rights issue. (I am not opposed to valid veterinary use of
prostaglandins to help us deal with the reproductive problems of pigs,
horses, and other animals that might otherwise jeopardize their health
and well-being.) But it is surely ethically questionable to use prostaglandins to make sows in different stages of labor give birth at the
same time, irregardless of potentially harmful consequences. This is
done so that expectant sows will give birth during working hours. While
this is consonant with the economic "efficiencies" of the hog factory
farm, it certainly is not in accord with the biology and psychology of
the sow. Judith Blackshaw has clearly demonstrated, in her research
on sows being given prostaglandins near to delivery, that such treatment intensifies instinctual impulses and needs, which can lead to
what humanitarians intuit as frustration and distress. The use of antibiotics as feed additives for farm animals and of analgesic drugs to
enable injured and lame horses to be raced, are other examples of the
unethical and commercial, as distinct from veterinary, use of drugs in
animals today, which should be questioned.
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THE ORIGINS OF EMPATHY
AND ALTRUISM
Carolyn Zahn-Waxler, Barbara Hollenbeck and
Marian Radke-Yarrow
National Institute of Mental Health
Bethesda, MD 20205

Empathy and altruism are most commonly thought of as forms of
compassion that human beings express toward one another. However,
emotions and behaviors reflecting apparent concern for others occur
within other species and across species as well. Although not without
controversy, ethologists and sociobiologists (e.g., Wilson 1975) have
identified many behaviors in other animals and insects that may be
viewed as prosocial or altruistic (e.g., cooperative efforts of bees, warning calls of many species, rescue behaviors of whales, certain acts of
mammalian caregivers toward their young, etc.). There are fewer signs
of altruism across species. Some animals can be trained to protect, defend and help others (usually humans) in distress. Animal owners
sometimes indicate that their pets show emotional concern for others.
In observing parent-child interaction in the home we have seen emotionally distressed pets hovering over persons feigning distress in
situations where we are measuring the child's capacity for empathy.
The recent spate of research on animal facilitated therapy attests to
the capacity of animals to provide comfort to persons suffering from a
variety of physical and emotional problems.
Altruism across species is probably most commonly seen, however, in human behavior toward other animals. Humans are known to
help, comfort, share witli, protect and defend animals. There have even
been reports of loss of human life, for example, in the process of rescu21
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ing animals. There is also enormous variation among humans in their
sensitivity to their own animals, their commitment to principles of
humane treatment, (Miller 1983) and their concern for preservation of
wildlife. It is difficult to account for these individual differences in
human beings' capacities for compassionate versus aggressive, exploitative attitudes and behaviors toward others, for the origins are
multiple and complex.
In a review of the altruism literature, Burleson (in press) concluded
that comforting activity by humans is most likely to occur or occurs
more sensitively when the distressed, needy other (a) has a close, caring relationship with the comforter, (b) shows salient signs of distress,
and (c) is perceived by the comforter as similar to himself or herself. In
order to facilitate altruism then, it would be important, to identify
both the attributes we have in common with others (animal as well as
human) and the factors that promote caring relationships. The earlier
in development the emotional ties are established, presumably the
more deeply engrained will be the compassion. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore these processes in greater detail.
We will describe theories and research that try to explain the
development, especially in children, of sensitivity to the needs of
others. Are children born with empathy? Is it instinctive or learned?
What kinds of changes do humane feelings and behaviors undergo as
children develop? How do the environments in which children are
reared determine whether they will be more or less likely to show concern and to assume responsibility for the welfare of others? We have
examined these issues in a series of studies of (a) the early origins of
emotional concern (empathy) and (b) the translation of concerned feelings into altruistic behaviors such as helping, sharing, and comforting.
Because of an interest in the development of generalized altruism, we
have studied children's prosocial orientations toward humans and animals, in many settings and over long intervals of time. We will consider the implications of theories and research findings for humane attitudes and treatment.
Empathy refers to the capacity to feel what another is feeling. Examples include the sadness felt when tragedy strikes a friend or the
pleasure vicariously experienced in relation to another's joy. It is,
then, the sharing of an emotional experience. While it is not restricted
to the contagion of any particular emotion, the term most commonly
does refer to the emotional concern aroused by the suffering of another
living being. This is where our research interest has centered-on the
development of emotions and behaviors reflecting concern for the welfare of others. Empathy has many functions. It is viewed by some as
essential to all social interactions and relationships because it informs
us about the inner world of the other person (Meade 1934). It has been
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suggested that empathy is critical to the process of insight, for one
sees oneself through the eyes of the other via empathy (Dymond 1945).
In some theories of moral development (e.g., Hogan 1973) empathy is a
necessary component of mature, moral functioning. Empathy may be
a fundamental motivator in eliciting altruistic and prosocial behaviors
and inhibiting aggressive ones (Hoffman 1976; Feshbach and Feshbach, in press). And empathy is viewed as a critical condition of effective therapeutic intervention in psychotherapy (Rogers 1957) and psychoanalysis (Olinick 1980).
Empathy is hypothesized to have both a cognitive and affective
component, i.e., (a) the emotional experiencing or sensing of the other's
experience and (b) the intellectual understanding or interpretation of
what that experience means (Hoffman 1976). In very young children
and in animals as well, where symbolic capacities are limited, we would
expect the emotional component of empathy to predominate. In
theory, both the cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy should
enhance the likelihood of caring for another in need and hence of assuring humane treatment. And with increases in intellectual abilities and
competencies throughout childhood, compassionate behavior, too,
should increase. However, this is not always the case. Another
person's distress may be so frightening or painful when experienced
empathically, that it may turn the viewer away from the victim's
plight. Intense emotional involvement and preoccupation with another's problems may enmesh one in that distress so completely that it
interferes with appropriate emotional concern and provision of constructive help. Further, we may mistakenly project our own emotions
onto another with whom we think we are empathizing. Finally,
knowledge of another's needs, emotions, and desires may be used to
manipulate or control another person, to prey on their vulnerabilities,
or to intellectualize, and hence deny, the experience.
Prosocial behaviors, acts that benefit another in need (e.g., help,
sharing, cooperation, comfort, protection, rescue, and defense) also
represent complex and diverse processes. They may or may not be the
behavioral counterparts to feelings of concern. Helping can be an intrusive and unwanted act of domination, defense of a victim often contains elements of aggression and anger, sharing may be done with expectations of reciprocity, comforting may be motivated by guilt or
righteous indignation, cooperation may be in the services of intent
ultimately to exploit a partner. These complexities suggest (a) that
there may be optimal levels of expression of concerned feelings and
behaviors, and (b) that some types of prosocial behavior are more likely
than others to reflect altruism or generalized humane behavior. It is
important to try to distinguish those emotions and behaviors that
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reflect genuine concern, because this attribute is particularly important in assuring humane treatment.

THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM
There are four major theories that have been used to explain the
development of altruism. They variously emphasize the importance of
(1) guilt and conscience, (2) cognitive development, (3) instinct, and (4)
learning and environmental processes, to explain the origins and
maintenance of prosocial behavior.

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY
In psychoanalytic theory, the concept of identification has been
used to explain how the values and mores of society become internalized,
and hence why children become prosocial. The child is believed to become altruistic, to share and cooperate, either because of guilt resulting from moral transgressions or through the internalization of ego
ideals (i.e., positively valued behaviors in others). The concept of pathological altruism also derives from psychoanalytic theory. The emphasis is on unconscious, inner forces that drive the behaviors. This
approach has produced relatively few studies, but it seems reasonable
to assume that prosocial behaviors (e.g., help sharing and comfort) for
some persons and on some occasions result from feelings of guilt or an
overactive conscience.

COGNITIVE THEORY
In cognitive-developmental theory which originated with Piaget
(1932) the emphasis has been on children's social-inferential abilities
as a prerequisite for prosocial behavior. The young child is viewed as
egocentric, assuming that others think and feel the same way s/he
does. A certain level of intellectual growth or maturation thus is necessary before the child becomes capable of understanding another's
point of view and hence of being altruistic. This approach produced
many studies in which children's abilities to take others' social roles or
perspectives and their abilities to reason about moral issues were examined in relation to prosocial actions. The assumptions were that the
ability (a) to interpret accurately another's needs or (b) to attain a high
level (stage) of moral reasoning was necessary for a child to show con-
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cern reflected in actual behavior. The results of these research projects
are mixed (see reviews by Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and Chapman
1983; Shantz 1983) with no strong evidence for the hypothesized connection between social-cognitive capacities and altruistic acts. In
other words, one can understand the nature of another's distress
without doing anything about it and one can behave in a caring way
without highly developed cognitive capacities.
In both psychoanalytic and cognitive theories, there is a long
period of early development in which self-concern is presumed to
predominate: Consideration for others would not be expected from
children until they were at least five to seven years old. Two other
theories, ethological/evolutionary and learning theories, do not
highlight a particular age or stage of development necessary for
altruism to occur. They are considered in greater detail throughout
this chapter because of their special relevance to humane education:
The ethological approach because it provides an evolutionary perspective and identifies those attributes that we have in common with
others (human and animal) and the learning approach because it begins
to identify specific mechanisms by which empathy and altruism can be
taught and learned.

LEARNING THEORY
In learning theory, the emphasis has been more on the overt,
observable prosocial behavior of the child rather than on reasoning and
inner motives. In initial formulations, prosocial behavior was presumed
to be acquired in the same way as other learned behaviors-through
processes of conditioning reinforcement, and modeling (see Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, and Chapman 1983). Over time, conceptions of learning were expanded to include the influence of other
socialization processes (e.g., nature of parental discipline; specific instruction; institutionalized, cultural norms and so on). For example,
different cultures and subcultures have quite different norms that are
communicated to the child about cooperative, individualistic and competitive behaviors and what is appropriate balance between them
(Madsen and Shapira 1977). Learned norms of responsibility (i.e., that
it is our duty to help) and norms ofreciprocity (i.e., "I'll help you if you
help me") are thought to be culturally determined and learned in institutional settings (school, church, home, etc.).
The values of society impinge most directly on young children
through their parent's attitudes and philosophies about moral and
altruistic behaviors as well as through their specific teaching and
caregiving practices. Some of these practices include (a) what care-
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givers model or convey in their own behavior about empathy and altruism, (b) what they preach about consideration for others, (c) their
general nurturance or warmth toward the child and their own empathy
when the child is distressed, (d) their teaching and control practices,
when their children cause distress to another (e.g., physical punishment, love withdrawal, explanation and reasoning) (e) the use of praise
and punishment, (f) the use of attributions (such as "you are mother's
good helper"), and (g) the creation of environments that promote prosocial behavior or make caring possible. Generalizations or formulas
for how to produce a prosocial child are difficult and sometimes hazardous, but the bulk of evidence implicates the following caregiver
variables as important-the modeling of altruism to others, nurturance toward the child, use of reasoning (and firm discipline when
the child hurts others), direct instruction in how to help, and reinforcement for helping (Eisenberg 1983; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and
Chapman 1983). In later sections we will consider in greater detail how
some of these variables influence the development of empathy and
altruism in children. Another approach to the socialization question
has been taken by investigators who have examined parental and
societal factors that promote or inhibit aggression rather than prosocial behavior. A brief overview of these findings indicates that
parental permissiveness and inconsistency are associated with high
levels of aggression in their children; also predictive of cruelty in
childhood are high levels of parental aggression and abusiveness, both
toward the children and others as well (see Parke and Slaby 1983, for a
detailed review of this literature). The learning/socialization perspective holds special promise for humane education because it can identify processes that may be alterable and hence may enhance the child's
prosocial tendencies.

BIOLOGICAL THEORIES
Ethological/evolutionary approaches, on the other hand, hold promise for understanding the biological bases of altruism and possibly
for understanding empathic relationships between humans and animals. In this view, altruism is built into species and some forms of altruism are adaptive for survival. Ethologists emphasize the fact that
humans like other animals, are born with behavioral and emotional
tendencies that enhance their own likelihood of survival and hence the
continuation of the species. Even though human infants are more helpless than the young of any other mammalian species, they are well
equipped with reflexes and behaviors of significance for survival (e.g.,
rooting, sucking, clinging, following). The distress cries of infants are
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present at the moment of birth: They provide for very effective means
of eliciting attention, sympathy, help, and comfort from adults. In all
mammals this distress cry or isolation call is a stimulus for caregiving
and comfort. It served originally to maintain social cohesion by maintaining maternal-offspring contact. The distress cry of mammals is
also a constant reminder that animals other than ourselves do have
feelings and are capable of suffering.
There are many characteristics that humans have in common with
other mammals that may contribute to maintenance of social contact
and hence, possibly, to the development of empathy as well (e.g., social
play, nursing, separation distress). Distress is a universal emotion expressed across all mammalian species. Distress is also a stimulus for
acts of altruism. It has the potential for evoking an emotional,
possibly empathic, response in some other members of the same species. If there is sufficient similarity in expressions of distress across
different mammalian species, this may be a powerful biological mechanism reminding us that some of the distresses and needs of other
species are similar to our own. This recognition of communality might
help to promote empathy across species. There is little or no research
designed to explore humans' reactions to the cries of other animals. In
one of our studies (Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, and Cummings 1983) preschool and elementary school-age children overheard cries of premature and normal babies. It was not uncommon for children initially
to mistake the cries, particularly those of the less developed, premature infants, for cries of animals and birds (sheep, donkeys, cats, goats,
even kangaroos and turkeys). This did not deter the children from expressing empathy toward the infants with unusual (animal-like) cries.
Distress cries, however, should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for eliciting empathy. There are also studies to indicate
that distress cries elicit aggressive behavior in some caregivers.
Physical abuse and neglect of distressed offspring have been reported
in primates as well as humans.
MacLean (1982) has hypothesized that the capacity of mammals
for nurturant caregiving toward their (distressed) offspring, in contrast to some reptilians who may abandon or eat their young, is the
evolutionary forerunner to the development of empathy, conscience,
and a sense of social responsibility. MacLean has attempted to identify those parts of the brain that are responsible for this caregiving.
The limbic system is clearly basic for parental care and family affiliation in mammals. But the development of the prefrontal neocortex
which is a much more recently evolved structure, has contributed to
further development of the family, especially in primates. The added
sector of neocortex gives human beings a capacity for foresight, which
is believed to underlie our striving for the welfare of our own progeny
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and the progeny of others. Some scientists also have begun to speculate about neurochemical and hormonal bases of empathy and altruism
and the brain circuitry that might be involved (Panksepp, in press).

RESEARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
GENERALIZED ALTRUISM
Many of the processes that explain the origins and development of
·altruism are difficult to study directly. However, it is possible to study
developmentally young children's responses to other's distress cries
and hence examine their early capacities for empathy and caregiving.
Such research has established the importance of both instinct and environment in the development of sensitivity to another's distress.
Studies from the early 1900's demonstrated the possibility that even
newborns may be predisposed to be receptive to distress; they are likely to cry, reflexively when they hear the cries of other babies. It was
not clear, however, from these studies, whether children cried because
they were empathic or because they were frightened or because the
sounds of the crier were aversive and painfuL More recent and experimentally sophisticated research designs (Simner 1971; Sagi and
Hoffman 1976) have confirmed that there is special sensitivity to the
cry, per se, and not just to the noisiness of the cry.
We have engaged in two kinds of studies of the development of
altruism and empathy in over 17 5 young children. We have examined
the origins and transitions (in one to two-and-a-half year olds) in prosocial patterns over time in natural settings (Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1982); and we have created different learning environments
to determine which are most conducive to developing prosocial behavior based on concern for another's welfare (in three to five year olds)
(Yarrow, Scott and Waxler 1973). In both studies we have been interested in how children respond to others in distress, because this represents the set of conditions most likely to evoke emotion (and hence
possibly empathy and altruism). Both kinds of studies explore conditions that create generalized consideration for the welfare of others
(i.e., caring for nonfamily as well as family members, for animals as
well as humans).

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND
SOCIALIZATION OF ALTRUISM
A longitudinal study of one to two-and-a-half year olds examined
chilqren's responses to compelling dist:J;ess situations. A sample of
middle-class mothers was trained by research assistants to make
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systematic, narrative accounts and to tape record their observation
reports. The mothers observed events of naturally occurring distress
(e.g., pain, sadness, anger) that were either caused or witnessed by the
children. This was done over a period of many months. Standard emotional incidents were also introduced. Each week either the mother or a
home visitor acted out a distress emotion in the home. These procedures provided thousands of incidents which were then analyzed to
determine (a) developmental changes in children's reactions to other's
distress and (b) parental socialization practices that were more or less
likely to produce altruism. Several hundred of these incidents involved
reports of children's feelings and behaviors toward animals.
There are very distinct age changes in how children react to
another's distress during the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler and
Radke-Yarrow 1982). Children almost always are keenly aware of the
distress and if they consistently do not notice, one wonders what is
wrong. The youngest children are themselves likely to become distressed, in ways similar to the reflexive crying of newborns but not
with such full-blow intensity. Just a little past the first year of life,
children begin to comfort others in distress. This is a developmental
landmark; an aversive experience in another person draws out a concerned, approach response from the child. Children's first prosocial
acts are physical interventions: they pat and hug the victims, rub their
hurts and so on. Children often begin to seek out guidance, reassurance, and information from their mothers when in these situations.
There is also an explosion of prosocial activity at this time. Children's
acts of compassion begin to take many different forms: acts of help,
sharing, comforting, rescue, distraction, defense/protection, verbal
sympathy, are now present in development. These reactions occur not
only when children are innocent bystanders to the others' distress
(e.g., watching mother stub her toe) but also when they have caused
the harm (e.g., biting sister). The first prosocial interventions are largely, as one might expect, confined to family members. If families have
pets, the animal sometimes become recipients of the child's first ex-·
pressions of empathy. We have described the range of prosocial responses to humans elsewhere (Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1982).
There is considerable overlap in the ways young children express kindness to animals and people. Table 1 provides illustrations from our
data of the different kinds of prosocial behaviors that young children
show to animals. And Table 2 provides examples of child's aggressive
tendencies toward animals.
Virtually all of the children studied showed this early capacity for
concern for the welfare of another being. This uniformity suggests that
altruism is a biological given, "wired" in and ready for expression
given sufficient physical, cognitive, and emotional growth. There were
differences among children in the frequency and emotional intensity of
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Table 1
Compassionate Behaviors Toward Animals Shown by One-and-a-Half to Two-and-aHall Year Old Children*
1. Child throws rubber toy at dog. Mother says, "Oh, you've hurt Bruno, poor Bruno."
Child reaches over and hugs dog around the neck, then lies down on the hearth with the
dog.

2. The dog begins to gasp for breath: Child runs over and smiled at first. Then he looks
serious and throws himseH on the dog to console him. Mother encourages him to get off.
Mother comforts the dog by stroking its head and neck, and the child pats too.
3. Child pulls the dog's foot hard and the dog yelps. Mother says, "Oh, don't pull Suzy's
foot like that." Child looks serious, touches foot and says "hurt." Mother becomes very
excited because this is the first time child has used a word that expresses a feeling. She
says, "Yes, it did hurt, but it doesn't anymore." Child then pats dog's paw very lovingly and gently, and hugs the dog.
4. Cat gets caught in the window well and girl cries with concern.
5. Dog sneezes and child brings Kleenex to blow its nose.
6. A dead goldfinch lies on the doorstep. Child points and said, "Birdie, birdie." and
keeps looking at it with a furrowed brow-kind of sad-like.
7. The dog comes in making little crying sounds. The child turns around and says very
sympathetically, "What's the matter, Lady? What's the matter?"
8. Mother is rough housing with the dog and hits a sore spot. He yelps, the mother tries
to console and the girl comforts the dog as well.
9. Child steps on the dog's foot and he gave a snappy growl. Mother grabbed the dog,
yelled at him and threw him in the basement. Father joined in. Child squawks back at
parents in a loud harsh tone, i.e., she came to the defense of the dog by scolding her
parents for yelling at the dog.
10. Child starts hitting the cat and pulls its tail. Mother moves child away and says,
"No, we do not do that to cats, not at all. We treat them nicely. We never pull their tails
and we never kick them." Then child begins to pat and kiss the cat.

11. Child is eating a snack and tries to share her animal crackers with the dog.
12. Child pulls dog's ears and dog gives a high little squeak. Mother notes that child
doesn't seem to realize that those are squeaks of pain. So she has to tell him, "No, don't
hurt the doggie; be gentle." Then he puts his arms around the dog's neck, puts his
cheek to the dog's head and is sweet and gentle. (On another occasion like this, the
mother explains but also slaps the child thus giving a mixed message.)

*Excerpted from mothers' observational records.

their altruism. This variability might result, in part, from differences
in what children are being taught by their parents about responsiveness to the needs of others.
We examined three aspects of child-rearing and socialization that
might be expected to influence young children's orientations to others
in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow and King 1979). One concerns the nurturance or warmth of the caregiver and the sensitivity
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Table 2
Aggressive or Callous Behaviors Toward Animals Shown by One-and-a-Half to
Two-and-a-Half Year-Old Children*
1. Mother calls the dog who won't come and mother says, "That dumb dog!" Child
mimics mother's tone and says, "Get in here dumb dog."
2. Father is "real harsh" with the dog and the child, in turn, starts to berate the
dog-yelling at him in the same kind of tone of voice.
3. Dog gets into chicken livers. Mother yells loudly, "Get down and get out of here
dog," smacks him and shoos him out of the kitchen. A few minutes later the dog comes
back in and the child imitates the mother, waving her arms, yelling at and hitting the
dog.
4. Dog chokes and child laughs hilariously.
5. Child is squeezing a kitten's neck. Mother is worried that he might be able to hurt it.
So she wraps her hands around the child's neck, to give him the idea of how unpleasant
it is to have one's neck squeezed. He drops the kitten and she stopped squeezing.
6. Mother fusses at the dog. Child goes up to the dog, stomps her foot, jabbers to
him-really trying to tell him off, calling him "Bad" and so on.

*Excerpted from mother's observational records.

with which s/he handles the child when the child is distressed. This is
one kind of index of the parent's empathy toward the child. Also, important are the parent's teachings and emotional reactions when
parent and child view someone who is hurt or upset. For example, does
the parent model altruism to the victim by helping, consoling, and so
on, does s/he reassure the child, or does s/he ignore the situation entirely? The parent also plays a significant role when the child causes
distress. Children's acts of aggression (e.g., hitting father, pulling the
eat's tail) provide further occasions for teaching. Caregivers may use a
variety of techniques here, sometimes in combination. These include
for example, (a) power assertion (physical punishment or restraint), (b)
withdrawal of love (e.g., sending the child to his room or coldly ignoring him), (c) verbal prohibitions ("stop it!"), (d) suggesting a positive,
alternative behavior ("why don't you pet kitty instead of pulling on
him?"), (e) reasoning or explanations about the consequences for the
other ("you make Joey feel bad when you take his toy"; "that hurts
Blacky when you step on his paw"), (f) perspective-taking, "Remember what it felt like when your foot got caught?", and (g) ignoring the
situation. Some of these parental techniques are also illustrated in
Table 1.
The content (or substance) of children's prosocial actions often appeared to have been learned (imitated) from the parents' own actions
(e.g., mother shows child how to pat gently, or put on a Band-Aid). A
very major parental influence had to do with the ways in which children were disciplined for hurting others. Mothers who had the most
prosocial children used the following techniques: (1) They gave clear
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explanations about the negative consequences for the victim when the
child hurt others; (2) they were sometimes moralistic and judgmental
("it's not nice to bite"; "I don't want to be near you when you act like
that"); (3) they provided their children with general rules about
physical aggression toward people and animals ("you must never hurt
others"); and (4) they firmly prohibited their children from hurting
others in specific situations and suggested positive, alternative actions. The children were more likely to make reparation for distresses
they had caused and to come to the aid of victims they had not themselves harmed. Mothers who used this constellation of disciplinary
techniques also tended to be highly empathic and sensitive to the
needs of their own children when they themselves experienced distress.
The strong relationships between maternal practices and early
child (prosocial) behaviors suggests that this is a time in the child's life
when there is special receptivity and sensitivity to environmental influences, and hence to teachings about kindness toward others. A
follow-up study of these families five years later showed that those
children who showed high levels of generalized altruism and remorse
over hurting others as toddlers were also the more altruistic children
by the time they entered school (Cummings et. al., in press). Thus, we
must take seriously the possibility that basic humane attitudes and
behaviors are laid down in the first years of life and teachings can
begin then. Young children can be made to understand that animals as
well as people, have feelings, are receptive to affection, and sometimes
require consolation.
Children's imitations of parental behaviors were by no means
restricted to parents' prosocial actions (e.g., see Table 2). In at least
half of the families studied, parents showed anger to animals and
children imitated parent's expressions of anger and disciplinary action. This included episodes of shouting at and hitting animals.
Sometimes we would see the young child embellish the parent's punitive action by yelling and hitting when the parent had just shouted. In
some families, this appeared to be part of a consistent pattern. For example, one mother described an incident in which she yelled at the dog,
picked hini by the collar and "sort of" threw him down. In her
words-"! get very violent with him because he really annoys me
sometimes; I think I even kicked him." She noted that usually when
she does this her one-year-old becomes frightened or angry too, but
this time that didn't happen. Perhaps the child was already developing
defensive coping strategies. We also saw the other extreme-families
where pets were treated with respect and accorded family status. In
such homes, children were often unusually responsive to the plights of
pets. In one family, when the dog sneezed, the two-year-old boy
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would bring a kleenex to blow its nose, and when the dog hiccupped,
the child tenderly kissed its nose. When the mother brushed the dog
and hair came out, the boy interpreted it as a hurt and tried to shield
the dog from the mother while anxiously attempting to pat the hair
back on.
Humane and inhumane orientations of children thus may derive
from the values fostered and the treatment of animals provided within
the family. We have identified some of the parental practices that may
promote compassion and dampen aggression. We found that mothers'
communications about the need for humane behavior occur most frequently and with special intensity when their young children are
themselves harming others. However, in another study of preschool
children we found that young children can also be taught to help when
they are bystanders to another's distress. An experimental research
approach was used. Different learning environments were created to
determine what kind of caregiver practices were most likely to produce
generalized altruism in bystander circumstances.

THE TEACHING OF GENERALIZED ALTRUISM
Four experimental environments were developed to represent configurations of rearing conditions that differed in the adult's nurturant
relationship with the child, and in how she conveyed her own prosocial
principles, feelings, and behavior. The children were from middle-class
and upper-middle-class families. They were assigned to nursery
school groups in which an adult provided either highly nurturant or
relatively aloof, matter-of-fact care. These experimental conditions
took place in 30-minute periods in the nursery school over a period of
two weeks. Following these "histories of rearing" the adult provided
one of two kinds of programmed experiences that dealt with prosocial
content. In type "A" conditions, the adult expressed prosocial principles and values in relation to many incidents of distress presented in
pictures and in miniature play materials (dioramas depicting a child,
an adult, or an animal in some kind of situation in which help was needed).
The adult's reactions to these symbolized distresses combined inductive reasoning, positive emotional involvement, modeling of help, and
provision of information. Thus, she explained, "Look, this little bunny
is caught in the bush and can't get out. Poor bunny must be scared. I
am going to help it out of the bush so it can get back to its mother.
There, that makes the bunny feel better." The child would then have a
turn at helping. Type "B" conditions included the preceding procedures, with the important addition of the adult's responding similarly to programmed distresses that involved interaction with real people
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and animals (e.g., a teacher dropping her pencils, a cat tangled in yarn,
etc.). These training conditions took place over several weeks. Both
sets of rearing techniques provided the child with information intended to
help the child to recognize cues of distress and feelings of the victim; to
demonstrate ways of helping, and to indicate the consequences of such
helping for the victim. The ''A'' and ''B'' procedures differed in two important respects: (1) Principles expressed by the adult in A conditions
were only at the level of the hypothetical or abstract; in B conditions
principles were put into practice with real consequences for the
distressed persons. (2) Prosocial modeling by the adult in B conditions
involved interaction with the distressed person which gave the adult
the direct experience of the consequences of her prosocial interventions. High and low nurturant histories were used with each training
type. These four conditions were intended as a study of configurations
of rearing conditions as they are practiced in real life by parents and
experienced by children. All four conditions resulted in more symbolic
altruism than the control condition where no forms of teaching were
done. One of the four configurations of rearing conditions produced a
significantly higher frequency of real helping behavior from the children and more verbal expressions of sympathetic feelings than the
other three conditions. It was an adult with whom the child had a
history of a nurturant relationship and who provided the child with the
model of her own caring behavior for others in both symbolic and real
interactions with those in need. Also, in this condition, the adult's prosocial interactions involved child, adult and animal victims of distress
and has clear cognitive and positive affective accompaniments. The
adult provided the child with information about the victim's experience, the adult's own feelings, and the consequences of her prosocial intervention. The same set of rearing conditions that produced
the highest levels of altruism in these children was similarly effective
with a group of lower-class children in a replication study (Yarrow,
Scott and Waxler 1973).
If we were to generalize from these experimental findings to
child-rearing in the real world, we would conclude that the parent who
is altruistic toward others but is cold with his child is not going to have
much success in developing generalized altruism in his child. Further,
the parent who conveys his moral values as principles only, but does
not translate these into real, caring actions, accomplishes a similar
limited kind of learning in the child. Generalized altruism appears to
be best learned from parents who both inculcate the principles and
show real altruism in their everyday interactions. And their practices
toward their children are consistent with their general altruism.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our research provides substantial evidence of empathy and
altruism in children at ages well before many theories would have it occur. The tendencies of young children sometimes to be egocentric,
dependent, lacking in competence, demanding, narcissistic, and so on,
have been emphasized in many theories of personality and cognitive
development. Hence, we have been inclined to ignore their tender, prosocial side and the fact that they do have considerable social skills.
Also contributing to an inaccurate view of young children as very
limited in their empathic capacities are the research methods used.
Cognitive/developmental studies often rely on interviews of children
and this puts young children at a particular disadvantage. Often they
cannot put into words the reasons for their acts of caring, they cannot
state abstract principles of justice, and they evidence primitive, unsophisticated verbal understanding of moral issues. They then become
labelled as functioning at a low stage of moral development, and are
stereotyped as hedonistic, exploitative, negativistic, dominionistic,
and so on in their orientations toward others. These characterizations
are based on poorly applied understanding of young children's words
rather than on their deeds and their expressed emotions.
While some studies report that children become more prosocial
with age, many other studies of cooperation, comforting, helping, and
sharing do not show the expected age increase (Radke-Yarrow, ZahnWaxler and Chapman 1983). The research situations in which older
children have been shown to be more likely than younger children to
manifest prosocial behavior are research situations in which the victim's plight is portrayed symbolically and children must share with a
hypothetical other (i.e., as in giving to charity). Older children will
necessarily be better able to understand such abstractions and representations of distress and will have developed greater competencies
for prosocial behavior that requires these abilities. This does not mean,
however, that children necessarily develop a greater emotional capacity for empathy as they grow older. In fact, the opposite sometimes
may be true for many because they have had more time to learn other
values and practices, to treat distress as routine, and to have developed defenses for shutting out their own and others pain. It is reasonable to assume that children of all ages are capable of learning to be
kind. The ways in which they learn will differ considerably. This is an
area where much research is needed to help plan the most effective curricula for children of different ages.
Our research is not unique in finding that young children's
capacities for concerned feelings and behaviors far outstrip their verbal competencies. Increasingly, there are studies that corroborate the
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occurrence, in the first years of life, of children's understanding of
others' inner feelings; children's abilities to cooperate, take turns with
others, and negotiate conflicts, show willingness to share with peers
and adults, and manifest capabilities for giving help (e.g., Bretherton,
McNew and Beeghley-Smith 1981; Eckerman, Whatley and Kutz
1975; Rheingold, Hay and West 1976; Ross and Goldmam 1977; Hay
and Ross 1982). These findings are not merely an academic issue. They
influence whether we view young children as altruistic or hedonistic,
and determine when, if, and how we will attempt to teach them compassionate behavior. Our data, and those of others, indicate that training should begin very early and that it should recognize the child's innate empathic sensitivies. It is commonly recommended that children
be at least five to six years old before they are allowed to have pets
because this is when they can first begin to assume some real responsibility. This decision precludes exposure to animals in those important early years of life where basic orientations are established.
The research has specific implications for curricula that are
designed to develop and encourage empathic and humane behavior in
young children. The following factors have been found to be important: (a) having warm and accepting relationships with the parent/
teacher if the learning is to generalize, (b) using training materials that
realistically portray feelings and distress, (c) giving the child direct experience with real helping, (d) beginning teaching very early in the
child's life and making it a fanrlly affair, (e) using explicit explanations
about feelings and circumstances of the victim, i.e., actively evoking
empathy in the child, and (f) stating general codes or principles about
altruism, aggression, and morality, in simple, explicit terms. Many of
these notions are probably already part of existing curricula and hence
may represent what is already conventional wisdom to some. To large
numbers of people, however, it is not common knowledge that empathy and humane behavior can be taught and learned even in the
earliest years of life.
To summarize, as early as the second year of life, one can begin to
teach children the rudiments of a sense of responsibility for other people and animals. This teaching task should continue through childhood, with an attempt both to retain the child's early empathic proclivities and to be sensitive to the changing cognitive and symbolic
capacities that occur with development. It is possible to show even
young children specific ways of helping and caring for others. The verbal messages and the physical demonstrations of appropriate actions
need to be simple, direct, concrete, consistent, and repeated in a variety of contexts throughout the early years of life. It is especially important with toddlers and preschoolers (and with older children as well)
that the teaching not always be at an abstract symbolic levels, (i.e.,
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with pictures, stories, teddy bears, etc.) Rather, "hands on" experiences with real animals and persons, with their needs, their discomforts, and the specific caretaking they require will be necessary to
equip children with the knowledge and motivation for responding humanely.
The mothers' reports in the longitudinal study of altruism provided
us with many detailed narrative records of family interaction with
pets. Based on clinical evaluations of these reports we offer the following observations and generalizations. Many of the families had pets
but there was considerable variability in the ways in which animals
were incorporated into the family and in their specific roles and functions. Parents vary considerably in how much they praise and reward
children's nurturing of animals and how much teasing they tolerate.
Some parents find the child's abuse or aggression "cute" while others
firmly apprise their children of the distress this creates for the animal.
There are differences (described earlier) in the techniques parents use
to prevent the child from hurting and encourage the child to be more
caring. Hence, parents presumably differ in the extent to which they
believe animals have feelings, are receptive to affection, and require
comfort.
Some parents clearly use pets as the scapegoats for other family
and personal problems: in volatile, angry families, animals are the recipients of displaced aggression, receiving more than their share of
hostility for minor misdeeds. Some of the parents give mixed messages to their children about the value of the pets and the children, in
turn, reflect this ambivalence in their own treatment of animals. Thus,
they can be seen to alternate between affection and abuse, with little
awareness of this inconsistency in their treatment. The research
literature and common sense would lead us to expect that children will
learn to be caring, or abusive, or indifferent to animals depending on
whether they see the parent behave in a similar way. It is more complicated, however. Some children may be relatively unresponsive to
parental teachings and some may react against their parents. One little girl, for example, sided with the animal in situations of conflict and
consistently tried to protect it against parental punishment, sometimes literally putting herself in the middle. This kind of compassion
(i.e., early adoption of the defender role) thus may have very different
origins from the compassion based on positive teachings. Even if
families have pets early in child's life, this does not assure a good
learning situation. There is considerable variability in early family experiences with animals; children will come to early training and education programs with very different attitudes, behavior styles, values,
and emotional orientations toward animals. These patterns may al-
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ready be pervasive and entrenched. Teaching techniques then will
have to be adapted to reach each child.
It is interesting to speculate concerning why domestic cats and
dogs evolved. Mostly, we take them for granted but they are an
anomaly in the animal kindgom in terms of (a) their propensity to form
more intense social attachments outside of their own species (i.e., to
humans) than within it, and (b) their ability to elicit strong expressions
of affect from humans. These mutual attachments were thought to
have evolved originally because ca~s and dogs were useful to human
physical survival,-in keeping down the rodent population, in protecting, and defending humans, and so on. Yet, even when these needs no
longer existed, people continued to have pets, perhaps more to fill
psychological and emotional needs. The extensive recent use of pets as
"therapists" attest to their remarkable capacity for reducing stress
and providing companionship, comfort, and pleasure to others (Katcher and Beck 1983). We make animals an important part of children's
lives from infancy onward. As babies they are given stuffed animals of
all kinds and many of their first experiences with comfort (given and
received) are with these play objects. The first dreams of children are
reported to have more animal than human themes. Also, many early
educational materials make use of animal characters. Some people
believe that there is a natural, special affinity or empathic bond between young children and animals (though there is the potential for
cruelty as well). We have many reasons for giving pets to children.
Pets provide companionship and comfort, they provide an opportunity
for less ambivalent emotional relationships, they may help to
ameliorate family tensions. Some mothers, for example, indicate that
the child goes to the family's cat or dog for comfort after having been
disciplined. Animals also provide an opportunity to learn to be responsible for others, to be gentle, and to discipline effectively. Because the
life span of a pet is often shorter than the periods of childhood and
adolescence of humans, children's first experiences with suffering,
death and mourning, issues of mortality and immortality often will be
in relation to their pets. Thus, animals provide an arena for teaching
and learning (at both cognitive and emotional levels) about many of
the major issues and struggles basic to existence.
Darwin's travels and observations led him to reaffirm, as have
others before and after him, that man is not the center of the universe.
Man is connected to a larger web of life. We are a fellow species who
need to share the earth with other species. Family pets may serve a
very special purpose of reminding us of this connection between
human life and animal life and the emotional needs we have in common
with other animals.
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Many of the issues that concern us here are conveyed with eloquence and insight in de Saint-Exupery's book, The Little Prince
(1943). The prince, a young boy, travels to many planets, and talks to
many people in his quest to know about the meaning of life. At last, on
earth, he learns from a fox what is important. The boy meets a wild fox
one morning and invites him to play. The fox tells the prince he cannot
play with him because he is not yet tame. The prince asks what it
means to tame and the fox replies, "It is an act too often neglected. It
means to establish ties. Until we establish ties, neither of us is special
to each other. But if you tame me, then we shall need each other. To me
you will be unique in all the world. To you, I will be unique in all the
world,''-' 'You become responsible forever for what you have tamed.''
The fox teaches the boy how to tame him and they form a close bond.
Eventually they must part and the fox is about to cry. The prince
speculates that it might have been better never to have met because of
the pain of separation. The fox assures the prince that it is infinitely
better to have formed the relationship because through the process,
they have become unique in all the world. It is this complex and poorly
understood process of relationship formation, whether between people
or between people and animals, that helps to foster empathy and diminish aggression.
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ABSTRACT
What we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the
analogues of human rights, including the fundamental right to be
treated with respect. Once we recognize their possession of this right,
it follows that whales are not to be used or exploited by us for the promotion of our ends, however "benign" they may appear. In the case of
humans, to refrain from killing them is to discharge only a small part
of our total duties. We must also refrain from exploiting them, whether "consumptively" or "nonconsumptively." Having come as far as
we have in our understanding of the moral ties that binds humans and
whales, we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not
here for us to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us ''to
study," or "to watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is
the most difficult. It is to let whales alone.
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In 1946 representatives of fourteen governments met in Washington to sign the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling. This was the meeting that established the International
Whaling Commission. The declared purpose of the Convention was to
safeguard the "great natural resources represented by whale stocks"
in order to "make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry" (International Whaling Commission 1946).
Since 1946 attitudes towards whales have changed enormously
both within the IWC and among the general world population. Public
opinion surveys have indicated that in most countries, including J a pan, opposition to whaling is the majority sentiment. The IWC, andespecially its Scientific Committee, has reflected this shift in opinion, as
well as playing a role in bringing it about. The Commission has contributed to our knowledge of whales by supporting the collection and
collation of scientific data. This in turn has focused attention on the
plight of the planet's largest mammals. In its 1980 Washington conference the IWC even began to explore tentatively the ethical issues involved in killing cetaceans. Today it seems to many that the IWC is as
involved in protecting whales as in protecting the whaling industry.
There seem to be at least two sources for this shift in attitudes towards
whales.
First, recent research has suggested that whales are remarkably
intelligent and sensitive creatures. Exactly how sensitive and intelligent, and how exactly these terms are to be applied to whales, is difficult to say, however. There are serious problems involved in studying
whales. They live in very different environments than we do. The
course of their evolutionary history has been very different, and there
are also significant variations among species. Still, some things are
known. Whales have extraordinarily large brains. Some have about 30
billion neurons in their neo-cortex compared to about 10 billion in
humans. With brain to body ratios that are similar to those of the higher primates, their brains are also highly differentiated and exhibit a
high degree of folding of the cortical surface. For these reasons one of
the leading researchers in the field, P .J. Morgane, has claimed:
... only the brain of whales and men have the amount and quality
of neocortex making both appear at the pinnacle of the animal
kingdom ... (Frost 1979).

In addition, whales have extremely rich behavioral repertoires, sophisticated communication systems, and complex forms of social organization. Whatever finally may be decided about the exact nature of whale
intelligence and sensitivity, it has become increasingly clear that
whales are comparable to the higher primates and perhaps even to humans. For this reason it has seemed to many that killing whales for
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their blubber and oil is a moral crime akin or even equivalent to wan·
ton murder.
A second reason why attitudes towards whales have changed is
due to the apparent harmony in which whales live with their environment. Millions of years before our ancestors came out of the trees
whales had already evolved to about their present state, and they were
living lives very much like the ones they live today. For millions of
years they were clearly the most intelligent beings on the planet. Seen
from this perspective, we are evolutionary upstarts. In an incredibly
short period of time we have become masters of the planet. And what
do we do? We devote ourselves to destroying all other intelligent forms
of life. But at least we are consistent. We seem just as willing to
destroy ourselves as well. For people who despair at the havoc humans
have wrought, whales are role models. They are symbols of how intelligent beings can live joyful, peaceful lives in harmony with their environment. From this point of view, whales are the teachers, we the
students, about the things that really matter.
Whether or not we are willing to fully accept either of these lines of
thought doesn't really matter. It is clear that we have all come a long
way since 1946 in our attitudes towards whales. To some degree this
Conference marks the progress we have made. Instead of talking about
"maximum sustainable yields" we are now talking about "whales
alive" and the "nonconsumptive utilization of cetacean resources."
In the light of the progress we have made it would be nice to say
that we have gone far enough, that we are on the verge of a new era in
which we give the whales their due. If this were the case, this Conference would be the occasion for a double celebration: one for the
whales, and one for us for celebrating them. We shall argue, however,
that although we have freed ourselves from the worst aspects of the
anthropocentric ethic, which holds that everything on the planet only
has value insofar as it has value to us-our ends, our purposes, our in·
terests-we have not yet fully liberated ourselves from its lingering
vestiges.
Not everyone will be willing to accept what we say. But whatever
beliefs we finally come to, it is important that we be willing from time
to time to reconsider them, and to scrutinize honestly the fundamental
presuppositions and commitments on which they are based. We hope
that this paper will be a contribution to such a reconsideration.
First we shall argue that what we know about whales is sufficient
for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including a right
to life, a right that is violated by those whaling practices that we are
beginning to put behind us. We shall argue further that this right is
undergirded by a more fundamental right that whales share with humans: a right to be treated with respect. It is this right which would be
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violated by allowing, for instance, exploitative benign research on humans. And it is this right that is violated when we treat whales as "cetacean resources." Next we shall discuss some of the implications of
our view for the concerns of this Conference.

WHALE RIGHTS
To credit whales with a comparatively sophisticated mental life is
hardly new. It is in the spirit of Darwin who claimed repeatedly that
conciousness forms a continuum; the mental life of the higher animals
differs from our own only in degree, not in kind. Any rationally viable
ethic of how whales ought to be treated must take their mental sophistication into account. And it is the demonstrable failure to do this that
exposes the grave inadequacy of the "ethic" that allows these animals
to be viewed and treated as a resource for us, as if they were trees or
mineral deposits. Just as Bonnie is not a resource for Clyde, nor Clyde
for Bonnie, so whales are not a resource for us-though of course they
can be, and almost always are, treated as if this is their ''place in the
scheme of things.'' That we are, so to speak, on all fours with whales on
this morally crucial matter will be seen more clearly once we reflect on
the philosophical underpinnings of why we do, and should, deny that
human beings are to be viewed and treated as other peoples' resources.
In our case we avoid this impoverished view by postulating that
we have a different kind of value. Sometimes this is said to be our
worth, or our dignity, or our sanctity; sometimes, as in Kant's writings, the root idea is expressed by saying that human beings exist as
"ends in themselves." That is to say, people as individuals have their
own projects and purposes that imbue their lives with meaning. As a
member of the human community I recognize that others have virtues
and excellences which they strive to develop more fully. I may not
share their conception of virtue and of the good, but I recognize that
they, like me, have legitimate ends which they pursue, which are
valuable to them, and so if I am to be moral I must treat them as independent beings with their own excellences-as "ends in
themselves." Let us here call the kind of independent, nonresource
value attributed to individual humans inherent value. It is because we
have such value that we must not be treated in ways that fail to show
respect for us as individuals, and respect is not shown whenever we are
treated in ways that assume that our value is reducible to how much
we answer to or advance the interests of others-as if, that is, we exist
as a resource for others. Acts and institutions that fail to treat us with
appropriate respect, from a deceitful promise to slavery, are to be
morally condemned. Or so it is commonly believed. Were we to grant
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this much, how could we rationally avoid the same view about the
value of whales, since they too seem to have their own virtues and excellences? How could we rationally defend, that is, the view that we
have this special kind of nonresource value-inherent value- but they
do not?
Many possibilities come to mind: Whales lack immortal souls.
Whales lack moral autonomy and reason. Whales lack the ability to enter into contracts. Whales lack the ability to choose between alternative life-plans. And so on. Some of these claims are almost certainly
false. But even if they are granted, for argument's sake, they neither
singly nor collectively provide a rationally satisfactory basis for affirming
inherent value in our case while denying it in the case of whales. For
example, even if it is true that we do, but whales do not, have immortal
souls, nothing whatever follows concerning the sort of value each of us
has during our terrestial life. Again, that whales lack the ability to
recognize the inherent value of others, should this be true, is no better
reason to deny that they have such value than it would be to say that a
daffodil cannot be yellow because it lacks the ability to recognize that
lemons are yellow too. And as for the other sorts of considerations
mentioned (for example, that whales lack, but humans possess, autonomy and reason), each conveniently overlooks the fact that many
human beings who we regard as having inherent value-young
children, the senile, and the mentally enfeebled, for example-are
similarly deficient. We do not, and we should not, treat these human
beings as if they exist as a resource for those of us who, as luck has it,
happen to possess the list of favored attributes under review. To persist in viewing and treating whales, creatures who, it bears emphasizing, have a mental life of greater sophistication than many human beings, as if they exist as a resource here for us, their value to be
measured in terms of how much they answer to and advance human in- .
terests, while denying that the same is true in the case of these
humans-to persist in doing this is neither rationally nor morally
defensible. Rationally, we are inconsistent in judging relevantly
similar cases in dissimilar ways; morally, we are prejudiced because we
draw moral boundaries on the basis of a biased consideration (namely,
species membership), a tragic moral failing in the case of our dealings
with animals that is not unlike other failings, such as racism and sexism, in our dealings with one another. For just as the moral status and
value of a human being does not turn on such biological considerations
as race or sex, so the moral status and value of an individual, whether
human or cetacean, does not turn on the different biological consideration of species membership.
There is an obvious way around these charges of prejudice and inconsistency: give up the belief in our own inherent value. This is an op-

106

D. Jamieson and T. Regan

tion that will tempt some, but few on reflection will give in. And that is
a good thing too. For the moral theory we would be obliged to put in
the place of one that recognizes our independent, nonresource value
will prove to be weak at the joints, unable to stand up under the weight
of sustained, fair, and informed criticism (Regan 1983). So we do well
not to make a shambles of our theoretical understanding of interhuman right and wrong in order to avoid recognizing our prejudice and
inconsistency when it comes to the value of individuals beyond our
species' borders. We do well, that is, to expand our moral vision rather
than to close our eyes to our human fallibilities.
The inherent, nonresource value of a human being is the linchpin of
the idea that individual human beings have basic moral rights, including such rights as the rights to life, to liberty, and to privacy. If
Jack is to show respect for Jill's inherent value, he is obliged to respect
her rights; he must not do anything to her that reduces her status in
the world to that of a mere resource for others. Thus must he not kill
her, for example, so that he, or his children, or the chronically destitute
can have more of what they want or need; nor may he limit her freedom
or invade her privacy just because he or others stand to reap some benefits, whether the benefits be monetary, recreational, or scientific. To
recognize the inherent value and basic moral rights of a human being is
to accept the moral inviolability of the individual. Like "No Trespass"
signs, our basic rights mark off the boundaries of that unique ''moral
space" which, as individuals, we each occupy.
These same signs come into view once we accept the inherent, nonresource value of whales-and, with this, their basic rights. This is not
to say that they do or must have every right a human being has-the
right to vote, for example, or the right to attend the church of their
choice. The basic rights they do have are those they can have. These include the ones mentioned earlier-rights to liberty, to privacy, to life,
and to pursue their own wellbeing or happiness, all violated in a flash,
one might say, when whales are killed for their meat or blubber, their
oil or bone. But are any of these rights violated when, as many aspire
to, we view and treat whales as objects that satisfy and advance our
scientific, recreational, or, in either case, our economic interests? That
is the central question that remains to be considered.

WHALE WRONGS
Let us consider the recreational uses of whales first. One way that
people use whales for recreational purposes is by observing them in
their natural habitat. Each winter in California, for example, thousands of people view the gray whale migration. Whales and other ceta-
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ceans are also kept in captivity so that they can be used for recreational purposes. Aquatic parks like Seaworld and Marineland train
cetaceans to perform tricks for the pleasure of paying customers.
In the previous section we said that if whales have rights then
they must be treated with respect. Their value and dignity does not
rest on their place in our plans, purposes and projects. From this
perspective our exploitation of whales for recreational purposes is not
morally acceptable. They are not nature's toys to be "oohed" and
"aahed" at by humans. They are not human artifacts made by us to
fulfill our intentions. They are creatures of inherent value with lives of
their own and the capacity to lead them in their own ways. To confine
them in aquatic parks and to make them perform tricks that people
find amusing is to try to remake them into our own creations. This attempt to appropriate such marvelous and magnificent creatures for
such trivial purposes, denying them their liberty in the bargain, is
morally to be condemned.
The commercial whale-watching industry-often viewed as the
"benign" substitute for commercial whaling-is similarly unacceptable, though for a different reason. Whales do not exist as visual commodities in an aquatic free market, and the business of taking eager
paying sightseers into their waters, though nonconsumptive, is exploitative nonetheless, morally analogous to making a business of conducting sightseeing tours of human beings who either cannot or do not
give their consent to be exploited by other people in this way. Moreover, just as Grayline Tours of the black ghetto, or the barrio, or· the
gay community would tend to dehumanize and trivialize those whose
very lives were being regarded as objects of curiosity and amusement,
so it is also true in the case of the whales.
The "nonconsumptive uses" of whales for scientific purposes are
extremely diverse. They include observing them in aerial surveys, recording their sounds, taking samples of tissues and fluids, and observing their behavior while held in captivity. Though ''nonconsumptive,''
all too often whales are again directly treated as means to our ends.
They are studied to satisfy our scientific curiosity or to test our scientific theories. Even so apparently harmless an activity as aerial viewing for purposes of population estimates should not completely escape
moral skepticism, if the object is to determine whether a given species
is at risk of extinction. Such studies foster, and are often in the service
of, a false understanding of whales-as if, for example, the death of a
whale matters only when a species is endangered. As with humans, so
also with whales, it is individuals, not species, who have rights. We
must take care not to accept that science that smothers the individual
whale in numbers, graphs, charts, and so on. And we must also free
ourselves from those enterprises that help perpetuate the general view
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that whales exist as one or another kind of resource, to be thought of in
terms of "herds" or "stocks." To the extent that population and migratory studies are cut from this cloth, to that extent, and for that reason, they are wrong (Jamieson and Regan 1982; Regan 1983).
In defense of research on captive cetaceans it will be said that we
overlook the many benefits, both real and potential, that have and will
accrue for the animals themselves as a result of our scientific understanding of them. We have learned something about the maladies of
cetaceans in captivity and as a result of this we are now better able
both to prevent and cure them in the case of those animals now in our
care. Like all benefits, however, the morality of those in question
depends on the means used to secure them. And no benefits are morally to be allowed if they are obtained at the price of violating individual
rights. Because, then, keeping these animals in captivity violates their
rights, the gains obtained for whales and other cetaceans are ill-gotten. To take the rights of an individual whale seriously is to believe
that individual whales no more exist as a source of benefits for other
whales than they do for us.
Two kinds of response might be given to our argument. First, it is
often said by people who work with whales and dolphins that these
animals enjoy their interactions with humans, even those in experimental settings. Just as people like observing whales, so whales enjoy
observing people. If this is correct then perhaps it can be said that in
many cases whales "consent," in some sense, to be the subjects of
benign research and to be entertainers in aquatic parks. If this is true
then such "nonconsumptive uses" do not harm them, or if they do
harm them, they do not violate their rights. It is difficult to know what to
make of this claim. We should remember, however, that similar claims
have often been made about oppressed humans as well as about other
animals. It was said in defense of slavery that blacks enjoyed picking
cotton and being taken care of by the master. It was said in defense of
sexism that women preferred to stay home and do housework, and not
compete in the cutthroat male world. Frequently today we see television commercials depicting happy cows and chickens, more than eager
to lay down their lives for the sake of our palates. Perhaps these claims
about the voluntary cooperation of cetaceans are true, but in the light
of this history we should be highly skeptical. It is extremely doubtful
that we add anything to the quality of cetacean life by our presence,
more than doubtful that our absence would be missed by them.
The second response is that the "nonconsumptive use" of whales
is important, because the whales themselves are the main beneficiaries
of increases in our knowledge. This argument takes two forms.
The first claims that as a matter of realpolitik, whales will be killed
as long as it is economically profitable to do so. If it can be shown that
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"nonconsumptive uses" of whales are economically preferable, then
whaling will cease. There are a number of problems with this argument. First, it presupposes that "consumptive" and "nonconsumptive" uses of whales are mutually exclusive. James E. Scarff has
argued that this is not the case (Scarff 1980). He cites as an example
the fact that the Russians kill various numbers of gray whales every
year in the Artie Ocean, without any apparent effect on the California
whale-watching industry, even though both industries exploit the
same species of whale. This suggests that nonconsumptive uses could
simply add to rather than subtract from our repertoire of cetacean exploitation. But second, realpolitik is, so to speak, a two-edged sword.
Even if it can be shown that whaling is an economically inferior use of
whales relative to "nonconsumptive" uses, that still would not put the
anti-whaling position on a firm foundation, since to accept the argument in this form suggests that whaling should continue if it can be
shown to be the economically optimal use of whales. And while whaling may not be economically optimal now that whale populations are
so low, there is no guarantee that the economic equation won't change
in the future. The basic problem with this argument is, then, that it is
analogous to saying that the reason we ought not to kill derelicts is
because it is not economically efficient to do so. One would have
thought the reason against this has nothing whatever to do with dollars and cents; and this is what we have argued is true of whales as well.
The second form of this argument suggests that the more we learn
about whales the better able we will be to protect them. This argument
undoubtedly has merit. We would not be in a position today to argue
for the rights of whales were it not for the scientific research that has
been done. And if we could be certain that additional benign research
would redound to the benefit of the whales, who could oppose it? But
again, history provides reason for skepticism. Sad though it is to say,
science has been more often used against animals than for them. In the
past we mainly have studied animals in order to make them a better
resource rather than to ensure that they have better lives. By its very
nature scientific knowledge is public information, and scientists are
not in a position to control its uses. Sidney Holt has given one such example in which the results of benign research involving wolves is now
being used against them (Global Conference on Non-Consumptive Utilization of Cetacean Resources 1983). Who can have confidence that this
will not be the case with the whales as well? Even if we are motivated
to do benign research on whales by the desire to improve their lot, we
should be skeptical of our ability to do that. We have learned over and
over again that human intervention in complicated natural systems
often only makes things worse. Trying to be friends of the whales may
only be another way of making us their enemies.
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What we owe the whales is the recognition that they too are the
bearers of moral rights, worthy of our respect. Once we are willing to
accept, as we should, the idea that whales have the right not to be killed
or needlessly harmed, consistency demands that we then acknowledge
that they also have the right not to be exploited for the promotion of
our ends, however "benign" they might appear, whether such exploitation is "consumptive" or "nonconsumptive." Having come as far as
we have in understanding the moral ties that bind humans and whales,
we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not here for us
to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us "to study," or "to
watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is the most difficult because the most hidden and possibly self-sacrificial: It is to let
whales alone, satisfied with the mere knowledge that these "other nations" continue to roam the vast reaches of the oceans in no small
measure because of our principled efforts to save and preserve them.
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